









DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION AS A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 



















Brunel Law School  
Department of Politics, History and Law 
Brunel University London 
 
 






This thesis assesses the role of diplomatic protection (DP) from historical and current 
perspectives. The institution of DP is one of the oldest state rights in international law, and 
examples of its use have been recorded prior to the 18th and 19th centuries. Historically, DP has 
been used by powerful states for the purpose of protecting investors in host countries. However, 
it carries two main conditions for execution, namely establishing nationality and the exhaustion 
of local remedies. Both of these conditions will be evaluated and analysed in the context of 
current international law. Over time, using DP as a dispute settlement mechanism has served to 
politicise investment disputes, and, for this reason, in 1965, the Washington Convention for the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment (ICSID) was established. It came into force in 
1966, and its main purpose was to ‘depoliticise’ investment disputes. Article 27 of the 
Convention explains that DP is not allowed in investor-state disputes, but exceptionally it can be 
exercised for the enforcement of awards. However, it is not clear to what extent it could work as 
a successful instrument for enforcing awards. In addition, the thesis examines the changing role 
of DP over the years to conclude that the ICSID Convention has begun to lose popularity among 
some member countries. Indeed, some Latin American countries have now withdrawn from the 
Convention. A doctrinal analysis will be applied to try to find solutions to the problems faced by 
the ICSID regime.  
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List of Abbreviations  
 
 
AAD    Arbitration Award Default Coverage  
ALBA   Members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America  
ATE    After the event  
BIT    Bilateral Investment Treaties  
BTE    Before the event  
CAFTA   The Central America Free Trade Agreement  
CETA    EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement EU 
European Union  
CIL    Customary International Law 
CSN    South American Community of Nations  
DP Diplomatic Protection 
ECHR  The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
FCN    Friendships, and Commerce and Navigation Treaties 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
FSIA    United States of America’s Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976  
FTSE    Financial Times Stock Exchange 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947 
GSP    The Generalized System of Preferences 
IALS    The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies  
IBRD   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICSID    International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
IIA   International Investment Agreements  
IL    International Law 
ILC DP   Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection International Law Commission, 
ILC RSWIA  The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
ISA   Investor-State Arbitration 
ISDS    Investor State Dispute Settlement   
ITO   International Trade Organization 
LDC    Less developed countries  
MAI    Multilateral agreement on Investment  
MIGA   Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency 
MIT    Multilateral Investment Treaties  
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement OECD Organisation for Economic 




NGO    Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PCIJ    Permanent Court of International Justice  
PRI    Political Risk Insurance  
SADC   Southern African Development Community  
SCC   Stockholm Chamber of Commerce  
SIA    United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 
SOE   State Owned Enterprises  
TFEU    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union   
TTIP    Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership  
TTP    Trans-Pacific Partnership  
UDHR   The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [1948] 
UNASUR   The Union of South American Nations  
UNCITRAL   United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  
UNCRC  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
UNCTAD   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
USA   United States of America 
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 


















Ad hoc An arbitration that is not administered by an arbitral institution. 
 
Arbitration The resolution of a dispute between two or more parties by a third person 
(the arbitrator), who derives powers from an arbitration agreement 
between the parties and whose decision is binding on them.   
 
Arbitration clause A clause in a contract or agreement that requires the parties to resolve 
their disputes through an arbitration process. In the context of investment 
arbitration, this clause may be included in the investor–state agreement; it 
generally provides for broad jurisdiction to submit any investment dispute 
to arbitration. 
 
Arbitrator  An independent person or body officially appointed to settle a dispute. 
 
Award The decision of an arbitral tribunal. An award (or arbitral award) is much 
like the judgment in a court of law. An arbitral award is binding but not 
necessarily final. The parties might be allowed to take further steps to 
interpret, revise, rectify, appeal or nullify the decision.  
 
Bilateral   
Investment  
Treaty (BIT)  This is an agreement that establishes the terms and conditions for private 
investment by nationals and companies of one state within another state. 
Bilateral treaties between two states are intended to promote and protect 
foreign direct investment in host states. 
 
Convention on the  
Settlement of  
Investment Disputes  
between States and  
Nationals  
of other States  This Convention is also known as the Washington Convention. It was 
adopted under the auspices of the World Bank on 18 March 1965 and 
entered into force on 14 October 1966. It established the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 
Customary  
International Law A source of international law. The term refers to international obligations 
that arise from established state practices and customs, rather than 





countries  A term of reference for states that have relatively high per   capita incomes 
and standards of living. Synonyms are ‘rich countries’ and ‘high-income 
countries’. 
 
Developing   
countries     This term is used synonymously with ‘Third World’, ‘less     
developed countries’ and ‘underdeveloped countries’. A similar term is 
‘the global South’. These terms denote states that have relatively low per 
capita incomes and relatively low standards of living. 
 
Diplomacy  The application of intelligence and tact in the conduct of official relations 
between the governments of independent states. More briefly, diplomacy 
refers to the conduct of business between states by peaceful means. 
 
Diplomat A senior official who discusses affairs with another country on behalf of 
his or her own country, usually working as a member of an embassy. 
 
Diplomatic  
Protection  A state is entitled to protect its subjects who are injured by acts contrary to 
international law that are committed by another state.  
 
Diplomatic  
Relations  Diplomatic relations exist between two states that have so agreed. Such 
relations usually involve the establishment in each other’s country of, and 
the conduct of bilateral international relations through, resident diplomatic 
missions. 
 








of awards This term has various meanings, depending on the legal system. It 
generally denotes securing compliance with an award, and if necessary, by 
intervention of the forces of law. 
 
Execution The legal right of the creditor in an award to collect monetary damages 
from the debtor in the award, or to benefit from other remedies granted if 
the debtor refuses to pay the converted award voluntarily.  
 
 




local remedies Local remedies include all effective remedies available to natural or legal 
persons under the domestic law of the state concerned. Local remedies 
must be capable of redressing the situation complained of, whether 
judicial or administrative, ordinary or extraordinary, in the first, second, or 
third instance. They include procedural means and other formal remedies. 
 
Economic  
sanctions   The withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign and 
security purposes. The sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting 
commercial activity with regard to an entire country; or targeted, blocking 
transactions by and with particular businesses, groups or individuals. 
 
Foreign Direct  
Investment (FDI) The process whereby residents of one country (the source country) acquire 
ownership of assets in another country (the host country). This is done to 
control the production, distribution and other activities of a firm in the 
host country.   
 
Gunboat  
Diplomacy The use of military threats by a strong country against a weaker country to 
make the weaker country obey.  
 
Genuine link A state cannot claim that the rules pertaining to the acquisition of 
nationality that it has laid down (by virtue of its internal laws) are entitled 
to recognition by another state, unless it has acted in conformity with the 
general aim of ensuring that the legal bond of nationality accords with the 
individual’s genuine connection or link with the state.   
 
International Centre 
for the Settlement of 
 Investment Disputes  
(ICSID)  This centre was established to provide facilities for the conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between the nationals of two (or more) 
contracting states.  
 
Investor Any natural or legal person who enters into business relations with the 
state. 
 
Investment  Any asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has 
the characteristics of an investment. 
 
Investor–State  
Dispute Settlement Dispute settlement between a state and a private party from another state, 





Legal disputes A dispute is legal if the claim is based on treaties, legislation and other 
sources of law, and if remedies such as restitution or damage are sought.   
 
Least Developed  
Countries  Least developed countries are low-income countries confronting severe 
structural impediments to sustainable development. They are highly 
vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of 
human assets.  
 
Most-Favoured 
Nation     A treatment accorded by the granting state to the beneficiary state or to 
persons or things in a determined relationship with the beneficiary state; 
such treatment is not less favourable than treatment extended by the 
granting state to a third state or to persons or things in the same 





Treaties An international treaty between three or more states for the promotion and 
protection of investments, which provides foreign investment with the 
protection of host states. 
 
 
Nationality A term of art denoting the legal connection between an individual and a 
state. 
 
Nationality of  
companies  According to the traditional rule, the nationality of a company refers to the 
state under whose laws the company is incorporated and in whose territory 
the company has its registered office. In some cases, nationality of the 
companies could be decided according to whether it has seat of 




New York  
Convention 1958 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards is also known as the New York Convention. It was adopted by a 
United Nations diplomatic conference on 10 June 1958 and entered into 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1. Introduction	
	
In globalised world, international economic trade and investment relationships between states are 
fundamental for the growth of countries. Over the last few decades, the process of globalisation, 
together with vast improvements in transport and technology, has worked to link states and 
citizens all over the world. This has helped the growth of economic and trade relations between 
states. Furthermore, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), international companies, and individual 
investors have been given increased opportunities to make decisions about whether to invest in 
foreign states. This process has created competition between host countries. Nowadays, almost 
every developed and developing country strives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Indeed, there are many reasons why host states compete to receive FDI, and these reasons 
include opportunities to create new jobs, which directly or indirectly impact the local economy, 
bringing new opportunities for education, technology and culture.  
 
Historically, the protection of investors in foreign countries was the direct responsibility of the 
home state of the investor, and this role was part of foreign policy. Home states would usually 
espouse the claims of their nationals and try to settle disputes with host states in a diplomatic 
way. Previous research tells us that this type of protection became known as diplomatic 
protection (DP). A recent definition of DP is as follows: ‘a concept of customary IL whereby a 
State espouses the claims of its nationals against another State and pursues it in its own name.’1 
Over the years, DP has been widely exercised by powerful states in order to protect the 
properties owned by its nationals in host countries. When necessary, forceful mechanisms, such 
as ‘gunboat diplomacy’, have been used against a host state, and, at one time, this approach was 
viewed as a legitimate and legal dispute settlement method. However this kind of approach 
served to create a political atmosphere, which ended up transforming investor-state disputes into 
state-state conflicts. Nowadays, using any kind of forceful tool against another sovereign state is 
not legal, and this is clearly indicated Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  
 
The popularity of DP reached its height in the 18th and 19th centuries. This was because, in these 
times, states were regarded as the sole subjects of public international law (IL). Thus, neither 
																																																						




corporations nor individual investors had any legal rights to bring a claim against a state for 
violating international rules.2 Therefore, conflicts between foreign individuals and host states 
were politicised. Over time, this approach began to harm investment relations between states, 
and it impacted on other areas of foreign affairs.  
  
In context of DP, in order for the home state of the investor to formally espouse an investor’s 
claim, certain conditions need to be met. The most important prerequisite for DP is that the 
investor must be a genuine national citizen of the protecting state. Here, the word ‘genuine’ is 
very important for two reasons: firstly, investors might possess or claim more than one 
nationality, and this serves to complicate the situation in respect of which state espouses a claim; 
secondly, investors might switch to another citizenship with the purpose of obtaining DP. For 
these reasons, ‘nationality’ problems need to be resolved by a tribunal, which will check the real 
and effective nationality of the investors, as happened in the Nottebohm case.3 If issues arise 
concerning the nationality of shareholders, this poses even more complications. This happened in 
the well-known Barcelona Traction case.4  In this case, the Spanish Government caused the 
bankruptcy of a Canadian company whose shares were partly owned by Belgian citizens. 
Belgium espoused the claim of the Belgian shareholders who were seeking compensation for 
actions taken by the Spanish Government in contravention of IL. Spain objected to the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction, partly on the grounds that Belgium had no standing. The ICJ agreed, and dismissed 
the case, holding that as the general rule of international law, only a national of the state of a 
company is permitted to sue. Lastly, previous ICJ tribunals have needed to assess the ‘real and 
effective’ nationality of individuals, but modern legal articles, specifically the 2006 International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, allow claims from individuals 
who are lawfully resident in a country.5  
 
Second pre-requisite is the exercise of the exhaustion of local remedies rule. This is another 
essential requirement for DP. If local remedies have not been exhausted, then the home state of 
the investor cannot espouse its national’s claim. The individual must ask to settle the dispute in 
																																																						
2 Leonie Timmers, ‘The Protection against Expropriations in Venezuela: A Right to Property in Theory’ in Freya 
Baetens (eds) Investment Law within International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 138. 
3 The Affaire Nottebohm Case (Leichtenstein v Guatemala) ICJ (1955).  
4 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belguim v. Spain) ICJ (1962). 




the local courts, before initiating DP against the host state. This means that using DP faces 
challenges in the international arena, and even after meeting all requirements, the investor’s 
claim might still not be accepted by the home state. Furthermore, even if the home state of the 
individual has espoused a claim, in DP, the investor will not have any control over the dispute, 
and they must wait for a conclusion to the disagreement. Therefore, to solve only one investment 
problem, investors are expected to meet different conditions, and even then, they do not know if 
their home state will accept claims against another state. In some circumstances, the home state 
of the investor might not to wish to instigate conflict with another host state. These kinds of 
requirements for settling investment disputes create other problems, and this situation does not 
motivate investors to use DP as a dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Nowadays, international officials understand that DP cannot be used as a primary investor-state 
dispute mechanism, and that, in the contemporary world, there is a need for other institutions that 
will move investment disputes away from the political arena, or, in other words, ‘de-politicise’ 
investment disagreements. With this in mind, in 1965, under the supervision of the World Bank, 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established. As 
officially stated on the web page of the World Bank, ICSID is one of the five organisations of the 
World Bank group, and its purpose is to guide investor-state disputes towards resolution. The 
Convention came into force in 1966, and since then investment disputes between investors and 
host states have been supervised by the ICSID Secretariat.  
 
The ICSID Secretariat registers disputes arising directly out of ‘investment’.6  Therefore, other 
political or commercial conflicts cannot be registered with the Secretariat. The purpose of the 
ICSID is outlined in the preamble of the Convention, which explains that there is a need for 
international co-operation for economic development, and, in this process, the role of the private 
international investor should be considered.7 After ratification of the ICSID Convention, an 
investor of the home state is permitted to sue the host state using a third party tribunal, without 
the involvement of their home state. This means that the ICSID Convention is unique among 
legal conventions, in that individuals are given expansive rights in international law; in no other 
																																																						
6 Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention (1965). 




sphere of international law have private actors been given such privileges.8 In Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) the host and the home state can opt to use ICSID as the investment 
dispute centre.  
 
Since its inception, ICSID has become a popular means for resolving investor-state disputes. 
Indeed, up to 31st December 2018, more than 706 Cases have been registered under the ICSID 
Convention and its Additional Facility Rules.9 The Additional Facility Rules are available for 
those disputes where one party is not ratified by the ICSID Convention. All of these disputes 
were settled with the support of the ICSID Centre. Indeed, the ICSID works successfully, and it 
would not have been possible to have resolved this large number of disputes using DP or state-
state methods. After interviewing eleven arbitrators, Tucker came to the conclusion that, ‘BITs 
substituted DP and without BITs gunboat diplomacy and war would proliferate.’10 
 
It is worth mentioning that ICSID was not intended to be a substitute for, or to take the place of 
DP. Both institutions work in different ways as a dispute settlement mechanism in investment 
arbitration, and this is why, to a certain extent, investment arbitration is still struggling to define 
its identity.11 The rules of ‘nationality’ and the exhaustion of local remedies still survive within 
the articles of the ICSID Convention, and this confirms that there is still a link between DP and 




This thesis will explain the role of DP in investment arbitration. On the one hand, the ICSID 
does not allow the use of DP (Article 27), but Article 27 (1) allows DP only if the losing party 
fails to comply with an award. This research proposes a comprehensive approach to the issues, 
and seeks to understand under which circumstances DP should be exercised against host states. It 
has been claimed that ICSID has ‘depoliticised’ investment arbitration, but in practice states still 
use diplomacy as investment dispute settlement mechanism, even though the ICSID Convention 
																																																						
8 Beth A Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment’ (2014) 66 (1) World Politics 42. 
9 ICSID Caseload-Statistics (Issue 2019-1) (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 2018) 7. 
10 Todd N Tucker, Judge Knot: Politics and Development in International Investment Law (Anthem Press 2018) 80. 
11 Gustavo Laborde, ‘The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration’ (2010) I (1) Journal of International 




and BITs exist. For instance, when the Bolivian Government nationalised its country’s biggest 
energy provider, Empresa Electrica Guaracachi, the UK Company Rurelec indirectly owned a 
50.01% of stake of the company. Therefore, Rurelec took the Bolivian Government to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and requested compensation of $100 million. At 
the same time, the UK Embassy in Bolivia protected its own companies in the host country, and 
lobbied against the Bolivian Government. Officials from the UK Embassy in Bolivia made an 
official statement as follows, ‘Our regular high-level lobbying on behalf of Rurelec has helped to 
demonstrate the seriousness with which we take protection of our companies’ interests.’12  
 
In another case, the former UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, personally intervened against 
the Indian Government on behalf of two British companies, Cairn Energy and Vodafone. The ex-
prime minister of the UK concerned that the deal between Cairn Energy and its Indian subsidiary 
Vedanta Resources were not apporved by the government authorities for more than seven 
months.13 In addition, Mr Cameron was involved in the matter of $2 billion tax demanded by 
Vodafone, and unpaid bills of more than £20 million of owing to Britsh companies that worked 
at the Commonwealth Games staged in Delhi.14  
In the context of this thesis, it is important to understand why home states feel the need to 
intervene on behalf of investors, in an era of BITs and investment arbitration. This research will 
try to simplify under which circumstances the involvement of the home state is necessary and 
acceptable. Moreover, although it has been claimed that the ICSID Convention has 
‘depoliticised’ investment arbitration, the above examples reveal that politics continue to lobby 
to try to protect investors in host countries. So far, states such as the Republics of Bolivia and the 
Republic of Ecuador which have denounced the ICSID Convention, have done so for political 
but not legal reasons.  
1.3.	Research	Questions		
 
Under modern International Law (IL), it is difficult to argue that all the investor-States disputes 
																																																						
12 Claire Provost and Matt Kennard, ‘The Obscure Legal System that Lets Corporations Sue Countries’ 10 June 
2015, The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-
sue-states-ttip-icsid/ accessed October 2018. 
13 Rowena Mason and Dean Nelson, ‘David Cameron Intervenes for Cairn and Vodafone in India’ 19 February 
2011, The Telegraph https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/8334832/David-Cameron-





may be settled under a single institution or settlement mechanism. According to one research15 it 
is argued that only one out of two international agreements have dispute resolution provisions. 
The remaining agreements also need settlement mechanisms, and DP fulfill this function.  
This thesis aims to understand the role of DP in modern investment arbitration. Moreover, for the 
research its important to identify the position of DP as a dispute settlement mechanism in 
investor-State disputes. It will try to discover whether all types of investment disputes have been 
‘depoliticised’, and whether or not home state involvement is needed at any time during the 
arbitration process. As part of these aims, the thesis will attempt to answer these questions:  
 
1- Why Investor-State Arbitration was created?  
2- Was the ICSID Convention successful for resolving investor–state disputes?  
3- Do investors need home-state protection in the era of the ICSID Convention? 
4- Does diplomatic protection plays a powerful role in investment arbitration? Or do home 
states have a right to espouse their nationals’ claims in investor–state disputes? 





For this research, a doctrinal methodology was applied. The doctrinal methodology has been 
dominant in the realm of research for several centuries. From the Middle Ages until the 17th 
century, legal doctrine was considered and used as an argumentative discipline to determine what 
kind of arguments were acceptable for specific cases.16  
The doctrinal method lies at the basis of common law and is the core legal research 
method.17 With the popularity of common law, doctrinal research methodology became the 
dominant research mechanism in the legal sphere. In the 19th and 20th centuries, law as a subject 
started to be studied at universities, especially in the UK, where the doctrinal method was 
																																																						
15 Barbara Koremenos, 'If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half 
Needs Explaining', Journal of Legal Studies (2007), 36 (1) 189-212. 
16 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van Hoecke (eds) 
‘Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) 5. 
17 Terry Hunchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ Deakin 




applied as a research instrument for legal studies.18 In the 19th century, learned writings or 
‘doctrine’ were the fundamental sources of law.19   
The doctrinal methodology focuses entirely on library-based research.20 It comprises two 
main processes that can be outlined as follows.21 First, the sources of law are located. This helps 
the student to understand historical aspects of the law, discover where legal doctrines originated, 
and learn how law was applied in the past. Historically, international dispute resolution law was 
governed by states; previously, the institution of diplomatic protection (DP) mainly worked 
properly.  
The protection of foreign investors evolved over time in various steps. For investors in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, one of main dispute settlement mechanisms was DP. However, this 
mechanism was accessible for only a few states’ investors. At that time, the biggest issues 
confronting investors were how to deal with the direct actions of governments in the acquisition 
and nationalisation of assets, and finding equitable judicial and executive protection in foreign 
territories. Chapter Two of this study analyses the historical aspects of DP and its development.  
 
The second process of doctrinal methodology involves interpreting and analysing texts. 
Today, the most important sources of international law are customary law, treaties, and the 
general principles of law. For this thesis, analysis was focused primarily on the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on DP (2006) and Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). Additional instruments for the analysis were the ICSID 
Convention, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and International Investment Treaties (IIAs) 
between states. The ICSID Convention provides a legal framework for international investor–
state dispute resolution and is one of the most important treaties used in such disputes. However, 
an examination of BITs signed between states reveals that specific terms and definitions have not 
been sufficiently dealt with in the relevant Conventions. For instance, the ICSID Convention 
																																																						
18 Amrit Kharel, ‘Doctrinal Legal Research’, 2018, Juris Nepal Law Associates, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130525, last accessed 17th of May 2019. 
19 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal research: researching the jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research 
Methods in Law, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2013) 10. 
20 Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and Socio-Legal Methods of Research: Merits and 
Demerits’, 2012, Vol.2 (7), Educational Research Journal, 252-256. 
21 Terry Hunchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’, 2012, 




does not define ‘nationality’, but states have proceeded to define the terms of ‘nationality’ in 
various BITs. These sources were classed as primary sources for this research.  
Secondary sources examined and referred to in this research include books, academic 
journals, cases, and previous studies. The Brunel University, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
(IALS), and Queen Mary University of London libraries were used during this research. 
As mentioned, the methodology was doctrinal legal research. This approach can be 
uniquely utilised by every legal researcher or lawyer because it identifies, analyses and 
synthesises the content of the law.22 This methodology employs readings and analysis of the 
primary sources of legal doctrines and its aim is to achieve more than description of the law. 
Hutchinson and Duncan claimed in the past, this non-articulation was not a problem, whereas 
currently ‘the research is being directed, read and more importantly “judged” by those outside a 
narrow legally trained discipline, [so] articulation of method is vital – especially if funding is tied 
to quality, and quality depends on methodological clarity.’23  
However, there are some criticisms regarding the doctrinal method. The method has been 
criticised as being too theoretical, descriptive, technical and uncritical. It has also been described 
as not taking the context of the law sufficiently into account. Further criticisms are that it lacks a 
clear methodology and legal practice; it does not offer an adequate framework for addressing 
issues that arise; and it does not consider social, political, economic frameworks or its contexts.24  
It is known that law cannot be isolated from society; the law should be real and 
practicable for everyday life. However, legal doctrine does not study law as it is. It is limiting its 
‘empirical data’ to legal texts and court decisions whereas other disciplines learn legal reality, 
law as it is.25 In addition, because of the above-mentioned criticisms, lawyers need more than 
doctrinal and library-based research skills to make their research practical and relevant at an 




22 Hutchinson (n 19) 9. 
23 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 21) 83-119. 
24 See Mark Van Hoecke (n 17) 3;  Kumar Singhal and Malik (n.20) 252-256. 
25 Mark Van Hoecke (n 17) 2. 






The first chapter of this thesis presents an introduction to the research, and deals with the 
following aspects: the scope of the research, the significance of the research, the research 
problems, and the research methodology used. This chapter also outlines details the organisation 
of the thesis. 
Chapter Two explores the development of diplomatic protection in relation to 
international investments by tracing historical developments in protecting foreign investors. This 
is done using various case studies, and by examining the findings of international law jurists. The 
chapter also gives a brief introduction to evolutionary changes of the diplomatic protection from 
Calvo Doctrine (1868) to Hull Rule (1938) and other foundations of ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection (2006). Furthermore, the chapter investigates the scope of state 
responsibility towards international investors. Thereafter, early developments are traced by 
presenting the insights of various writers, including Emmerich Vattel (The Law of Nations, 
1758), with special reference being made to the issue of the nationalisation of international 
investments. Part of this chapter also focus on the international legal framework which defines 
the scope of international legal instruments, such as the Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States (1933).  
Unlike other works on the same topic, in Chapter Two this work presents a unique 
adumbrated course of development. The discussion refers to various concepts related to 
diplomatic immunity, using the Calvo Doctrine (1868) and the Hull Formula (1938) as points of 
reference. Moreover, among the various international legal documents examined include the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (1962), the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), the ICSID Convention (1966), and various 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). A significant contribution in this chapter concerns 
highlighting the role of modern international instruments for resolving disputes relating to 
international investments, such as the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and ICSID. The chapter concludes by 
explaining the significance of international trade and relevant state responsibility towards it. The 




international investment disputes. Moreover, the chapter concludes that diplomatic protection 
still remains an effective tool for protecting international investments. 
Chapter Three focuses on analysing the domain and scope of diplomatic protection as it is 
used as a tool for protecting foreign investors. Invoking diplomatic protection requires the 
fulfillment of certain conditions, and establishing the nationality of the investor is one of the 
most significant factors among these conditions. This chapter will examine the legal discourse 
for defining nationality, with special reference to the nationality of the individual, the nationality 
of the company, rights of the refugees, and other entities formed through an award of sovereign 
charter. A brief discussion on the modes of acquiring nationality will also be presented, with 
special focus on states, keeping in mind their role in protecting international investments. 
Diplomatic protection of stateless persons and refugees is also examined, as it is relevant to the 
point of discussion, with emphasis placed on Article 25 (2) of ICSID. This chapter examines 
modes of defining the nationalities of states, the nationality of natural persons, the nationality of 
juridical persons, and the significance of nationality in relation to diplomatic protection for 
foreign investments.  
The last part of this chapter focuses on the rights of shareholders in a company. The 
protection of shareholders with foreign investments is a complex issue, which has now been 
elaborated using the ICSID framework. A thorough discussion will be presented of the protection 
of the rights of shareholders in companies working in foreign territories. Based on the analysis 
presented in previous chapters, this chapter will continue the critical analysis of the conditions 
for invoking diplomatic protection of foreign investments. This chapter mainly presents a textual 
and contextual analysis of Article 27 of the ICSID Convention, and reveals that invoking 
diplomatic protection to protect foreign investments remains an exceptional remedy, which is 
only applied after the fulfilment of certain conditions. This chapter also connects to next chapter 
which presents an analytical study of the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule.  
Chapter Four analyses shifts in the global attitude towards the ‘exhaustion of local 
remedies’ rule as a condition for invoking diplomatic protection for international investments. A 
foreign investor needs to prove that local remedies have not been effective, on account of the 
reluctance of the contracting state, or that the remedies made available were not adequate. In 
these cases, where there is an inability of the host state to provide remedies, or where remedies 




international jurisdiction. The chapter places special focus on Article 44 (b) of the ILC Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), and explains 
that a state’s responsibility is not invoked where the exhaustion of local remedies rule is 
applicable, and where there is an effective local remedy that the claimant has not exhausted. 
Moreover, Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides parties with an option for international 
arbitration with consent. A detailed discussion on the exhaustion of local remedies rule will be 
presented, keeping in mind the various BITs and multilateral agreements signed by states, such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,1994).  
This chapter finds that the modern international legal interface for resolving international 
investor disputes calls for mutual agreement to international methods of settlement. Recent 
decades have seen the rise of an ‘internationalised’ investment regime  which has been protected 
by international forums that are organised by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, (UNCTAD, 1964) or by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1961). Chapter Four concludes that a lengthy process of local remedies 
may jeopardise the interests of foreign investors, which can affect the growth of international 
trade and globalisation. One solution for this issue has been to adopt a flexible interpretation of 
the condition of the ‘exhaustion local remedies’ rule. 
Chapter Five focuses on identifying the concept of DP and analyses the characteristics 
and distinguishing features of the ICSID. This chapter also looks at examining the political 
aspects of investment arbitration for both developing countries and developed countries. 
Chapter Six aims to examine the judicial and non-judicial resolution systems available to 
resolve international investment disputes arising between investors and states. International 
investment arbitration is one of the most effective methods for the resolution of international 
investments disputes, but some legal challenges have still arisen in relation to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. This chapter focuses on analysing practical solutions that can provide effective 
enforcement, and which can increase an investor’s access to justice. 
Chapter Seven presents a summary and conclusion, with recommendations provided in 
respect of the knowledge standards of international law. This chapter looks at what changes are 
needed to the ICSID Convention in order to help prevent the withdrawal of various countries 
from the Convention. This approach might help maintain the survival of the institution as the 








This chapter explores the international responsibility of states towards protecting foreign 
investors, by critically analysing historical developments and the development of international 
consensus. The protection of foreign investors has evolved over time in various steps. Perhaps 
the biggest issues to confront investors have been how to deal with the direct actions of 
governments in the acquisition and nationalisation of assets, and finding equitable judicial and 
executive protection in foreign territories. This thesis will begin by outlining the evolutionary 
development of state responsibility towards international investors. 
The protection of investors in foreign territories has been a continuing source of conflict 
throughout history; the issue first became apparent in classical times. Before international 
agreements such as the ICSID Convention or BITs states under the classical international 
treatment of investors, states included the extra-territorial application of national laws, the rule of 
reciprocity, and restrictive systems for the treatment of aliens under national laws. However, they 
lacked adequate protection of property and equitable interests. In the 18th century, Emmerich 
Vattel in The Law of Nations (1758) argued for state responsibilities towards protecting foreign 
investors. He advocated rights against the arbitrary acquisition of the property of foreign 
investors through nationalisation or other unilateral acts of certain states. The Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) was a significant development in defining 
the various elements that make up a state, including a permanent population, a defined territory, 
a sovereign government, and, most significantly, the capacity to enter into international 
agreements. This Convention was a departure from the narrow interpretation of the state as an 
entity capable of protecting its nationals and its territory from foreign invasions.  
A broad interpretation of state responsibility towards the protection of foreign investors further 
evolved with the following legislations: the Calvo Doctrine (1868); the Hull Formula (1938); the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (XVII) on the Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources (1962); the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the 




and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The aforementioned international legal instruments 
focus on avoiding the unilateral and arbitrary actions of states against foreign investors in order 
to protect the international trade regime. Moreover, these international developments also cover 
the use of diplomacy to resolve ‘unjust’ trade practices. Indeed, the international legal regime has 
always worked to find a balance between the protection of foreign investments and a state’s right 
to regulate international investments. Transitional solutions such as the Calvo Doctrine and the 
Hull formula have contributed towards finding balance. Although the Calvo Doctrine did not 
attain significant reputation among the international community, it contributed towards the ILC 
draft conventions and later developments in the shape of the ICSID Convention, the laws of the 
sea, and various treaties during the 1960s. The Hull Formula focused on seeking compensation 
against the arbitrary seizure of property in other states. To illustrate, the Chorzow Factory Case 
is an example where the Judge noted that it is a principle of international law that any breach of 
international obligation must be remedied through adequate reparation. The rule of compensating 
international investors was confirmed in the UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) in 1962. 
Furthermore, following input from the UN, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were 
introduced, which encapsulate the idea of obtaining compensation from a state in cases of the 
inadequate protection of international investments. This thesis will also elaborate on the concept 
state responsibility towards international investment, an idea that can be traced from the ILC 
Draft Harvard Convention (1929), which defines the scope of damage to a person and property. 
This development precluded the adoption of the laws of the sea in 1956 and further treaty laws in 
1966. 
In 2001, the ILC Draft Articles of State Responsibility provided for the protection of 
international investors. The Draft Articles define the scope of the actions of states in prejudicing 
the interests of international investors in violation of international responsibility. Article 4 of the 
Draft Articles obliges member states to act in accordance with international laws and not in an 
arbitrary manner. This development will be explored by presenting various case studies. 
Reference to the ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens (2014) will be made to explore 
the powers a state has for expelling a foreigner from its territory. This study will focus on 
defining the conditions of the declaration of an alien and later expulsion, and it will also explore 




also be examined in relation to expelling foreigners from a state’s territory and the various 
conditions relating to this.  
This thesis will also focus on exploring the diplomatic protection of international investments as 
described in the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
(2006). In this respect, the scope of international responsibility towards protecting international 
investors will be defined, together with state prerogative for protecting nationals, rules regarding 
refugees and the stateless, and, most significantly, the invocation of diplomatic protection and 
the conditions relating to this. The ILC Draft Articles contributed towards the formulation of the 
ICSID Convention. Indeed, this chapter will reflect on the significance of exploiting diplomatic 
protection in relation to international investors’ rights, with special focus on Article 27 of the 
ICSID Convention. This Article calls for limiting a state’s use of diplomatic protection with the 
proviso of triggering it, in cases of the failure of the contracting state in the performance of its 
responsibility towards protecting international investments. 
This chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first part will embark on 
highlighting the need to find a balance between state regulation and the protection of foreign 
investments. The second part will focus on transitional developments that call for an effective 
system of protection for international investors against the arbitrary use of state powers against 
rights of a person and the property of an international investor. The last section will present an 
overview of contemporary international law on the same subject matter. 
2.2.	A	Historical	Assessment	of	the	Protection	of	Aliens:	Diplomatic	Protection	
 
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, provides the 
following: 
 
“The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other States.” 
 
Although, when it was introduced, this Convention did not prove to be popular in all countries of 
the world. However, even if no convention existed to offer such a clear definition, it would not 




autonomous territory, as basic elements, in order to be classed as a state. The history of 
international relations attests that states can survive only if they are able to protect their 
sovereign territory and their citizens. This means that states see it as their duty to protect their 
land, as well as their citizens on both national and foreign territory. Now, as in the past, it is part 
of human nature to travel abroad for different purposes, including tourism, business, education 
and making investments. When citizens from one nation enter a foreign state, they are sometimes 
described as ‘aliens’. In other words, these people are viewed as outsiders.1 The word ‘alien’ is 
derived from the Latin word alius, meaning ‘other’.2 Therefore, an alien is an individual who, 
according to the laws of a given state, is not considered its national.3  
 
In previous centuries, 'alien-others' have been treated differently in different jurisdictions. For 
instance, in Ancient Rome, the alien fell outside the legal system and the judicial organisation of 
the city, that is, they were 'outlawed',4 and were treated as enemies, barbarians or outcasts.5 This 
meant they were usually denied legal capacity and rights.6 However, historically, aliens have 
been able to gain access local tribunals under one of the four principles outlined below: 
 
1. Extra-territoriality. The alien’s own national laws can be used to govern them while the alien 
is abroad.7  
2. Reciprocity. When the rights of the alien depends on corresponding rights granted to citizens 
living in the alien's native country.8 An alien might enjoy these corresponding rights, either 
because these rights are granted diplomatically, or legislated for, or simply offered on the basis 
of reciprocity.9  
																																																						
1 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) 3. 
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Publishers 2001) 1.  
4 Andreas H. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (Leiden 1949) 25. 
5 Newcombe and Paradell (n 1) 3. 
6 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law Volume I (published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, under the direction of Rudolf Bernhardt, 1944) 102. 
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3. The Restrictive System. This is based on rules of equality between nationals and aliens. Even 
though this rule might be proclaimed in theory, aliens might become subject to many important 
exceptions, enough as to render any guarantees meaningless.10  
4. Assimilation or equal treatment. Aliens are granted the same rights as the nationals of the host 
state.11  
 
These four principles have not always been adequate to cover all cases or situations relating to 
diplomatic protection. Under these rules, in some instances, aliens were not able to gain 
membership of any community other than their own.12 Due to this, and other discriminatory 
treatment, many citizens began to feel that they needed better protection from their national 
governments when they travelled or did business abroad. It should be noted that, in previous 
centuries, only the states themselves were subject to international law, not individuals, and 
individuals could not protect their own rights under international law. It was a state’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens from the governments and subjects of other countries. 
Furthermore, historically, countries have not been under any obligation to admit aliens onto their 
territory, but once a foreign citizen entered onto its land, international laws deemed that the host 
state was under an obligation to provide a degree of protection to the foreigner and/or his 
property, in accordance with international minimum standards set for the treatment of aliens.13 
Failure to correspond to these principles might result in breaking international laws that engaged 
the responsibility of the host state.14 This idea was defined for the first time in 1758 by 
Emmerich Vattel as follows: 
 
“Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect that citizen and the 
sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige 
him to make full reparation since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end of the 
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Commentaries on International Law: The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2010) 1051. 
14 Ibid. 





Vattel’s proposition was generally accepted internationally as the foundation of the principle of 
diplomatic protection. His main aim was to rationalise diplomatic protection as an institution, 
and to protect aliens abroad. However, it should be noted that the exercise of diplomatic 
protection can be traced back to the Middle Ages, if not earlier.16 Diplomatic protection is one of 
the oldest rights established in international law.17
 
But, in comparison with other international 
legal mechanisms (such as the laws of the sea or the acquisition of territory), it is comparatively 
young.18
 
There are no recorded examples of the exercise of diplomatic protection prior to the late 
eighteenth/early nineteenth century.19 Even so, before this time, just as with other issues, such as 
economics, industry, and foreign affairs, the protection of citizens and their property had for a 
long time been the subject of government policies. Furthermore, up until recently, an individual’s 
property was, essentially, classed as the property of the nation.20 For instance, between 1820 and 
1914, the British armed forces intervened in Latin America twenty six times in order to enforce 
the claims of British subjects in relation to outrage and injury, or to restore order and protect 
their property.21 During the same period, Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, set out 
British policy on diplomatic protection for bondholders.22 He believed this kind of protection lay 
entirely within the political discretion of the Government, based on 'good policy reasons'.23  
 
The above examples show that the actions of a home state were recognised as lawful when they 
were undertaken to protect its nationals against a host state. Interestingly, during this period, 
jurists universally agreed that it was lawful to use force to protect the lives and property of its 
nationals.24 In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) asserted the following:  
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“It is an elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect its subjects, 
when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another state, from whom they 
have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of 
one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on 
his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its 
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.”25 
 
This mirrors Emmerich Vattel’s view about diplomatic protection. However, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Edwin Bochard published a different take on Vattel’s theory; he argued 
that, in international law, states do not have an automotic right to protect its citizens abroad.26 
However, for Bochard, this was a moral rather than a legal idea, because there were no real 
means of enforcing it.27 Bochard justified his position by arguing that, when citizens enter into a 
contract, they do so voluntarily, taking into account the probabilities and possibilities of 
performance by the foreign government.28
 
Moreover, by going abroad, the investor (citizen) 
implicitly submits to local laws and the local judicial system and, if necessary, the contract or the 
local law should provide a remedy for a breach of contract.29 In a short, it means that when an 
alien takes up residency in a foreign country, and invests capital there, he/she becomes subject to 
the same conditions as that country’s own nationals.30  
 
The above arguments suggest that there should not have been any problems for people when they 
travelled, and any disputes relating to foreigners could be fairly settled in the foreign state’s 
national courts. However, in reality, these circumstances often meant it was difficult for an alien 
to expect an objective settlement in a foreign country, especially in investor-state disputes. 
Diplomatic protection was often misused by powerful states against developing countries. As a 
result, lawyers began to look for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms and organisations 
through which investors could settle their disputes fairly. They arrived at the conclusion that 
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investors should be encouraged to use mediation, negotiation and arbitration to settle their 
disputes. Nowadays, these methods are commonly used by disputants; they are preferred in 
comparison to the diplomatic protection of parties, but, nevertheless, there is still a role for 
diplomatic protection to play in international law. Historically, politicians have taken an active 
role in protecting their nationals at home and abroad, and as a result, certain political viewpoints 
have been accepted as legal theories, and have been named after their proponents, including 
Carlos Calvo (The Calvo Doctrine), Luis María Drago (The Drago Doctrine), and Cordell Hull 
(The Hull Formula). These examples show that the protection of nationals and their interests 
have always been, and continue to be, an important legal consideration in international day-to-




Prior to the 19th century, diplomatic protection was viewed by Latin American states as a 
discriminatory exercise in power rather than as a method of protecting the human rights of its 
nationals.31 This view developed because of the misuse of diplomatic protection by powerful 
states against Latin American states and their nationals. European states gave the impression that 
the legal mechanisms used by Latin American states were inefficient and slow, in comparison to 
their own, and that the court systems used in Latin America were not equal to European legal 
systems in cases where citizens were in need of protection.32 Furthermore, Western states put 
diplomatic pressure on developing states in Latin America, and sometimes intervened militarily 
to assert pressure. Therefore, Latin American states did not feel they possessed full political and 
economic independence. Latin America understood that it was necessary and profitable to attract 
foreign capital and foreigners to work in their territories, but this ambition was meaningless 
unless they could control their own economic, social, and legal procedures. These political 
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circumstances gave rise to a desire to create more logical, moral and secure legal defenses.33 In 
1868 the Argentine diplomat, jurist, and scholar Carlos Calvo announced the following: 
 
“It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same right to protection 
as nationals but they ought not to lay claim to a protection more extended. If they suffer any 
wrong, they ought to count on the government of the country prosecuting the delinquents and 
not claim from the state to which the authors of the violence belongs any pecuniary 
indemnity.”34 
 
Calvo said that foreigners should be treated neither better nor worse than citizens of his 
country.35 His doctrine was based on principles of the equality of nations36 and the independence 
of a nation's territorial jurisdiction.37 It is important to note that proponents of this doctrine do 
not assert strict equality, because it is obvious that foreigners do not always enjoy full equality 
with nationals elsewhere.38 In this vein, foreigners would not be granted full political rights or 
access to all economic activities, but would be subject to restrictions on the kind of property they 
may acquire and activities they undertake.39 Therefore, the core idea underlying the Calvo 
Doctrine is not that aliens should be treated the same as nationals, but rather, aliens should not be 
given better treatment than nationals.40 Calvo asserted that if an investor had a dispute with his 
host country, then the host country's state courts should settle the conflict. Calvo’s twin ideas are, 
for good or ill, his main legacy to international law and international politics.41 
 
Understandably, European states and America did not support Calvo’s doctrine. This was 
because, as capital-exporting countries, they not only invested abroad, but were in a position to 
impose upon, or place political pressure on, developing countries, in order to safeguard their 
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national interests. For instance, in 1873, in the early years of the practice of Calvo’s Doctrine, the 
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lafragua, sent a note to the US Ambassador, Mr Foster, in 
which he referenced Calvo's Doctrine, and affirmed that Mexico was not responsible for the 
harm caused to foreign owners during the civil war.42 The Ambassador replied that Calvo was a 
'young lawyer', whose theories had not been universally accepted.43 This was the first of many 
rejections of Calvo's Doctrine by the United States.44  
 
Nevertheless, Calvo’s views gained support in capital-importing states, especially in Latin 
America and in Asia. These economically dependent countries began incorporating Calvo’s 
views into contracts they entered into with foreign investors. This practice became known as 
using the ‘Calvo Clause’. The main purpose of the Calvo Clause was to accomplish what Latin 
American governments had failed to achieve using other techniques: to limit, or, if possible, 
eliminate diplomatic interposition.45 In addition, the clause required all disputes to be settled 
under national law. The Clause began to be seen not only in state-investor contracts, but also in 
constitutions, national legislation, and international agreements formed by Latin American states. 
For instance, Article 16 of the Constitution of Ecuador states the following:  
 
“The waiving of all rights to diplomatic recourse is implicit in contracts concluded by the 
Government or by public entities with foreign natural or juridical persons. If such contracts are 
made in Ecuadoran territory, they cannot be subjected to a foreign jurisdiction.”46  
 
Similar provisions were introduced into constitutions and national jurisdictions in other 
countries. However, the inclusion of the Calvo Clause in a state's national legal system divided 
the opinion of scholars. Some scholars believed that the Calvo Clause was successful, but others 
viewed it as being totally useless. The main reason for the latter view was because the Calvo 
Clause is half-legal and half-diplomatic in nature.47 This makes the clause unpredictable in 
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practice. Donald Shea,48 an eminent researcher on this theory, and a supporter of the Calvo 
Doctrine explains as follows:  
 
“The Calvo Clause as a technique to implement the Calvo principles has proved to be the most 
successful method of limiting the exercise of diplomatic protection.”49  
 
Conversely, for scholar Denise Manning-Cabrol, in spite of the fact that the Calvo Clause was 
incorporated into constitutions, laws and contracts, she argues that it is an ineffective legal 
instrument, and actually does nothing to prevent the use of diplomatic protection.50 For this 
reason, the United States of America and Latin American States continue to resolve disputes 
through the use of diplomatic intervention.51 Another scholar, Carmen Tiburcio argues that, 
whilst it is true that Calvo is perceived as an opponent of diplomatic protection, an accurate 
examination of his work shows that he only opposes diplomatic protection in cases where 
intervention is unfounded.52 In other words, Calvo criticises intervention only in cases of 
expropriation of private property, and not intervention in all cases.53 In short, Calvo voiced 
criticism of abuses of diplomatic protection in situations where protection was not really needed, 
and therefore, where interventions should not have taken place.54  
 
An exploration of international legal practises confirms that diplomatic protection was exercised 
before, during and after the development of the Calvo Clause. International law affirms that a 
state’s right to diplomatic protection may not be waived, even though an entity or individual may 
waive a personal right to diplomatic protection.55 Furthermore, not only developed states 
exercise diplomatic protection. In recent years, Latin American nations have used diplomatic 
protection but have euphemistically termed this as ‘good offices’.56 Given these different 
arguments, it is necessary to ask whether the ideas of Calvo are dead, or still alive?57 This 
question can be answered by exploring the views of different scholars. Donald Shea argues that 
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the future of the Calvo Clause depends on developments in inter-American diplomacy and 
international jurisprudence, which, in turn, depend on the degree of integration and 
harmonisation of the world community.58 Academic Wenhua Shan suggests that the Calvo 
Doctrine has been significantly changed or generally ‘deactivated’ but is not yet completely 
dead.59 Shan argues that when political and economic climates are ‘right’, the Calvo Clause 
could be re-activated and ‘resurge’, and this seems to be happening.60 These arguments support 
the view that Calvo’s ideas are still alive, but it is impossible to predict how long the doctrine 




Investing in a foreign country is an activity undertaken at the investors’ own risk. This is because 
investors are faced with the danger that the home state might either, nationalise, expropriate, or 
confiscate their investments. These three terms are often viewed as meaning the same thing. 
However, from a legal perspective, they are different. Confiscation means that a state deprives a 
person, in real or juristic terms, of their property, whether or not this is done in punishment.61 
Nationalisation occurs when a state starts a new policy that affects property, or when a state 
decides it must act to protect public security or public interests, and, therefore, it takes control of 
or exploits certain resources and goods.62 Expropriation involves the state depriving someone of 
their property, but, in contrast to confiscation, expropriation does not have any penal 
connotations.63 These actions put investors at serious risk. Prior to 1917, expropriation had 
international ramifications. Methods used for settling disputes between an expropriating country 
and an expropriated one, included arbitration, diplomatic intervention, and governmental 
pressure.64 This was of particular relevance during the Russian Revolution in 1917, and 
continued to be relevant with the Mexican nationalisations of the 1930s. Doman argues that these 
two events gave rise to the first series of impersonal expropriations on a large scale.65 
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It would be less risky for investors if they could get ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ 
compensation from home states. Achieving these outcomes is one possible solution for investors, 
which would avoid or, at least, minimise the risks of being subjected to expropriation by host 
states. The terms ‘prompt’, ‘adequate’ and ‘effective’ have different meanings but all can used to 
support investors. For instance, the term ‘prompt’ requires paying compensation without 
unreasonable delay; ‘adequate’ means that investors should receive the equivalent to the fair 
market value of the expropriated property (as valued immediately before it was expropriated); 
whilst ‘effective’ means that payment must be made in a freely transferable currency.66 These 
terms were used as a basis for the development of The Hull Formula, which was first used by 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, at the time of the Mexican expropriations. 67   
 
The development of The Hull Formula began with a letter from Secretary Hull to the Mexican 
Ambassador in Washington on the 21st of July 1938, about the payment of compensation to 
American nationals for agrarian and oil properties that had been taken over by the Government 
of Mexico.68 Secretary Hull wrote the following: 
 
“[…] The American owners, whose properties have been taken, are left not only without 
present payment but also without assurance that payment will be made within any foreseeable 
time...” 
 
The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. It is confiscation. 
Governments would be free to take property far beyond their ability or willingness to pay and 
the owners thereof would be without recourse. We cannot question the right of a foreign 
government to treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of 
domestic concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government may take the property of 
American nationals in disregard of the rule of compensation under international law. Nor can 
we admit that any government unilaterally and through its municipal legislation can, as in this 
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instant case, nullify this universally accepted principle of international law based as it is on 
reason, equity and justice.”69 
 
The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs responded to this letter on the 3rd of August 1938, 
stating the following:  
 
“There is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, 
which makes obligatory, the payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred 
compensation, for expropriations of a general and impersonal character like those, which 
Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the land.”70 
 
However, at the end of the letter, the Mexican official admits that, in obedience to Mexico’s 
laws, they were indeed under an obligation to indemnify to American nationals in an adequate 
manner, but they stressed that the manner of such payments must be determined by their own 
laws.71 On the 13th April 1940, Secretary Hull wrote a note back to the Mexican Ambassador in 
Washington, stating the following: 
 
“The Government of the United States readily recognises the right of a sovereign state to 
expropriate property for public purposes. […] The right to expropriate property is coupled with 
and conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation. The 
legality of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon the observance of this requirement.”72  
 
These letters reveal that American policy was to protect its investors abroad. For the United 
States of America (USA), expropriation, nationalisation and confiscation can only be legal if the 
investor obtains ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that questions about awarding compensation to the owners of expropriated property 
and abolishing vested rights have been raised for thousands of years.73 These problems did not 
begin at the time of the development of The Hull Formula, but these problems began to be 
addressed using this formula. Using The Hull Formula, the international community came to 
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understand that a person who has assets seized, without explanation, is entitled to recover them, 
or be paid their equivalent.74 If this rule is not respected, then the actions of the expropriating 
state are viewed as being illegal. Moreover, the restitution of possessions is recognised in most 
legal systems, as a matter of justice and fair dealings between persons.75 However, The Hull 
Formula raises critical questions about how to calculate and value the property of investors in 
host countries, in order to give full and appropriate compensation. For capital-importing 
countries, ‘appropriate’ can interpret with regard to relevant circumstances, and awards should 
be given in accordance with the domestic laws of the expropriating state.76 Summing up in the 
Chorzow Factory case, the Judge noted that, “It is a principle of international law that the breach 
of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.”77 
 
After World War II, a number of newly independent states emerged. However, these states began 
to question the legitimacy of The Hull Formula. States started to claim national rights to 
determine how they would treat investors, and the standards of compensation that should apply if 
treatment was deemed sufficiently harmful.78 Furthermore, some states such as Libya, or Iran 
claimed they were tied to long-term contracts to which they were not party, and felt that these 
contracts did not give them economic independence, especially if it was not possible to control 
their own natural resources. On the basis of these arguments, British oil assets were nationalised 
in Iran in 1951, LIAMCO concessions were expropriated in Libya in 1955, and in the 1960s 
sugar interests were nationalised in Cuba. The expropriation, nationalisation and confiscation 
undertaken by these newly independent states put foreign investors at enormous risk. The 
investors thus needed protection from these newly independent states, which were not secure 
places for investment. They needed more legal protection for their capital. Guzman explains, 
“Before decolonisation, the official views of these states were controlled by their colonial 
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masters who supported a regime of full compensation.”79 This meant that, even if investors had 
problems with their host states, these problems were settled by the imperial states.  
 
In order to gain full economic independence, least developed countries (LDCs) started to work 
with the United Nations (UN), but early attempts made in this regard by less industrialised 
countries were not successful. However, in 1962, as part of the General Assembly Resolution 
1803 (XVII), the UN adopted the ‘Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources’, which, for the first time, was broadly supported in the developing and in the 
developed world.80 This resolution required sovereign states to pay ‘appropriate’ compensation 
in the event of expropriation. This resolution was adopted during a time when collective 
resistance to The Hull Formula was on the rise in the UN.81 During the same period, developing 
states began signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with developed states. 
 
Different scholars have interpreted this epoch differently. For example, Guzman suggests this 
period comprises two phases: 1) When developing countries successfully dismantled The Hull 
Formula; and 2) When developed countries responded with treaties that offered each individual 
LDC the opportunity to improve its position in the competition for investment.82 Sornarajah 
argues that if there had been customary international law dealing with investment protection, 
then there would have been no need to confirm, time and time again, what already existed by 
entering into bilateral investment treaties.83 In his opinion, the less-developed states entered into 
treaties in order to clarify the rules that should apply if any disputes arose between them.84 
Furthermore, Dolzer asserts that, under BITs, states do not view The Hull Formula as 
undesirable, but they enter into treaties because some provide developing countries with special 
benefits.85 Finally, it would not be wrong to argue that the main reason why The Hull Formula 
ceased to be popular was because of the appearance of BITs. This argument can be countered by 
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stating that most BITs offer investors even greater protection than The Hull Formula ever did, at 
the expense of the host states.86 In addition, breaches of BITs are violations of international law. 
Also, under BITs, investors can settle their disputes through arbitration, which has an 
enforcement mechanism. These advantages did not accrue to investors under The Hull Formula, 





The International Law Commission (ILC) was founded in 1948, and from its early inception one 
of the first topics it faced dealing with was state responsibility. However, the topic of state 
responsibility was neither addressed by nor put into writing by the ILC straightaway. In 1929, 
the Harvard Research Draft Convention was among the first proposed codifications of the laws 
of state responsibility.87 The Hague Conference followed this in the 1930’s. Both the Harvard 
Draft Convention and the Hague Conference perceived the responsibility of states as being for 
damage done in their territory to the person or property of foreigners.88 However, the Harvard 
Draft Convention was not well received by the ILC.89 This was because it appeared, in some 
respects, to depart from well-established rules of international law.90 Indeed, it did not become 
successful until 2001. Another reason for the hesitant reception of the Harvard Draft was 
because, if there is no international obligation, therefore, there is no international responsibility, 
and this basic principle was not dealt with in the Draft.91 Matine-Daftary argues that the main 
reason why the Draft was unsuccessful was because it was, ‘based on purely European standards 
of justice. These standards did not propose protection of the rights and interests of individuals 
alone, but rather an acceptance of the jurisdictions of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the rights of individual petitions.’92 Indeed, the practices of international law today confirm that 
achieving consensus is not easy task, and ultimately it took decades for states to unanimously 
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accept ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. These periods of unproductiveness in 
relation to addressing the idea of state responsibility did not benefit most states, and, in 1988, 
Allot suggested the following: 
 
“There is reason to believe that the Commission's long and laborious work on state 
responsibility is doing serious long-term damage to international law and international 
society.”93 
 
However, other international agreements were not seen in the same light. For instance, the ILC 
successfully adopted a final draft of the Laws of the Sea in 1956, and the Law of Treaties in 
1966. These examples show that, for states, it was easier to come to an agreement on some topics 
more than others. The main reasons for this might lie in political changes that took place after the 
1960s, and the economic growth of some countries after World War II. Nissel puts forward two 
main reasons for this discontinuity:  
 
1) Changes in the balance of institutional power in world politics affected the ILC.94 In 
particular, a shift in authority between Anglo-America and Latin American countries allowed 
Latin Americans to represent their views in international institutions.95  
 
2) The spirit of decolonisation that pervaded institutional politics at the time precluded any 
substantive consensus on the law of state responsibility.96  
 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the laws of state responsibility and diplomatic protection 
are politically more sensitive in comparison with other legal codifications carried out by the ILC. 
This is because ‘state responsibility’ is viewed as a set of international rules that govern the 
international obligations of states in their relations with other states.97 From a political point of 
view, each state recognises another state’s wrongful action against it. For instance, as mentioned 
earlier, states have, historically, not been obliged to admit aliens into their territories, but once 
they have done so, they are obliged to protect these foreigners, or at least provide them with a 
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minimum standard of treatment. If the host state fails to do this, this may result in an 
internationally wrongful act or omission by the host state.98 This ‘international responsibility’ 
covers new legal relationships under international law.99 In other words, the theory of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens rests on the idea that an individual injury is an injury to the 
home state.100 This means that one state’s international wrongful action does not only impact on 
the alien, but also on the alien’s home state. In the Phosphates in Morocco case, the PCIJ affirms 
this by stating, “International responsibility would be established immediately as between the 
two States.”101 It is probably for this reason that, in the early days of ideas about ‘state 
responsibility’, international lawyers from Latin America and other countries viewed this subject 
as essentially a matter of confining the diplomatic protection of aliens within limits that 
respected the sovereignty of all states.102 Moreover, for some states, the law of state 
responsibility essentially meant the responsibility for injuries to aliens, as well as the diplomatic 
protection of citizens abroad.103  
 
Article 1 of the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles of State Responsibility reads as follows: “...every 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that State.”104 
However, according to Article 2 of the Articles on State Responsibility, it is only under two 
specific conditions that particular conduct can be characterised as constituting an internationally 
wrongful act:  
 
1) The act must be attributable to the state. 
2) It should constitute a breach of that state’s international obligations. For example, in respect 
of investor-state disputes, if an investor has signed a contract with one of the ministries of a 
state or governmental entity, and this contract binds a state, and if the investor’s property is 
expropriated, and the state fails to compensate the investor for the expropriated property, this 
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is a wrongful act on the part of the state. Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the 
host state is responsible for this wrongful act. 105 
 
The state cannot act by itself if it requires persons, groups of peoples, ministries, and 
governmental entities to act on its behalf. This is clarified in Article 4 of the Articles of State 
Responsibility. Article 4 states that the act of any state organ shall be considered an act of that 
state under international law, whether the organ exercises a legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other function, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the state, and whatever its 
character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the state.106 Moreover, 
according to Article 4 (2), an organ of state is any person or entity that acts in accordance with 
the internal law of that state.107 Nowadays, it is not always easy to identify whether a party 
belongs to a certain state or not. This was an issue in the case of Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & 
Co KG v. Republic of Ghana.108 Here, the claimant argued that, according to the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, Cocobod was a state organ. The tribunal considered both 
Ghanaian law and other Articles of State Responsibility, such as Article 5, which reads as 
follows:  
 
“The conduct of a person or entity, which is not an organ of the State under Article 4, but 
which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law.”109 
 
The tribunal also considered Article 8, which states the following: 
 
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.” 110  
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After analysing all relevant laws and after the facts were put forward by both parties, the tribunal 
concluded that Cocobod could by no means be considered an organ of the Ghanaian State, either 
de jure or de facto.111 However, in Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A. v Kingdom of 
Morocco the tribunal came to conclusion that the party was a Moroccan State organ and that, 
under the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the Moroccan State was responsible for 
that company’s wrongful acts. The tribunal ruled the following:  
 
“The Societe Nationale des Autoroutes du Maroc (ADM), incorporated in 1989 as a limited 
liability company, builds, maintains and operates highways and various road-works, in 
accordance with the Concession Agreement concluded with the Minister of Infrastructure and 
Professional & Executive Training, acting on behalf of the State (Kingdom of Morocco).”112 
 
The above examples show that the ICSID tribunals have referenced the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility in some cases. They relied on these Articles as secondary rules, because the 
primary rules had been breached. Riphagen describes this scenario as follows:   
 
“International law as it stands today is not modelled on one system only, but on a variety of 
interrelated subsystems, within each of which the so-called ‘primary rules’ and the so-called 
‘secondary rules’ are closely intertwined—indeed, inseparable.”113 
 
In this respect, the question arises of when and where arbitration tribunals should refer to these 
Draft Articles. Most investment tribunals, especially those dealing with investor-state disputes, 
do refer to the Articles, but without distinguishing attribution.114 At the same time, it is not an 
easy task for tribunals to determine the scope of the Articles. For instance, the tribunal in 
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentina Republic stated the following:   
 
“The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility is a detailed and official study on the subject but it 
contains no rules and regulations of state responsibility vis-à-vis non-state actors. Tribunals are 
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left to determine ‘the ways in which state responsibility may be invoked by non-state entities’ 
from the provisions of the text of the particular treaty under consideration.”115   
 
Some scholars interpret the ILC Articles to mean that only Part One (Articles 1-27) is applicable 
to investor-state relations, whereas the other parts are confined to inter-state relations.116 
Moreover, some argue that Article 55 explains that the ILC Articles do not apply when another 
area of international law is lex specialis: 
 
“These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility 
of a state are governed by special rules of international law.”117  
 
Thus, Article 55 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility stipulates that other articles 
shall only apply until the extent to which internationally wrongful acts or their legal 
consequences have been determined by special rules of international law. This is a deceptively 
simple concept, which is, however, difficult to apply in practise.118 Caron urges arbitrators to 
take more care, and not to imbue the Articles with undue or unquestioned authority.119 Moreover, 
Caron argues that arbitrators need to appreciate that these abstract rules are extremely difficult to 
apply, and that the arbitrators have to take particular care when they are seeking to apply the 
ILC’s law on state responsibility under lex specialis. Crawford and Olleson, who are experts in 
the law of state responsibility, support Caron’s arguments. They believe that the provision for lex 
specialis is potentially applicable in investor-state arbitration, to the extent that individual 
investment protection treaties may contain specific rules that govern discrete questions of state 
responsibility, and which deviate from the general supplemental rules articulated in Articles.120 
In addition, both scholars claim that investment tribunals have cited these Articles in crucial 
instances, and that this has attained positive results, except for in a few cases.121  
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In short, the views of scholars and the tribunals’ comments indicate that the ILC’s work on state 
responsibility will only be effective and successful if it is weighed, interpreted and applied with 
caution. To do this, decision makers must avoid a simple reading of the Articles, and instead 
must consult the commentaries and reports for each Article, which illuminate the practises 
underlying the rules, discussions of the ILC, and the comments of various governments.122 Only 
after doing this will arbitrators’ decisions be more appropriate, and the ILC’s document on state 




In 2014, the ILC adopted its Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens. This was not a new topic, 
and the Draft Articles cover the sovereign rights of states. Historically, the expulsion of aliens 
has been an important and controversial issue in the political life of many nations, and it remains 
so today.123 Throughout history, many different states have expelled aliens from their territories. 
For example, Jews were expelled from England in 1290, Muslims were expelled from Spain in 
1610, and the Huguenots were expelled from France in 1685.  
Originally, the word ‘expulsion’ was used to describe the exercise of state power which secured 
the removal of an alien from the territory of a state, ‘voluntarily’, but under threat of forcible 
removal or through the use of force.124 A similar definition of the term ‘expulsion’ is provided in 
Article 2 (a) of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens. This Article defines ‘expulsion’ as 
a formal act or conduct attributable to a state, by which an alien is compelled to leave the 
territory of that state. However, this does not include extradition to another state, surrender to an 
international criminal court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien to a state.125 This 
definition makes it clear that ‘expulsion’ constitutes a lawful act on the part of a host state, but 
only where it does not conflict with international law. Thus, Article 3 of the Draft Articles 
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provides that states have the right to expel an alien from their territory on condition that the 
expulsion is in accordance with the Draft Articles, without prejudice to any other applicable rules 
of international law, especially human rights law.126 Grotius describes such an act as being, 
“barbarous and contrary to the law of civilized nations.”127 This means that, on the one hand, 
civilised states cannot expel aliens from their territory as they wish, but that, on the other hand, 
the following applies: 
“[T]he right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain 
conditions, in war or in peace, is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and 
independent nation.”128  
This confirms that removing foreigners may be done in certain circumstances, which are clearly 
listed in the Draft Articles. Grounds for expulsion are as follows:  
1) An expulsion decision shall state the grounds on which it is based, and a state may only expel 
an alien on grounds that are provided for by law.  
2) Grounds for expulsion shall be assessed in good faith and reasonably, in the light of all the 
circumstances, taking into account in particular, where relevant, the gravity of the facts, the 
conduct of the alien in question and the current nature of the threat to which the facts give 
rise. 
3) A state shall not expel an alien on grounds that are contrary to its obligations under 
international law.129  
Similar views were expressed in the summing up of the Boffolo case by Ralston (the Umpire), as 
follows: 
“A State possesses a general right of expulsion but expulsion should only be resorted to in 
extreme circumstances and must be accomplished in the manner least injurious to the person 
affected.”130  
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It important to note that, as stated in the Draft Articles, Article 13 of the ICCPR provides that the 
following is permitted:   
“An alien lawfully in the territory of a State party to the present Covenant may be expelled 
there from only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except 
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the 
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the 
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority.”131 
However, there are some limits on the exercise of this right. For example, a state cannot expel a 
foreigner where the expulsion is arbitrary or discriminatory, or where the foreigner would be 
returned to a situation of persecution or torture.132 Moreover, states cannot expel or remove their 
own nationals, as this is prohibited under international law. If they do, they will infringe the 
sovereignty of other states, and will violate the national’s rights of residence in their home 
state.133 Nevertheless, under international law, if a citizen holds more than one nationality, a state 
has full authority to expel that national from their territory, as this is not prohibited under 
international law.134 However, a state cannot denationalise its citizen for the sole purpose of 
expelling that person. Article 8 of the Draft Articles clearly states that, “a State shall not make its 
national an alien, by deprivation of nationality, for the sole purpose of expelling him or her.”135 
In addition, the Draft Articles prohibit states from removing refugees136 or stateless persons137 
from their territories. Furthermore, a state cannot expel an alien from its territory for the purpose 
of confiscating that alien’s assets, as this is prohibited under the Draft Articles.138 If an alien is 
expelled, and his or her assets are held in the territory of the expelling state, then those assets are 
																																																																																																																																																																														
130 United Nations,  Reports of International Arbitral Awards Boffolo Case 1903 of a General Nature (2006) Vol.X, 
United Nations 528. 
131 ICCPR [1966] Article 13. 
132 ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens (2014) Article 24; William T. Worster, 'International Law and the 
Expulsion of Individuals with more than one Nationality' (2009) 14 (2) UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 426. 
133 Ibid 427. 
134 Ibid 500. 
135 ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens [2014] Article 8. 
136 Ibid Article 6 (a). 
137 Ibid Article 7.  




protected by the relevant rules of international law.139 Moreover, it has been argued that an alien 
should be given reasonable opportunity to dispose of his/her property and assets, and is granted 
permission to carry or transfer money and other assets to his/her country of destination. In no 
circumstances should the alien be subject to measures of expropriation, or be forced to part with 
his/her property and/or assets.140 Simply because the protection of assets is such a serious issue 
for both expelling and receiving states, it is addressed in Article 20 of the Draft Articles. This 
Article states the following: 
“The expelling State shall take appropriate measures to protect the property of an alien subject 
to expulsion, and shall, in accordance with the law, allow the alien to dispose freely of his or 
her property, even from abroad.”141 
As can be seen, under Article 20, expelled aliens can freely dispose of their assets from abroad. 
In other words, expulsion of the alien will not affect their assets. However, in some cases, the 
expelling state may, in accordance with its own laws, limit or prohibit the free disposal of certain 
assets, particularly assets that were illegally acquired by the alien in question, or that comprise 
the proceeds of criminal or other unlawful activities.142 According to Article 30, where a state 
expels an alien in violation of the Draft Articles or any other rule of international law, it will 
incur international responsibility for doing so. Simply put, illegal expulsion is prohibited in the 
Draft Articles as well as other international universally accepted norms, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  
In this regard, the first Special Rapporteur of International Responsibility, Garcia Amador, stated 
that, “In cases of arbitrary expulsion, satisfaction has been given in the form of the revocation of 
the expulsion order and the return of the expelled alien.”143 In addition, Article 31 of the Draft 
Articles permits the national state of the alien to exercise diplomatic protection for the purpose of 
defending its citizen against illegal expulsion by the expelling state. In conclusion, it is 
noteworthy that the expulsion of aliens only takes place when a state decides to expel foreign 
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nationals from its territory; each state’s municipal laws or internal government policies may 
differ on this matter. However, the Draft Articles, as approved by the International Law 




Another recent ILC document is the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006). When these 
Articles were drafted, diplomatic protection was still generally perceived as being closely related 
to state responsibility. The first Special Rapporteur, Carcia Amador, included a number of draft 
articles relating to diplomatic protection in his report.144 The ILC decided to work on these 
special inter-linked topics separately. Thus, many of the principles contained in the Articles on 
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts are not repeated in the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection.145 The ILC’s work on diplomatic protection begins by defining the 
principles of diplomatic protection in Article 1 as follows:   
 
“Diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other 
means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an 
internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the 
former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.”146  
 
Interestingly, Article 1 does not provide a complete definition of diplomatic protection, rather, it 
describes the characteristics and features of diplomatic protection. The reason for this might be 
that if Article 1 had provided a precise definition, this would create difficulties in practise in the 
future. Additionally, if the ILC narrowed down or drew a defined scope of diplomatic protection, 
this might result in disagreement between states, which may delay the ILC’s work on diplomatic 
protection. As in the past, according to the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, diplomatic 
protection can only be exercised where certain circumstances are met. Firstly, a person must 
have the nationality of a certain state. This means that, in most cases, only nationals are under the 
protection of their governments. For Rubins and Kinsella, the nationality requirement is the most 
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significant formal pre-requisite for diplomatic espousal.147 This is because without the 
connecting factor of nationality, diplomatic protection cannot normally arise.148 This is made 
clear in Article 3 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection, which says. “The State entitled to 
exercise diplomatic protection is the State of nationality.”149 At the same time, it is important to 
note that the national state is not under a duty to exercise diplomatic protection; in other words, 
international law does not oblige states to exercise diplomatic protection against other countries. 
It is a discretionary action, falling to the national state to exercise if it so wishes. In some 
situations, Article 8 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection permits the exercise of 
diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person who, at the date of injury, and at the date of 
official presentation of the claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that state.150 According to 
Article 8(2), the same rule also applies to refugees, if the refugees are recognised by that state as 
refugees or have documented refugee status.151 Article 8 is one of the most important articles in 
the ILC’s work on diplomatic protection. This is because, if Article 8 did not provide protection 
for millions of stateless persons or refugees, they might be discriminated against in comparison 
to other people who have citizenship, and their human rights might be violated.  
 
The second requirement in relation to diplomatic protection is the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’. 
This requirement originated in Europe in the Middle Ages, before the modern national state was 
born.152 However, it was only in the 19th and 20th centuries that the ‘exhaustion of local 
remedies’ became a firmly established part of the international law of diplomatic protection.153 In 
the Interhandel case, the ICJ recognised this rule as, “a well-established rule of customary 
international law.”154 This same principle is also recognised by Amerasinghe.155 Under this rule, 
an alien must seek reparation for the wrongful acts of the host state under that state’s national 
law. International law thus gives the host state the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong within 
the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international responsibility can be 
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called into question on an international level.156 Only after this has happened can an alien’s 
national state take up the case (of diplomatic protection), or bring it before an international 
tribunal. This principle is clearly stated in Article 14 (1) of the Articles on diplomatic protection 
as follows:  
 
“A State may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a national or other 
person referred to in Draft Article 8 before the injured person has, subject to Draft Article 15, 
exhausted all local remedies.”157  
 
This means that, according to Article 14, the following persons are required to have exhausted all 
local remedies: natural and legal persons; foreign companies that are partly or mainly financed 
by public capital; non-nationals; and, in exceptional circumstances (according to Article 8), 
refugees and stateless persons.158 Moreover, it is important to note that injured aliens (persons) 
are only required to exhaust remedies which may result in a binding decision.159 Article 15 states 
that local remedies are not required to be exhausted in the following circumstances:  
 
1) There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress. 
2) There is an undue delay in the remedial process which is attributable to the state alleged to be 
responsible. 
3) There is no relevant connection between the injured person and host state. 
4) The injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies. 
5) Where the state alleged to be responsible has waived this requirement.160  
 
The ILC’s document on state responsibility states secondary rules which deem that action can 
only be taken when the primary rules have been breached. However, Article 17 of the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection is not applicable in investor-state disputes. Article 17 
clearly states the following:  
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“The present draft articles do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent with the special 
rules of international law, such as treaty provisions, for the protection of investments.”161 
 
The main reason this paragraph was included is because the international legal community 
believe that the dispute settlement procedures provided for in BITs and by the ICSID offer 
greater advantages to the foreign investor than customary international law. They argued that 
BITs and the ICSID offer the following benefits:  
 
1) They give the investor direct access to international arbitration; 
2) They avoid the political uncertainty inherent in the discretionary nature of diplomatic 
protection. 
3) They dispense with conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection.162  
 
It is clear that the Draft Articles on diplomatic protection forbid states from exercising 
diplomatic protection in investor-state disputes. However, in the chapters that follow, examples 
will be cited from bilateral investment and multilateral treaties (such as the ICSID, Article 27), 
under which parties may exercise diplomatic protection under certain conditions. It is important 
to stress that Article 17 refers to “treaty provisions” rather than “treaties”, because treaties, other 
than those specifically designed for the protection of investments, regulate this area of law, and 




In 1975, the scholar Lillich stated the following: 
 
“Hence, pending the establishment of international machinery guaranteeing third-party 
determination of disputes between alien claimants and states, it is in the interest of all 
international lawyers not only to support the doctrine (of diplomatic protection), but to oppose 
vigorously any effort to cripple or destroy it.”164 
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This quotation reveals that Lillich was probably aware that diplomatic protection would remain 
necessary to international law for the foreseeable future. There are several reasons why he might 
have taken this view, but the following course of events might have informed his opinion. Before 
the Second World War, only countries and states were the subjects of international law. The only 
opportunity held by individuals to protect their rights abroad was via the use of diplomatic 
protection. However, after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the situation 
changed and individuals became the subjects of international law. This meant that individuals 
could now enforce their human rights at an international level.165 However, Dugard argues that 
international human rights law does not comprise human rights conventions only. Dugard argues 
that an entire body of conventions and customs, including diplomatic protection, all together 
comprise international human rights law.166 Furthermore, Dugard claims that, whilst the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950) may offer real remedies to millions of 
Europeans, it is difficult to argue that other human rights conventions, such as the American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969) or the African Charter on Human Rights (1981), have 
achieved the same degree of success.167 Moreover, he believes that only a limited number of 
individuals have obtained, or will obtain, satisfactory remedies under these conventions and that 
their remedies are weak.168 For Dugard, diplomatic protection is a customary rule of international 
law, which applies universally, and, as such, it potentially offers a more effective remedy.169  
 
The institution of diplomatic protection as a procedural device has undergone change, by recent 
legislations made in the area of human rights, for example.170 However, it has not disappeared, 
nor have any human rights declarations prohibited diplomatic protection as a dispute settlement 
mechanism. What all this means is that for individuals, diplomatic protection can provide a 
similar protection mechanism system to human rights declarations, because persons can now 
seek to defend themselves against national states. In short, as seen in the arguments above, an 
individual’s rights are better protected by modern international law. Nevertheless, states still 
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“own” international law. For this reason, Amerashinghe believes that diplomatic protection will 
survive as an institution, based on the theory that the state owns rights in international law, and 
not the individual.171 
 
As noted above, under the ICSID Convention, investors are permitted to initiate settlement 
procedures directly against host states, without any intervention by national states. This is 
classed as one of the successes of the Convention. It is believed that the Convention, with its 
prohibition of diplomatic protection, simply de-politicises investor-state disputes. When the 
ICSID Convention was drafted, the exclusion of diplomatic protection was explained in terms of 
the obligation to abide by the agreement to arbitrate, in order to avoid a multiplicity of claims 
and claimants, and to remove disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy into the realm of 
law.172 However, when the Convention was approved, it was on the basis that, under certain 
circumstances, diplomatic protection could not be exercised until the enforcement stage of the 
investor-state procedures was reached.173 In this respect, Article 27 of the Convention states the 
following:  
 
“(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have 
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such 
other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in 
such dispute. 
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include informal 
diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the dispute.”174 
 
Thus, Article 27 (1) of the Convention prohibits the exercise of diplomatic protection by the 
investor’s national state if the parties have consented to arbitration, unless the host state has 
failed to abide by and comply with an award. However, it does not mean that parties to the 
ICSID Convention are automatically prevented from exercising diplomatic protection over 
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investment disputes involving their own nationals vis-à-vis other contracting parties.175 They are 
prevented from doing so only if the parties have consented to or have actually initiated 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention.176 However, it should be noted that ‘consent’ to ICSID 
arbitration by the investor cannot be construed as a valid waiver of diplomatic protection.177 This 
means that, even under the ICSID Convention, diplomatic protection will be revived if the host 
state fails to abide by and comply with the award. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that diplomatic 
protection is not only triggered when the enforcement of an arbitral award is needed. In some 
rare cases, it can be exercised by the home state against a host country for the purpose of 
avoiding future disputes. For example, in 2007, the Italian Government warned that a new South 
African law (regarding the development of natural resources) might breach a bilateral investment 
treaty between Italy and South Africa.178  
 
With the introduction of BITs and the ICSID Conventions, the institution of diplomatic 
protection took a new turn, and new conditions and new rules started to apply. These new routes 
worked to alter the views of scholars. For example, Crawford argued the following:  
 
“One might argue that bilateral investment treaties in some sense institutionalise and reinforce 
(rather than replace) the system of diplomatic protection, and that in accordance with the 
Mavrommatis case formula, the rights concerned are those of the state, not the investor.”179 
 
Furthermore, Juratovich claimed that: 
 
“Investment treaty actions and diplomatic protection will both continue to have a role, even if 
unequal in magnitude and it is, therefore, necessary to continue to grapple with their 
interface.”180  
 
Some scholars believe that settlement by diplomatic means can be swift, less expensive, and less 
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confrontational than direct arbitration, and may be the sole remedy available in the absence of a 
BIT.181 However, other scholars, such as Paulsson, believe that diplomatic protection has, 
“proved itself unworkable as a way of protecting business interests in the context of 
contemporary international economic life.”182 Furthermore, some believe that diplomatic 
protection is a remedy of last resort, and experience demonstrates that it provides results which 
rarely satisfy the investor.183 These views reveal divergent views about the institution of 
diplomatic protection. This research will examine these issues from today’s investor-state dispute 
perspective. This research will attempt to answer questions such as: Do investors still need 
diplomatic protection? And, will diplomatic protection be prohibited in the future? The following 




The legal protection of international investors is important in the development of international 
trade. Historically, international investors have suffered from arbitrary state action against the 
person and property rights. Moreover, some international investors have covered-up malpractice 
by seeking diplomatic protection from powerful states. The evolution of the modern international 
legal framework for the protection of international investments strives for a balance between the 
rights of the individual investor, with state prerogatives for regulating international trade. The 
main focus of these developments is treating the international investor in accordance with both 
national and international laws, where the scope of arbitrariness is limited. This chapter contends 
that the international contemporary framework for the protection of international investors is 
more sophisticated than the unilateral regulation of trade by receiving nations. Moreover, this 
international approach aims to prevent foreign state actors from using other states to protect the 
investments of their nationals. The ICSID Convention and BITs concentrate on drafting 
agreements with special focus on minimising state intervention in trade related issues. All this 
has led to the establishment of free international trade standards, where states remain neutral, and 
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international investors can find remedies using national legal set-ups or international arbitration. 
Subsequent chapters will examine alternative remedies available for the protection of 









This chapter will investigate the domain and scope of the conditions for exercising diplomatic 
protection in order to protect the rights and interests of foreign investors. As concluded in the 
previous chapter, invoking diplomatic protection needs the fulfilment of certain conditions, 
most importantly: nationality, exhausting all available local remedies, and contending that a 
foreign investor has suffered harm on account of the wrongful acts of the host state. This 
chapter will focus on defining and explaining the concept of ‘nationality’ according to the 
various conditions for obtaining diplomatic protection.  
The first part of the chapter will explore the concept of nationality and its various facets, 
specifically relating to the nationality of the individual, the company, refugees, and other 
entities formed through the award of a sovereign charter. The debate about nationality will 
present contemporary opinions of the definition of nationality as a condition for diplomatic 
protection. Moreover, the debate will also cover the differentiation of nationality from 
citizenship. All this will be done using international legal interpretations of nationality as 
shown in various case laws. The debate on nationality will cover various facets of nationality, 
including companies as the nationals of a state and their eligibility to invoke diplomatic 
protection. Reference to the Barcelona Traction case will be made in order to explore how 
the nationality of a corporation is decided on the basis of its incorporation in a particular 
state. The diplomatic protection of stateless persons and refuges is also relevant to this point 
of discussion. Until the Hague Codification Conference of 1930, stateless people did not have 
any legal rights. Later, they attained legal rights for the protection of their foreign 
investments through diplomatic protection. Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection provides cover for stateless persons and refugees.  
The second part of the chapter will examine Article 25 of the ICSID Convention as it defines 
the conditions for jurisdiction over the legal status of the subject matter, the issue to be dealt 
with, and consent: one of the parties must be a contracting state, the case must relate to an 
investment, and both parties must give consent, in writing, to have recourse to the Centre. 
Special focus will be placed on Article 25 (2), which examines how to define a national of 
another state, the nationality of natural persons, the nationality of juridical persons, and 




Convention has transformed the way nationality is defined in terms of investment disputes. 
Although nationality related issues are not directly dealt with by the ICSID, the Convention 
has influenced how nationality is defined in terms of the diplomatic protection of 
international investments. With regard to diplomatic protection, the concept of nationality 
establishes an adequate link between the private party and the state under the responsibility to 
protect.  
The last part of the chapter looks at the rights of shareholders in a company. The protection 
of the shareholders of a company in foreign investment disputes is a complex issue which has 
been elaborated somewhat in the ICSID framework. A thorough discussion will be presented 
about the protection of the rights of shareholders in companies working in foreign territories. 
As mentioned earlier, the chapter will focus on the conditions for invoking diplomatic 
protection in case of harm to foreign investments. The main aim of the chapter will be to 
establish the significance of the nationality of various entities that may be involved in 
investor disputes, such as natural persons, companies, refugees, and shareholders. Based on 
the analysis presented in the previous chapter, this chapter continues the critical analysis of 
the conditions for invoking diplomatic protection in foreign investment cases. Moreover, the 
chapter will act as basis for the next chapter, which will present a detailed examination of the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule.  
3.2.	Conditions	for	Exercising	Diplomatic	Protection	
	
The exercise of diplomatic protection is based on meeting certain conditions. When certain 
conditions are met, diplomatic protection is legally exercisable for national states. This 
chapter will focus on the main conditions that need to be met for the exercise of diplomatic 
protection. First of all, a person must have the nationality of a state. This means, in most 
cases, only nationals are under the protection of their governments. For Rubins and Kinsella, 
this nationality requirement is the most significant formal pre-requisite for diplomatic 
espousal.1 This is because without the connecting factor of nationality, normally there cannot 
be any diplomatic protection.2 Secondly, the right of diplomatic protection can only arise if 
the ‘injured’ person has exhausted all local remedies available in the host state. Lastly, the 
alien (the investor) has to be injured by the host state's wrongful act. 
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People are the most important elements of states. This is because, nationhood does not 
require statehood, but there can be no statehood without a nation, which comprises nationals 
and territorial sovereignty.3 National entities in a certain territory determine the existence of 
states and the formation of nation-state relationships. This relationship is a, ‘historic-
biological’ idea based on the, “subjective corporate sentiment of unity members of a specific 
group” who make up a race or a nation.4 Nowadays, this concept is usually linked to a 
political or legal structure, but this link was not made in the past. Historically, only states 
could be the principal subjects of international law, but under contemporary international 
law, individuals are included also. Interestingly, before the independence of the United States 
of America, and during British colonial times, ‘nationals’ were classed as ‘subjects’.5 
Furthermore, it was only when the medieval system of government was replaced by the 
principles of territorial state sovereignty that the terms ‘subject’ and ‘citizen’ became 
synonymous.6 However, the term ‘nationality’ was still not used at that time. This term is 
fairly new and was used for the first time in the 1835 edition of the Dictionnaire de 
l'Academie Franqaise.7 From the time the expression was first conceived, ‘nationality’ has 
been used as a synonym for ‘citizenship’. This interpretation is based on Greek and Roman 
ideas of citizenship; these legal cultures have provided the foundation for today’s idea of 
‘nationality’, and are directly relevant to current definitions of ‘citizenship’.8 Therefore, 
although ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are different terms, they are often used as synonyms. 
These words are sometimes used to replace each other because both terms identify the legal 
status of an individual in light of his or her state membership.9 In other words, both terms 
emphasise different aspects of the same idea of state membership.10 Indeed, some states such 
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as Italy, do not distinguish between nationality and citizenship.11 Weis explains these 
terminologies as follows:  
 
“Conceptually and linguistically, the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ emphasise two 
different aspects of the same notion. ‘Nationality’ stresses the international, and 
‘citizenship’ the national, municipal.”12  
 
O’Leary describes these two expressions as follows: 
 
“Citizenship confers a number of rights, in particular, the right to participate politically in 
the life of the community. On the other hand, nationality defines membership of a state or 
community to the exclusion of non-members.”13  
 
In short, ‘nationality’ can be defined as a legal relationship between an individual and a state. 
However, nationality can be understood in two ways: as a political-legal term, or as a 
sociological term. As a political-legal definition ‘nationality’ was defined in the legendary 
Nottebohm case in the following words, “it is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the 
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”14 Tiburcio argues that these differences cannot 
always be distinguished, because one concept does not exclude the other.15 The sociological 
definition of ‘nationality’ stresses the role of the individual in the relationship, and it admits 
the existence of the feeling of nationality before the formal creation of the state.16 It is a fact 
that, throughout history, ‘nationalities’ have existed, but sometimes states have not enacted 
any laws to define them. This was the case in China before 1909 and Israel before 1952.17 
Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that if nationalities can exist without legislative 
support, it is plausible that they can exist without state recognition.18 Nevertheless, it is 
commonly accepted that a country’s national laws decide on matters of nationality. In other 
words, each sovereign state has the power to grant and to withdraw nationality according to 
its municipal laws. This was stressed in the Nottebohm (1955) case as follows: 
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“It is for every sovereign state, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the 
acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalisation, granted by its 
own organs in accordance with that legislation.”19  
 
A similar view was expressed in the Polish Nationality Case (1923), where PCIJ emphasised 
that, “generally speaking, it is true that a sovereign state has the right to decide what persons 
shall be regarded as its nationals, it is no less true that this principle is applicable only subject 
to the Treaty obligations.”20 Furthermore, an almost the identical assessment is given in the 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (The Hague 
Convention, 1930). This reads as follows: 
 
“It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be 
recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, 
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to 
nationality.”21 
In addition, a similar statement is presented in Article 3 (1) of the 1997 European Convention 
on Nationality, which states, “Each State shall determine under its own law who are its 
nationals.”22  In addition, Article 2 of The Hague Convention (1930) reads as follows, “Any 
question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be 
determined in accordance with that State.”23  
The above noted articles reveal that countries have established rules or domestic legislation to 
determine who is a national and who is not. However, a state cannot grant or withdraw 
nationality for individuals simply in order to follow its national legislation. This is because 
there is no sole definition of ‘nationality’ in international law. Brownlie (1963) explains that 
scholars such as Gauterpacht, Guggenheim, Redslob, Fitzmaurice, and McNair feel that 
international law does not regulate the question of nationality.24 However, under current 
international law the situation is different. Today, international law controls questions of 
nationality, according to its own requirements and restrictions. For instance, Article 15 (1) of 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that, “Everyone has the right to a 
nationality.”25 Furthermore, Article 7 of The Convention on the Rights of Child reads as 
follows: 
 
“1. [The] child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth 
to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents.  
 
2. State Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their 
national laws and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, 
in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.”26 
 
Van Panhuys affirms that, “restrictions imposed by international law on the competence of 
states to issue nationality rules are, of course, closely connected with the function of 
nationality in substantive law.”27 Moreover, states are under obligation, from a human rights 
perspective, to follow certain rules, including the rule that they cannot force to individuals to 
change or remove their nationalities. This is clearly stated in the Article 15 (2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which reads, “No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”28 These legal 
provisions help to regulate issues of nationality, the status of refugees, and statelessness in 
the world.  
In modern times, countries usually grant nationality using three main criteria as outlined 
below: 
1. Jus Sanguinis (the law of blood). Nationality is granted on the basis of the nationality of 
one or both parents.  
2. Jus Soli (the law of the soil). Nationality is granted by birth on a specific territory. 
3. Jus Domicile (the long residence principle) whereby nationality is granted due to a period 
of residency or by way of naturalisation.  
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In relation to these concepts, Weis remarks that there is no doubt that jus soli and jus 
sanguinis are the predominant modes of the acquisition of nationality.29 However, there are 
some exceptions to these rules in international law, where the state cannot grant nationality to 
an individual. Article 12 of the Hague Convention (1930) states the following:  
“Rules of law which confer nationality by reason of birth on the territory of a State shall not 
apply automatically to children born to persons enjoying diplomatic immunities in the 
country where the birth occurs.”30 
To sum up, the matter of nationality is usually decided by each government’s own national 
policy, but increasingly, nowadays, this matter is becoming controlled more by international 
conventions that guide states in the operation of their national laws under these conventions 
are significant for both the states and for the investors.  
3.4.	Nationality	and	Diplomatic	Protection		
	
In the first part of this chapter, nationality was defined as a legal and political link between 
the state and the individual. In this state-individual relationship, it is not sufficient for the 
individual to consider himself or herself a national of a state, and instead the state in question 
must expressly recognise an individual as a national.31 This requirement is important because 
only according to this kind of state-individual connection can diplomatic protection (DP) be 
exercised. In other words, if rights of protection are given according to the lawful 
administration of the territory, then it might be said that nationality arise from the fact of the 
rights of protection.32 The two ideas are interlinked. In addition, scholars have interpreted the 
exercise of DP differently. For some scholars, the question of ‘nationality’ is of international 
importance.33 Others are interested in the benefits of nationality in respect of the area of 
international law.34  
 
Article 3 of the ILC Articles on DP (2006) explains that, “The State entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection is the State of nationality.”35 However, there are some requirements in 
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relation to this principle that exist in the international legal arena, and the principle is not 
unlimited or unrestricted. Article 2 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Nationality 
(1929) states that, “…under international law the power of a State to confer its own 
nationality is not unlimited.”36 Indeed, limitations are that: a claimant must be a national on 
the date of the injury; they must be national at the date of presentation of the claim; and the 
link of nationality must remain uninterrupted during the intervening period. All three 
conditions must be fulfilled for the exercise of DP.37 Scholars such as Van Panhuys and 
Cutherbert believe that these conditions prevent the abuse of DP in the international arena.38  
 
It is worth mentioning that, under international law, a national state is not under any duty to 
begin DP.39 In the international arena, it is not always easy to exercise DP, especially when 
an individual has a dual nationality. Some main questions to ask in relation to exercising DP 
are: When dual nationality exists, should both countries espouse nationality claims, or should 
only one country espouse a claim? If so, which country should make the claim? This situation 
can create conflict and raise diplomatic issues between states. Probably for this reason, The 
Hague Convention Preamble (1930) clearly states that it is in the general interest of the 
international community for all its members to recognise that every person should have a 
nationality, and should have one nationality only.40  
 
It is not easy for international law to accumulate every sovereign state’s municipal laws 
under one universal legal system. Therefore, it is unrealistic and impractical to have one 
general nationality law. In other words, multiple nationalities will persist as long as sovereign 
nations confer nationality independently, and do not formulate an international system of 
granting nationality.41 This idea is approved in The Hague Convention Preamble (1930), as 
follows: “...considering… under the economic and social conditions, which at present exist in 
the various countries, it is not possible to reach immediately a uniform solution of all the 
above mentioned problems.”42 Until a single and unique system for granting nationality is 
introduced, courts need to focus on how to solve the problems that dual nationality creates.43 
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Courts need to find solutions that are continuous, active, and effective, and that link theories. 
For instance, in the Nottebohm Case, the Court ruled that nationality must be a, “real and 
effective nationality”, and it must correspond with the factual situation.44 Another example 
can be cited from an Iran-United States claims tribunal where the parties held opposite views 
about bringing claims against each other. Under these circumstances the Tribunal in Case No. 
A/18 explains that the determination of a claimant’s dominant and effective nationality 
involves the consideration of, “all relevant factors, including habitual residence, centre of 
interests, family ties, participation in public life, and other evidence of attachment.”45 
Furthermore, Article 5 of the Hague Convention states the following:  
 
“Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had 
only one, either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally 
resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be 
in fact most closely connected.”46  
 
The ILC’s Draft Articles on DP have changed these circumstances. Article 4 defines 
nationality for the purposes of DP, and the Article’s commentary explains that it is not 
required for a state to prove an effective or genuine link between itself and its nationals as a 
factor for exercising DP (along the lines suggested in the Nottebohm Case), even where the 
national possesses only one nationality.47 In the past, the main purpose of these principles 
was to help find a solution for the courts when ruling on multiple nationality problems; these 
principles avoided creating a hypothetical, political or legal relationship between the 
individual and state, but supported continuous, effective, genuine, and active state-individual 
relationships. O’Connell suggests that using the nationality of birth might help solve multiple 
nationality problems, so as to give effect to the nationality used by the individual, and not to 
permit representation by the national’s state against the other state, of which the individual is 
also a national.48 It is an accepted rule in international law that a state may not afford DP to a 
national against a state whose nationality such a person also possess.49  
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Another principle that is considered in cases of deciding nationality is the principle of 
continuous nationality. This is when a claimant must be a national on the date of the injury 
and on the date of the presentation of the claim, and there should be no interruption of this 
nationality from the first day of claim until the exercise of DP. Oppenheim supports this idea, 
and states the following:  
“From the time of the occurrence of the injury until the making of the award the claim must 
be continuously and without interruption have belonged to a person or to a series of 
persons…having the nationality of the State by whom it is put forward…”50.  
It is only when these conditions are met, under international laws, that DP is legally 
exercisable. These requirements are clearly necessitated in Article 5 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on DP. Article 5 (1) explains the following: 
“A State is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who was a 
national of that State continuously from the date of injury to the date of the official 
presentation of the claim. Continuity is presumed if that nationality existed at both these 
dates.”51  
Amerasinghe suggests that there is some support for the view that when an injured national 
dies before the official presentation of a claim, the claim may be continued because it has 
assumed a national character.52 In conclusion, the above examples clarify that doctrines about 
nationality, such as effective and genuine link theories have changed over the course of 
history. However, some principles such as continuous nationality still survive. This reveals 
that core nationality requirements about DP are still the same, but have been modernised in 
contemporary international law. 
3.5.	The	Nationality	of	Companies	and	Diplomatic	Protection	
	
It is an agreed principle that a host state can only espouse the claims of a national, if that 
national is a natural or juridical person. In other words, an individual’s home state has to 
establish its right to espouse such a claim and, in most cases, this right can be obtained 
through nationality. Thus, establishing the nationality of individuals and corporations is 
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important, and nationalities  must be differentiated from each other. As stated earlier, an 
individual’s nationality is a legal matter; it results from the political connections between the 
individual and the state. However, corporations are juridical persons, that is, they are entities 
that operate in circumstances which exceed the normal capacity of individuals.53 Their 
personality represents a development brought about by new and expanding requirements in 
the field of economics. In other words, corporations will often have ties with several different 
states (including fiscal, economic and legal links); whereas individuals tend to only have a 
legal or political links with a single state. For this reason, relations between states and foreign 
corporations should be dealt with on an international level, and not as an element of the 
normal rules that govern the status of aliens or individuals and their assets on the territory of 
a state.54 At the same time, it should be noted that, under international law, even though 
corporations sign contracts with states and/or have a different legal personality to individual, 
this does not mean that, in principle, corporations have an international legal personality.55  
 
One of the leading cases that considered how to establish the nationality of corporations was 
the Barcelona Traction case, in which the Court held that the nationality of a corporation is 
identified as being that of, “a state under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose 
territory it has its registered office.”56 In 1957, before the Barcelona Traction case was 
decided, the scholar Schwarzenberger explained that international tribunals use the following 
six criteria to help establish the state to which a corporation is more genuinely linked to, in 
order to determine the nationality of corporations: i) The Siege Social test; ii) The Domicile 
test; iii) the test of Incorporation; iv) the test of Control; v) the test of Beneficial Interest; and 
vi) the test of Responsibility.57 Schwarzenberger agrees with the Court that international law 
permits each state to define the nationality of corporations and to grant them nationality. This 
is reflected in Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012), 
which states the following: 
 
“Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State, and having 
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Union, shall be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member 
																																																						
53 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Limited (Belguim v Spain)  (Second Phase, 1970) ICJ 
39. 
54 Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under International Law, (Cambridge University Press 1987) 14. 
55 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8 (Oxford University Press 2012) 122. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 3 (Stevens & 




States. ‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under civil or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by 
public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making.”58 
 
From a DP perspective, a similar definition is given in Article 9 of the ILC’s Draft Articles as 
follows:  
 
“For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a corporation, the State of nationality 
means the State under whose law the corporation was incorporated. However, when the 
corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or States and has no substantial 
business activities in the State of incorporation, and the seat of management and the 
financial control of the corporation are both located in another State, that State shall be 
regarded as the State of nationality.”59  
 
Article 9 clarifies under which conditions corporations can be accepted as having the 
nationality of a certain state, and under which circumstances DP may be exercisable. Article 
9 has its roots in Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain); this case raised many questions 
regarding the diplomatic protection of both corporations and shareholders. Briefly, Barcelona 
Traction (Belgium v Spain) is a case that is often quoted when scholars are discussing the 
nationality of a corporation and how to distinguish the nationality of a company from the 
nationality of its shareholders. In this case, the Spanish Government caused the bankruptcy of 
a Canadian company, whose founders also had Belgian nationality. Belgium espoused its 
citizens’ claims against Spain, and tried to obtain compensation from the Spanish 
Government. However, the Spanish Government objected to the claim on grounds that the 
company was Canadian, and not Belgian. The International Court of Justice agreed with 
Spain, and dismissed the case, holding that: 
 
“[…] the general rule of international law states that where an unlawful act was committed 
against a company representing foreign capital, only the national of state of company could 
make a claim.”60   
 
In this case, the Court confirmed that the nationality of the corporation was Canadian, and 
that therefore only Canada could espouse a claim in respect of the corporation. The Court 
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identified the nationality of the company on the following basis: i) the company was 
incorporated in Canada under Canadian law, which was an act of free choice; ii) its main 
office was based in that State; iii) its board meetings were held in Canada; iv) the company 
had operated under Canadian law for over fifty years; v)| and the Canadian tax authorities had 
registered it there for tax purposes.61 This meant that Belgium had no standing to make a 
claim.62 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Court in this case distinguished the 
corporation’s nationality from its shareholders’ nationalities. In other words, the Court 
clarified that a corporation does not necessarily have the nationality of the majority of its 
shareholders.63 The Court concluded that the harm done to the company prejudiced its 
shareholders.64 However, it did not give rights to the shareholders take legal action, either in 
the name of the company, or in the name of the shareholders.65 This is because if the 
shareholders and the company concerned were to take diplomatic action separately against 
the host state in respect of a single injury, it would create confusion in international law. This 
issue is dealt with in Article 11 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on DP, which provides that: 
 
“The State nationality of shareholders in a corporation shall not be entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of such shareholders, in the case of an injury to the 
corporation unless: a) the corporation has ceased to exist according to the law of the State 
of incorporation for a reason unrelated to the injury; or b) the corporation had, at the date of 
injury, the nationality of the State alleged to be responsible for causing the injury, and 
incorporation in that State was required by it as a precondition for doing business there.”66  
 
Does this mean that a state can protect shareholders who are its citizens, but cannot protect 
shareholders who are not its citizens? In the Diallo Preliminary Objections Decision 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) the state of nationality was given 
the right to exercise diplomatic protection in favour of its ‘associés’ or shareholders when 
there was an injury to their direct rights as such.67 This position is also taken in Article 12 of 
the ILC’s Draft Articles on DP, as follows:  
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“To the extent that an internationally wrongful act of a State causes direct injury to the 
rights of shareholders as such, as distinct from those of the corporation itself, the State of 
nationality of any such shareholders is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect 
of its nationals.”68 
 
Therefore, a corporation’s home state must provide diplomatic protection to a juridical person 
where the shareholders of that company are foreign investors. This is one of the differences 
in the protection provided to an individual and to corporations.  
 
It should be noted that there are similarities and differences between DP as it relates to 
individuals and corporations. For instance, an individual must meet the continuous 
nationality requirement (as is stipulated in Article 5 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on DP), 
whilst continuous nationality in respect of corporations is dealt with in Article 10 of the same 
legislation, which reads that a state is only entitled to exercise DP for a corporation that has 
continually been a national of the state or its predecessor state from the date of injury to the 
date of the official presentation of the claim.69 However, there are some differences, 
including the provision of the genuine link requirement. For instance, in the Nottebohm Case 
the Court held that an individual must have a genuine connection to the State concerned. 
However, there is no such requirement in the case of a corporation. In Barcelona Traction, 
the Court held the following, “In the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate 
entities, no absolute test of the ‘genuine connection’ has found general acceptance.”70 
However, it should be noted that this ‘genuine link’ between the corporation and the host 
state is only required for recognising the existence of the corporation. This is because, in the 
absence of such a link, a corporation would simply not be recognised in international law, 
and issues of nationality and of the possibility of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ would not 
arise.71 Staker argues that this issue of a ‘genuine link’ raises questions, such as: Is a genuine 
link with the state of incorporation required only at the time of incorporation, or only at the 
time its existence is in issue? Or, is a genuine connection required continuously from the time 
of incorporation to the time of bringing the claim?72 In conclusion, it must be mentioned that 
company nationality is not only required for the protection of corporations. Indeed, for Judge 
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Gros, a company's nationality does not reflect any substantial economic bond. For him, the 
issue is that when the national economy of a state is adversely affected then the state should 
possess the right to take legal action (by using diplomatic protection).73  As the author of this 
thesis I support judge Gros's argument. It is understandable that each country should protect 
their national and their country's economic welfare (if necessary) by using different legal 
instruments including diplomatic protection. 
3.6.	Diplomatic	Protection:	Stateless	Persons	and	Refugees	
	
At the beginning it is worth to distiguish status of  'refugees' and 'statelees' persons. 
The refugess are: 'owing to well-founded fear of persecution for resons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwiling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return'.74 However, 'stateless person' defined as: 'a person who is not considered 
as a national by any State under the operation of its law'.75 These definitions confirm that not 
all stateless persons are refugees or not all refugees are stateless.  
 
The political theorist Adrent in her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism describes a stateless 
person as being ‘rightless’.76 For her, the requirement that a company has a nationality is not 
only needed for the protection of corporations, but for stateless people also.77 Adrent argues 
that the first loss that the ‘rightless’ suffers is the loss of their home, which means the loss of 
the entire social texture into which they were born.78 She argues that the second loss suffered 
by the ‘rightless’ is a loss of government protection, and this implies a loss of legal status in 
their home countries as well as in all countries.79 Van Panhuys also believes that the rule of 
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The view that a stateless person was a legal outlaw was common before the advent of modern 
day human rights laws, and an individual could not protect themselves from the illegal 
actions of governments. Similar problems were experienced by refugees. However, in the 
20th century, states began to make progress in trying to protect stateless persons’ and 
refugees’ rights. For instance, at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, the Netherlands 
proposed the right of a receiving state to protect refugees, but this proposal failed to be 
adopted.81 It has been the same story from a DP perspective. Neither the Convention on 
Refugees (1951) nor the Convention on Stateless Persons (1954) contains provisions that 
recognise the rights of contracting states to exercise DP on behalf of their stateless 
residents.82 However, the situation changed with the publication of the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on DP, and Article 8 of this Articles provides that the home state of a stateless person or 
refugee can take legal action against other countries on behalf of the individual. However, it 
should be noted that it is only in some situations that Article 8 permits the exercise DP in 
respect of a stateless person who, at the date of injury and at the date of official presentation 
of the claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in a certain state. According to Article 8(2), 
the same rule also applies to refugees if the refugees are recognised by a state as refugees or 
have documented refugee status.83 Article 8 is one of the most important parts of the ILC’s 
work on DP. This is because, if Article 8 did not provide protection for millions of stateless 
persons and refugees then, in comparison with  people who hold citizenship, they would be 
discriminated against, and their human rights violated. In conclusion, it could be stated that 
the ILC’s Draft Articles on DP implicates the rights of stateless people and refugees, and this 




As with other international Conventions, the ICSID Convention sets out its own jurisdiction. 
Article 25 of the Convention clearly states the conditions and requirements under which the 
Convention is applicable. Article 25 requires that: (a) dispute must be a legal dispute; (b) it 
must arise out of an investment; (c) one party must be a contracting state (or any constituent 
sub-division or agency of a contracting state designated as such to the Centre, by that state), 
and the other party must be a foreign national of a member state; and, (d) both parties must 
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have consented, in writing, to have recourse to the Centre.”84 It should be noted that 
ratification of the ICSID Convention by a contracting state signifies only that the state 
consents to being bound by the ICSID. It does not mean that the state consents to undergo 
arbitration in respect of disputes with foreign investors.85 This demonstrates that the idea of 
the 'consent' of the parties concerned is, “the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre.”86  
 
This part of the chapter will focus on Articles 25 (2) (a) and (b). It will begin by examining 
the following: how to define a ‘national of another contracting state’; the nationality of 
‘natural persons’ as referred to in Article 25 (2) (a); and the nationality of ‘juridical persons’ 
of other contracting states as noted in Article 25 (2) (b). The previous part of the chapter 
outlined the importance of nationality from the perspective of DP, and it was concluded that 
nationality is a crucial requirement for exercising DP. In public international law, the 
question of nationality has developed primarily in the context of DP.87 However, in respect of 
The ICSID Convention, the issue of nationality has taken a different path, and one that does 
not give nationality the same level of importance it had under the rules of DP. It should be 
noted that the meaning of the term ‘nationality’ in the context of The ICSID Convention is 
not identical to the meaning it has under the laws of DP.88 In the field of DP, the purpose of 
‘nationality’ is to establish an adequate link between the private party and the state giving 
protection, in order to enable the latter to espouse a claim.89  
 
Broches, a well-known scholar and a drafter of The ICSID Convention, has widely discussed 
the importance of nationality under both DP and in relation to The ICSID Convention. In 
relation to the concept of ‘nationality’, he explains the following:  
 
“[It] should be noted that the significance of nationality in traditional instances of espousal 
of a national's claim should be distinguished from its relatively unimportant role within the 
framework of the Convention. In the former case, the issue of nationality is of substantive 
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importance as being crucial in determining the right of a State to bring an international 
claim, while under the Convention, it is only relevant as regards the capacity of the investor 
to bring a dispute before the Center.”90  
 
The ICSID does not follow the laws of DP when determining the nationality of either 
individuals or corporations. Article 42 (Applicable Law) of the ICSID does not apply when 
determining the nationality of the individual claimant. Briefly, the nationality of a 'natural 
person' is determined by the laws of the state whose nationality is claimed. Furthermore, the 
nationality of a 'juridical person' is determined by the criteria of incorporation or seat of the 
company in question, subject to pertinent agreements, treaties and legislation. The nationality 
of shareholders is determined according to the applicable international investment 
agreements and Article 25.91 All this will be discussed further in the sections that follow.   
 
3.7.1.	The	Nationality	of	Natural	Persons	
The role of ‘nationality’ under ICSID Convention serves to bring a private party within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.92 However, in order to achieve this, there are certain requirements 
to be met, which are classed as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. The ‘positive’ requirement deems 
that an investor must be a ‘national of another contracting state’ whilst the ‘negative’ 
requirement deems that an investor ‘cannot be a national of the host state’.93 Moreover, 
according to Article 25 (2) (a) a natural person’s nationality must be measured on two dates: 
Firstly, on the date that the parties’ consent to submit to the Centre’s jurisdiction, and 
secondly, on the date that the request for arbitration or conciliation is registered by the 
Centre. These requirements are essential in the context of the mutuality principle, as 
embodied in the Convention, which balances the interests of host states on the one hand and 
investors on the other.94 As mentioned earlier, the Convention does not establish a definition 
of nationality. States are thus free to determine the nationality of individuals under their 
municipal laws. In the case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), states may choose how to 
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determine an individual's nationality, as they are bound neither by other international 
agreements, nor by their domestic legislations.95  
 
Not all BITs contain the same definition of ‘natural persons’. In some BITs, the parties 
involved agree on a definition. For instance, Article 1 (1) (a) of the Japan-South Korea BIT 
(2003) defines a natural person as, “[...] having the nationality of that Contracting Party in 
accordance with its applicable laws and regulations.”96 However, other BITs exist in which 
each party defines ‘natural persons’ differently. For example, in the Germany-United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) BIT (1998), in respect of the Federal Republic Germany, natural persons are 
defined as, “(aa) Germans within the meaning of the basic law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany.”97 However, in respect of the United Arab Emirates, natural persons are defined as, 
“(aa) [...] holding the nationality of the United Arab Emirates in accordance with the laws of 
the UAE.”98 It seems from these definitions that it would not be difficult to identify the 
nationality of natural persons. However, this is not the case, as Lauterpacht explains, “Where 
natural persons are concerned, few difficulties are likely to arise.”99 In ICSID practise, there 
are several cases in which the individual investor's nationality is one of the main issues at 





In this case the Claimants were Mr. Siag and his mother Mrs. Vecchi, and the Respondents 
were the Arab Republic of Egypt. Briefly, the Siag family set up an incorporated business 
and were investors in the Egyptian tourist sector (The Project), under Egyptian law. In 1995, 
the Egyptian Government expropriated the Saig family investment, which comprised 
property owned by the Claimants and the Project, thus destroying the value of the Claimants’ 
investments.100 The Claimants submitted a claim under the Italy-Egypt BIT (1989), in which 
they argued that the Egyptian Government had violated Article 5 of the Italy-Egypt BIT, by 
expropriating their investment. It should be noted that Article 5 only permits the 
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expropriation or naturalisation of investors’ property for public purposes, and for the 
protection of national interests.101 And, in these cases investors are compensated in line with 
the market value of their property.102  
 
In this case, the investors’ nationality was complicated, as they had originally held Egyptian 
citizenship, but as Egyptian nationals they were not allowed to apply for investor-state 
arbitration under the terms of The ICSID Convention, as investors are not permitted to take 
their home state to arbitration. Each of the Claimants had obtained their Egyptian citizenship 
separately: Mrs. Vecchi was originally an Italian citizen, but she married Mr. Elie George 
Siag (the father of Mr. Siag) who was an Egyptian national. Mrs. Vecchi obtained Egyptian 
nationality in 1954. Mr. Siag was born in Egypt, and was an Egyptian national. However, 
later on, Mr. Siag applied for Lebanese nationality, but before obtaining Lebanese 
nationality, he was required by Egyptian law to submit an application to the Egyptian 
Minister of the Interior to obtain permission to acquire Lebanese nationality. Mr. Siag 
submitted this application on 19 December 1989, but the application was inconclusive and 
Mr. Siag did did not establish a date for acquiring Lebanese nationality that co-incided with 
the loss of his Egyptian nationality.103 For these reasons, the Tribunal held that Mr. Siag had 
effectively lost his Egyptian citizenship on 14 June 1990.104 In addition, Mrs. Vecchi lost her 
Egyptian nationality on 14 September 1993 when she re-acquired her Italian nationality.105 
The loss of their Egyptian nationality was determined under the national laws of the Egypt. 
However, the Respondent asserted that the Claimant’s interpretation of Egyptian nationality 
law was incorrect.106 The Respondent further asserted that their links with Italy meant that 
they could not establish jurisidiction under The ICSID Convention.107 The Tribunal held that, 
although the Claimants had held Egyptian nationality in the past, they had lost it and, 
therefore, they only held Italian nationality.108 It should be noted that they did not hold dual-
citizenship, which would have meant that they satisfied both the positive and negative 
nationality requirements of Article 25 of the Convention. The national law of Egypt was 
applied by the Tribunal to come to this conclusion. Schreuer explains as follows:  
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“Whether a person is a national of a particular State is determined, in the first place, by the 
law of the State whose nationality is claimed. Indeed, in determining whether the individual 
holds a particular nationality, tribunals are entitled, and may be required, to apply that 
law.”109  
 
In summary, it was held that the Siag family had Italian nationality at the relevant time for 
the purpose of  provisions of The ICSID Convention.110 However, one of the arbitrators in 
this case, Orrego, has proffered a dissenting opinion:  
  
“[W]hen the investment was made the investors were Egyptians and they as citizens of this 
country benefited from Egyptian legislation and they were all the times considered to be 
Egyptians, not just by the Egyptian Government but this was also by own understanding of 
this family.”111  
 
In short, Vicuña suggests that Mr. Siag's nationality was 'artificial' in the context of this 
dispute.112 This is because his nationality was linked to Egypt, not Italy. However, the 
conclusion drawn in this case was to the Siag family’s advantage because Vicuña argues that 
the outcome was, “…not what international law or The ICSID Convention could have 
possibly intended.”113 However, Orrego claimed that it could only be expected that the 
Tribunal came to the conclusion they did, because the Respondent was able to demonstrate 
that the Claimants had taken steps to acquire Italian nationality for the sole purpose of 
obtaining investor rights pursuant to the BIT. Nevertheless, this was not an issue in this case, 
because the Siag family acquired their Italian nationality a long time before the claims were 
brought.114  
3.7.1.2.	Mr.	Hussein	Nuaman	Soufraki	v.	United	Arab	Emirates  
In the case of Mr. Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates,115 the investor wanted 
to take advantage of the United Arab Emirates-Italy BIT of 1995. The Claimant, who 
portrayed himself as a Canadian citizen, entered into a thirty-year concession agreement with 
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the Respondent.116 However, when a dispute arose, Mr. Soufraki sought protection under the 
UAE-Italy (BIT) and claimed that he held Italian nationality. This is because Italy was a 
party to The ICSID Convention at the time, whilst Canada had signed the Convention, but 
had not yet ratified it. In the past, Mr. Soufraki had held Italian nationality. However, when 
he voluntarily acquired Canadian citizenship in 1991, he automatically lost his Italian 
nationality.117 Nevertheless, in support of his claim to be an Italian national, he presented his 
Italian passports, five certificates showing his Italian nationality, and a letter from the Italian 
Minisitry of Foreign Affairs.118 The Tribunal concluded that, “The present dispute falls 
outside its jurisdiction under Article 25 (1) and (2) (a) of The ICSID Convention and Article 
1 (3) of the BIT.”119 However, the Claimant appealed this finding, and sought to annul the 
award. Mr. Soufraki argued that the Italian authorities were prepared to treat him as an Italian 
national, which would be sufficient for the purposes of the BIT. Therefore, the Tribunal was 
neither obliged nor even permitted to investigate the 'nationality' matter  further.120 
Additionally, the Claimant argued that the Tribunal had exceeded its power,121 and, “no 
international tribunal has the power to grant or withdraw nationality.”122 This position is 
correct: tribunals dealing with investor-state disputes are not able to grant or withdraw an 
investor’s nationality. However, the Ad Hoc Committee, which made the award, explained 
that the Tribunal had applied Italian law,123 and, according to the national laws of Italy, Mr. 
Soufraki was judged not to be an Italian. The Ad Hoc Committee stated that it was only in 
exceptional cases that ICSID tribunals reviewed nationality documentation issued by state 
officials.124 Oppenheim explains this approach as follows:   
 
“An international tribunal called upon to apply rules of international law based upon the 
concept of nationality has the power to investigate the state’s claim that a person has its 
nationality. However, this power of investigation is one which is only to be exercised if the 
doubts cast on the alleged nationality are not only not manifestly groundless but are also of 
such gravity as to cause serious doubts with regard to the truth and reality of that 
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Finally, this case confirms that, when identifying the nationality of an investor, a certificate 
of nationality is considered as part of the documentary evidence, but it does not constitute 
conclusive proof.126 In conclusion, it is worth remembering Amerashinge’s summary of the 
nationality requirements for natural persons: First of all, two dates are relevant for the 
fulfilment of the nationality requirement, namely, the date on which jurisdiction is consented 
to, and the date on which the request for arbitration or conciliation is registered. Secondly, 
both the negative and positive nationality requirements must be fulfilled on both these dates. 
Thirdly, there is no requirement of continuity in respect of these requirements. This means 
that it is not necessary that either the positive requirement or the negative requirement be 
satisfied continuously from the first date to the second. All that is required is that both the 
positive and negative conditions are satisfied on each of the two dates. Fourthly, there is no 
requirement that a naturalised person must have the same foreign nationality on both of the 
two dates.127 When all these requirements are met, a natural person fulfils the Convention’s 
nationality requirements. These requirements are different for juridical persons, and this will 
be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
 
3.7.2.	The	Nationality	of	Juridical	Persons		
International investment law clearly distinguishes between, and treats the issue of the 
nationality of individuals and corporations differently.128 A natural person's nationality is 
more easily identified than that of corporations. This is because, often, corporations can be 
linked to several countries. As with the nationality of ‘natural persons’, The ICSID 
Convention does not define the nationality of ‘juridical persons’. Instead, the Convention 
leaves it up to states to determine this matter. For this reason, states that agree to BITs may 
define a juridical person’s nationality as they choose.  
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The UK-Mexico BIT (2007) defines juridical persons as, “An enterprise which is either 
constituted or otherwise organized under the law of a Contracting Party, and is engaged in 
business operations in the territory of that Contracting Party.”129 Another example can be 
cited from the Russian Federation-People’s of Republic of China BIT (2006), in which legal 
persons are defined as follows:  
 
“Legal entities, including companies, associations, partnerships, and other organizations, 
established or constituted under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party, and 
having their seats in the territory of that Contracting Party.”130  
 
BITs also include various other definitions of ‘juridical persons’ as: ‘entities’, ‘companies’, 
‘partnerships’, ‘associations’, ‘legal persons’, ‘enterprises’, ‘corporations’, or ‘firms’. As 
noted earlier, both traditionally, and in the conflict of laws, the personal status of corporations 
is determined by their place of incorporation, registered office, central administration or 
effective seat (siège social), or the place where the principal activities of the juridical person 
are conducted.131 Schreuer explains that the place of central administration or effective seat is 
decisive.132 These criteria are used for determining the nationality of juridical persons in 
ICSID case law when interpreting Article 25 (2) (b) of The ICSID Convention.133 
Furthermore, Article 25 (2) (b) of the Convention provides that, for the purpose of 
determining juridical nationality, a national of another contracting state is considered to be:  
 
“Any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to 
conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, 
the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the 
purposes of this Convention.”134  
 
In the second part of Article 25 (2) (b), ‘because of foreign control’, is included as an 
exception because if no exception was made for foreign-owned but locally-incorporated 
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companies, a large and important sector of foreign investment would fall outside the scope of 
the Convention. In other words, if foreign control is not established, ICSID jurisdiction 
cannot be established.135 To be eligible, the host state and the company must specifically 
consent to that company being treated as a national of another contracting state ‘because of 
foreign control’.136 It should be noted that, even if the company is sold to nationals of a non-
contracting state, after the date the parties consented to ICSID arbitration, and those nationals 
continue to operate through a locally-incorporated company, the position cannot be changed, 
and the state which is party to the dispute cannot object to the eligibility of the company for 
ICSID arbitration on the grounds that the Convention applies only to nationals of contracting 
states.137 In other words, neither party is able to withdraw its consent unilaterally even if 
control of the company has changed.  
 
Last, but not least, the ‘foreign control’ possibility is unique to the ICSID, and is not 
available under DP.  However, this exception makes it possible to abuse the nationality 
requirement of the Convention. For instance, investors who intend to exploit this exception to 
protect their investments take capital from their home state into another state that has a treaty 
agreement with the investor’s national state. After establishing a company in the foreign 
state, the investors re-enter their home state as foreign juridical persons, bringing their capital 
back to the place it originated from, as a foreign investment. This mechanism is called the 
‘round-tripping’ technique.138 It was raised in the case of Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine. Tokios 
Tokeles was a business enterprise established under Lithuanian law; 99% of the company’s 
shares belonged to Ukrainian nationals, and two-thirds of its management were Ukrainian 
nationals.139  
 
In 1994, Tokios Tokeles formed a wholly-owned subsidiary, Taki Spravy, under the laws of 
the Ukraine.140 The company’s business advertised, published, and printed both in Lithuania 
and outside of its borders. In 2002, Tokios Tokeles initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
alleging that the Ukraine had engaged in a series of unreasonable and unjustified actions 
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against Taki Spravy, which had affected its investments in the Ukraine.141 The Claimant held 
that this constituted a breach of the BIT between Lithuania and Ukraine. However, the 
Respondent, (Ukraine) argued that the Claimant was not a ‘genuine entity’, mainly because it 
was owned and controlled by Ukrainian nationals, and had no substantial business activities 
in Lithuania.142 Moreover, the Respondent also argued that the Claimant had not made an 
‘investment’ in Ukraine as defined by the Treaty, because the capital for the investment 
originated in Ukraine.143 However, the Tribunal declined to look behind the Claimant into its 
shareholders, real owners, or controllers. For the Tribunal, it was important to decide whether 
or not the Claimant was a Lithuanian ‘investor’; anything above and beyond that did not fall 
within the Tribunal’s remit. Lastly, the majority of the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant 
was an investor under Article 1 (2) (b) of the BIT,144 and a ‘national of another Contracting 
State’ under Article 25 of the Convention.145 However, the President of the Tribunal 
dissented from the majority decision, and held that ‘the ICSID arbitration mechanism system, 
that is to say, for disputes between States and foreign investors’ is ‘not [for] investment 
disputes between States and their own nationals’.146 Weil argues that the ‘origin of capital is 
relevant and even decisive’.147 Sornarajah believes that such an action by an investor subverts 
the purpose of the treaty, which is to promote economic development through the injection of 
fresh funds.148 The President of the Tribunal warned of the following:  
“It follows that ICSID arbitral tribunals have to be particularly cautious when they 
determine their jurisdiction. An unwarranted extension of the ICSID arbitral jurisdiction 
would entail an unwarranted encroachment on both the availability of diplomatic protection 
and the jurisdiction of domestic courts.”149  
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Otherwise, this might jeopardise the future of the institution,150 by extending its scope and 
application beyond its legal limits.151 This is a result of juridical investors beginning to use 
other methods such as ‘treaty shopping’ or ‘nationality planning’. These methods are utilised 
by foreign investors who deliberately seek to acquire the benefits of a BIT by making foreign 
investments, or by bringing claims from third countries that have more favorable treaty terms 
with the target host state.152 This is done in order to gain full access to maximum protection 
for their investments. The strategy used to transfer companies from one country to another in 
order to either protect an investment or to take legal action against the host state is not illegal. 
However, if a tribunal rules that a claimant has acted in bad faith and that ‘nationality 
planning’ has been used to protect investments, a claimant will not succeed in the claim. In 
the case of Phoenix v Czech Republic, the Tribunal stated the following:  
 
“The evidence indeed shows that the Claimant made an ‘investment’ not for the purpose of 
engaging in economic activity, but for the sole purpose of bringing international litigation 
against the Czech Republic or in other words, the unique goal of the ‘investment’ was to 
transform a pre-existing domestic dispute into an international dispute subject to ICSID 
arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty. On the grounds of that, this kind of 
transaction is not a bona fide transaction and cannot be a protected investment under the 
ICSID system.”153 
 
A similar argument was made in the Tokois Tokeles case, where the Respondent (Ukraine) 
argued that the Claimant’s aim was to take legal action against his home state. However, in 
that case, the Tribunal determined that the Claimant had carried out business and investment 
activities for more than six years before the BIT between Ukraine and Lithuania entered into 
force, and that the Claimant’s aim in establishing a company in Lithuania was not to gain 
access to ICSID Arbitration. In addition, there was no evidence that the Claimant had used 
his formal legal nationality for any improper purpose.154 
 
When investors began abusing BITs using ‘nationality planning’ strategies, states devised 
methods to counteract these tactics.155 One such method is to request a bond of economic 
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substance, between the corporation and the state, which is termed a ‘denial of benefit clause’. 
This clause is included in the BIT.156 By adopting this clause, states reserve the right to deny 
the benefits of the treaty to a company that is incorporated by a state, but, which has no 
economic connection to that state.157 This idea is not a recent invention. Originally, a ‘denial 
of benefit clause’ was used to deny DP, and later, it was incorporated into treaties for the 
protection of foreign investments.158 For instance, the US’s 2004 Model Treaty, Article 
17(2), reads as follows:  
  
“A Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the Party that is an enterprise 
of such other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial 
business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a non-Party, or of the 
denying Party, own or control the enterprise.”159 
 
A similar example can be found in Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Even 
though, here, the wording of ‘denial of benefit clauses’ is different, the purpose of the 
paragraph is the same: to protect third parties from claiming the benefits of treaties, and not 
to permit them to go beyond the criteria expressly contained in BITs.  
 
In 1965, when the ICSID Convention was first drafted, determining the nationality of a 
natural or juridical person was much easier than it is today. The world has changed and has 
become more global, in the sense that corporations now operate universally, and this has 
created complex nationality issues in investor-state disputes. It seems that, in the future, 
nationality issues will continue to arise, and that disputes between investors and states will 




As discussed in the first part of this chapter, under Customary International Law (CIL) 
shareholders were not able to bring a claim in their own name, regardless of whether they 
held shares directly or indirectly in a company. This rule was enacted because it was believed 
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realm of international economic relations; the activities of a company can be internationally 
and widely scattered, and shares frequently change hands.160 Under CIL, only nautral or 
juridical persons could claim compensation for damage. As a result, shareholders were 
powerless under international law and had no effective remedy for their injuries.161 
Nevertheless, under CIL there were exceptions to the general rule, whereby the rights of 
shareholders could be be protected. Basically, shareholders could take independent action 
against a host state but only under the following circumstances:  
 
1) If their direct rights had been infringed.162  
2) The company had ceased to exist in the country of incorporation.163  
3) The state of incorporation lacked capacity to take action.164  
4) If their shares were expropriated in the host state.165  
 
Furthermore, under CIL, it was acknowledged that, “a shareholder's only obligation is to pay 
for his shares; there is no other obligation, whether to contribute to the company, to 
participate in the management of the company, or even to participate in the election of the 
managers of the company.”166 However, these rights were limited and could not protect their 
investors, and for this reason Schreuer argued that on this point, the ICJ was aware of the 
limited usefulness of customary international law and for that reason, specifically referred to 
the protection of shareholders' rights by way of treaties.167 Indeed, the ICJ noted the 
following:  
 
“Thus, in the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders requires that recourse 
be had to treaty stipulations or special agreements directly concluded between the private 
investor and the State in which the investment is placed. States ever more frequently 
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provide for such protection, in both bilateral and multilateral relations, either by means of 
special instruments or within the framework of wider economic arrangements.”168  
 
However, with the development of BITs, one can make a strong argument that the decision of 
the ICJ no longer reflects the current state of international law.169 Later on, this view was 
supported approach by the ICJ itself:  
 
 “…in contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies and the 
rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially 
governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of foreign investments, 
such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or the ICSID Convention, and also by contracts 
between States and foreign investors.”170   
 
3.8.1.	ICSID	and	Shareholder	Nationality	
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, determining the nationality of 
corporations is more difficult than determining the nationality of individual investors. To 
make matters more complicated, identifying shareholders’ nationalities is even more difficult 
than identifying the nationalities of corporations. One of the main reasons for this is because 
foreign shareholders do not often have a contractual relationship with the host state.171 
Nevertheless, in the process of using BITs, parties must define the investors and investments, 
and this determines the scope of their agreements. According to this, only defined investors 
or invesments are protected. This principle is a cornerstone for the future of dispute 
settlement. When parties specify the terms of their BITs, they use wide definitions in order to 
protect as many investments and investors as possible. A classical example of this can be 
found in Article 1 of the BIT between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic 
of Uruguay, which reads as follows:   
 
																																																						
168 The Barcelona Traction Case (n 53) [90]. 
169 Ian A. Laird, 'A Community of Destiny - The Barcelona Traction case and the Development of Shareholder 
Rights to Bring Investment Claims' in Todd Weiler (eds) International Investment Law and Arbitration: 
Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May, 
2005) 77. 
170 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment 2007) ICJ Reports 614 [88]. 
171 Jimmt Skjold Hansen, ‘“Missing Links” in Investment Arbitration: Quantification of Damages to Foreign 




“The term 'investment' means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, 
stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other 
debt instruments, and loans; (d) futures, options, and other derivatives; (e) turnkey, 
construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar 
contracts; (f) intellectual property rights; (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar 
rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or 
immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and 
pledges.”172 
 
In this example the word shares admits shareholders as investors, and gives the shareholder 
direct rights to claim against the host state of the investment. However, there are some 
exceptions even where the Treaty does not expressly provide for when an investor directly or 
indirectly controls or owns investments, but nevertheless, it does not stop shareholders 
benefitting from the Treaty's protection. 
 
Claims were presented under the Germany-Argentina BIT in the case of Siemens v. 
Argentina.173 Article 1 of the Treaty did not mention 'direct or indirect' investment. However, 
the Tribunal stated the following:  
 
“The definition of ‘investment’ is very broad...The specific categories of investment 
included in the definition are included as examples rather than with the purpose of 
excluding those not listed…One of the categories consists of ‘shares, rights of participation 
in companies and other types of participation in companies’ (Article 1 (1) (b) of the BIT). 
The plain meaning of this provision is that shares held by a German shareholder are 
protected under the Treaty.”174  
 
The Tribunal ruled that unless the Treaty had expressly limited investment to that which is 
owned directly by the investor, then an investor-shareholder would be able to claim 
protections for harm caused to an investment owned, even through multiple corporate 
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vehicles.175 The Tribunal explains that, if shareholders are investors in one of the member 
states of the ICSID Convention, and if they fullfil all the requirements of Article 25 (2) of the 
Convention, they are able to claim separately from the companies. Therefore, shareholding in 
a company is a form of investment that enjoys protection, and even if the affected company 
does not fulfil the nationality requirements of the relevant treaty, there will be a remedy if the 
shareholder does.176 This is particularly relevant where, as is frequently the case, the 
company possesses the nationality of the host state and does not qualify as a foreign 
investor.177 Alexandrov notes the following: 
 
“It is beyond doubt that shareholders have standing in ICSID to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation, and this principle applies to all 
shareholders no matter whether or not they own the majority of the shares or control the 
corporation.”178  
 
In short, the language of the Convention permits shareholders to claim for remedy if an 
investment treaty protects their shares. In other words, when shareholders seek protection 
independently, the size of their investment, as a general rule, is not relevant.179 In addition, 
Dugan pointed out a way to calculate damages for minority shareholders called ‘derivative 
damages’, but investment treaties do not provide any guidance on this matter.180 Overall, 
determining the nationality of public companies and their shareholders’ nationalities is not an 
easy task, and sometimes it is virtually impossible.181  
 
From a jurisdictional point of view, for the ICSID, there is no difference between ‘majority’ 
or ‘minority’ shareholdings. However, there have been cases where respondent states have 
argued that minority shareholders cannot claim for damages under an investment treaty, but 
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ICSID tribunals have viewed this differently. In Lanco v. Argentina the ICSID Tribunal said 
the following: 
 
“…the Argentina-US Treaty says nothing indicating that the investor in the capital stock 
has to have control over the administration of the company, or a majority share; thus the 
fact that Lanco holds an equity share of 18.3% in the capital stock of the Grantee, allows 
one to conclude that it is an investor in the meaning of Article I of the Argentina-U.S. 
Treaty.”182  
 
Additionally, the Tribunal further asserted that Lanco was liable for all contractual 
obligations arising under the agreement to the extent of its equity and share183 and was a 
party in its own name and right.184   
 
In CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina185, CMS was a shareholder in 
TGN, holding 29.42% of the shares. When the dispute arose, Argentina argued that CMS was 
a minority shareholder in TGN, and only TGN could claim for any damage suffered.186 It was 
further argued that, since TGN was an Argentine company, it did not qualify as a foreign 
investor under the BIT US-Argentina, nor was the license a foreign investment.187 In the 
conclusion, the tribunal explained the following:   
 
“[there is] no bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by 
shareholders independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those 
shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders.”188 
 
Interestingly, in this case the Tribunal confirmed that traditional customary of international 
law is different from ICSID law.189 Thus, this decision once again demonstrated that 
shareholders must indicate that they are shareholders, and if there are no restrictions or limits 
in treaties, then, as investors, they can claim for their shares without condition, including 
limitations as to whether these shares are directly or indirectly controlled, or whether they are 
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majority or minority shareholders. Additionally, in practice, minority and majority 
shareholders have separately submitted claims in connection with the same disputes. Here, 
the ICSID Convention and BIT rules try to protect shareholders rights. From an investment 
point of view, investors are protected under the ICSID Convention, because without 
shareholders there would be no investment or even investors. For that reason, it is 





As mentioned earlier, under the ICSID Convention the nationality of natural persons is a 
crucial condition that allows investors to bring a claim against a state within the jurisdiction 
of ICSID. Investors who meet those conditions might work on ‘nationality-planning’ and 
obtain other countries’ citizenship. By gaining another state’s passport, the investor acquires 
the ability to bring an investor–state claim against another country. For multimillionaire 
investors, the simplest way of obtaining citizenship in other countries is through citizenship 
investment programmes. This is also known as ‘cash for passport’.190   
The selling of passports is not a new phenomenon; it started in the early 1980s.  After 
the first year of independence, Saint Kitts and Nevis launched a citizenship-by-investment 
programme in 1984. Other Caribbean states, namely Belize, Dominica and Grenada later 
commenced similar programmes to attract foreign investment to their countries. The selling 
of passports was an alternative to attract investment and support the government’s economy; 
passports were seen as something to sell.191  
Citizenship-by-investment programmes should be distinguished from other investor 
visa programmes, in which multimillionaires can obtain residency visas after investing the 
required money into the country’s economy. Not only developing countries in the Caribbean 
offer investment programmes to foreigners; developed countries such as the US, UK and 
some EU countries have similar initiatives. For instance, in US, the investment visa is called 
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an ‘EB-5 Visa’. To apply for this type of visa, the investor should invest at least USD 1 
million and the invested amount should create 10 full-time jobs for qualifying employees.192 
In the UK, this type of visa is called the ‘Investor Visa (Tier 1)’. If the investor is 
outside the EU and wants to invest £2 million or more into the UK economy, he or she can 
apply for this visa. The invested amount determines when the investor is allowed to receive 
their permanent residency. Usually after the first year of settlement the investor becomes 
eligible for citizenship.  
According to the immigration law of the UK, if the investor invests at least £10 
million they can apply for settlement after two years; if they invest £5 million they can apply 
after three years; and if they invest between £2 million and £5 million they can apply only 
after five years. Hence, the amount of their investment determines how rapidly the 
multimillionaire can gain UK settlement and thereafter become a British citizen.  
 It is noteworthy that the rights and duties of investors are rigidly detailed. In the UK, 
for instance, they can run a business or they can work or study, but they cannot work as a 
professional sportsperson or sports coach.  
Similar schemes exist in other European countries, including Spain, Portugal, Malta 
and Cyprus. Their visa schemes are called ‘golden visa’. The required amount for investment 
differs. In Greece, an investor must buy a property or invest in the country’s economy with at 
least €250,000,193 whereas the threshold in Spain is €500,000. In some countries, such as 
Austria and Montenegro, the exact required amount for investment is not specified. For 
instance, in Austria it ranges from €800,000 to €10 million. By meeting these requirements, 
in the last decade more than 100,000 investors have obtained the ‘golden visa’ in the EU.194 
They have invested FDI of at least €25 billion into the European economy.195   
The invested amount is vast, especially for small countries like Cyprus and Malta, 
which have gained from this ‘citizenship for sale’ programme. For instance, Cyprus has 
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attracted €1.4 billion, which is equal to 7.5% of the country’s current gross domestic product 
(GDP).196  
However, the selling of passports is not supported by all politicians in the EU some 
have expressed their disapproval of this matter. For instance, Reding, the Vice-President of 
the European Commission, stated: 
 ‘A passport is not only a paper or an official document. It conveys rights and 
obligations both to citizens and to all Member States of the Union… Member states should 
only award citizenship to persons where there is a ‘genuine link’ or ‘genuine connection’ to 
the country in question… It is a fundamental element of our Union. One cannot put a price 
tag on it’.197  
Moreover, Palan claimed it is a way of ‘commercializing of state sovereignty’.198  For 
instance, in Austria, politician Scheuch promised to facilitate granting citizenship of that 
country to a Russian investor in return for an investment of €5 million in their party.199  After 
witnessing this kind of situation, experts have warned governments that cash-for-passport 
brings several problems into the government. It circumvents the ordinary naturalization 
process, supports money laundering and tax evasion, encourages criminals to hide, can result 
in diplomatic passports being issued to non-diplomats, and exerts other influences on political 
power.200 In addition, foreign investors might be criminals in their home countries. Before 
they are given citizenship they should be checked as they can put countries and society at 
risk. Such risks could be minimised by using due diligence assessment not only in the 
country but worldwide.  
In conclusion, it should be noted that a citizenship-by-investment programme can 
succeed if the state granting the passports assesses the genuineness of individual investors.  
3.9.	Conclusion		
 
This chapter explored the various conditions relating to diplomatic protection as they are 
presented in Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. Among various conditions, nationality 
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remains a significant factor in explaining the relationship of an investor with a state. A 
textual and contextual analysis of Article 27 of the ICSID Convention reveals that, invoking 
diplomatic protection for foreign investments remains an exceptional remedy, and can only 
be applied after fulfilling certain conditions. The fundamental focus of these conditions is the 
failure of the contracting state to protect foreign investments and the exhaustion of available 
local remedies. The concept of nationality remains one of the most significant factors that can 
trigger the process of diplomatic protection in relation to foreign investments in accordance 
with ICSID norms. This chapter has explored various aspects of nationality in order to 
examine the relationship of the foreign investor with a state. The next chapter will examine 
the exhaustion of local remedies rule in relation to invoking diplomatic protection in foreign 












Chapter Four: The Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
4.1.	Introduction		
	
This chapter analyses the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule in relation to the protection of 
foreign investments, which is a second essential condition for invoking diplomatic protection 
as a remedy. In investment disputes, a foreign investor can contend that local remedies have 
not been effective due to the reluctance of the contracting state to provide access, or that the 
remedies available were not adequate. Where remedies are inadequate for the purposes of 
justice, an aggrieved foreign investor has the right to invoke international jurisdiction. 
However, it is essential to establish if the contracting state is at fault, or directly or indirectly 
involved in denying justice to foreign investors. Article 44 (b) of the ILC Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), explains that state 
responsibility is not invoked where the exhaustion of local remedies rule is applicable, and 
where there is an effective local remedy that a claimant has not exhausted.  
The rule of exhausting local remedies will be analysed in this chapter by using various case 
laws and by examining the opinions of international jurists. Foreign investors bear some 
responsibility for invoking diplomatic protection, and this responsibility includes respect for 
the sovereignty of the contracting state, providing adequate time for the host state for redress, 
avoiding the premature exercise of diplomatic protection, and any kind of abuse of 
diplomatic protection. The ILC Draft Articles clarify the use of the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule when: there is no adequate or effective redress available; where undue delay in 
redressing a grievance has occurred; where foreign investors have been excluded from 
exercising their rights in local systems of redress; and where adequate remedy has not been 
provided. Furthermore, invoking diplomatic immunity requires proving the state’s part in the 
denial of local justice. However, it might not always be possible to claim that corrupt 
practices have been involved in the judicial or executive branch of a state. The exhaustion of 
local remedies rule remains fundamental to resolving international disputes, but modern 
ICSID Convention takes a lenient view on this condition.  
The exhaustion of local remedies rule in investment treaty arbitration is subject to customary 
international law. The ICSID and related international legal frameworks try to resolve issues 
under the local jurisdiction of the contracting state. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention 




detailed discussion on the exhaustion of local remedies rule, keeping in mind various BITs 
and multilateral agreements, regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). ICSID has eased the conditions of the rule, and available case law 
shows that an international investor can go to an international tribunal without strictly 
exhausting all available national remedies. This flexibility has been introduced in response to 
the existence of under-developed remedial systems in various countries. The modern 
international legal interface for resolving international investor disputes calls for mutual 
agreement on using international methods of settlement.  
This chapter aims to analyse the shift in global attitudes (ICSID, BITs, NAFTA) about the 
‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule as a condition for invoking diplomatic protection in 
international investment dispute cases. The chapter will explore traditional strict 
interpretations of the condition and its later evolution in terms of a broader interpretation. 





The second prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection is that a claimant is required 
to have exhausted all local remedies. The term ‘local remedies’ defines any legal remedies 
available (whether ordinary or special) in the state alleged to be responsible for causing the 
injury.1 These remedies should be open to the injured person, and offered by local judicial or 
administrative courts or bodies.2 Originating in Europe in the Middle-Ages, before the birth 
of the modern nation state, this requirement evolved as part of customary international law.3 
It can be traced back to the ancient practice of reprisals.4 However, it was only in the 19th and 
20th centuries, that this requirement became firmly established in international law in relation 
to diplomatic protection.5 In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the British 
Government was, “a government of laws and not of men…if the laws furnish no remedy for 
the violation of a vested legal right.”6  This view was soon articulated in the Calvo Doctrine 
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of 1868, which deemed that foreigners should be subject to the local laws of the state where 
the offence occurred, and must submit any disputes to its courts.7 
 
The gist of the idea of local exhaustion is intended to apply to aliens, who must exhaust all 
domestic remedies available under the law of the host state. By way of explanation, an alien 
can seek reparation for the wrongful acts of the host state under the host state’s national laws. 
This gives the host state the opportunity to redress alleged wrongs within the framework of 
its own domestic legal system, before international responsibility can be invoked.8 Bochard 
explains that DP is limited for the following reasons:  
 
1) A person going abroad is presumed to take into account the means furnished by local 
laws for the redress of wrongs. 
2) The rights of sovereignty and independence support the demands of the local state for 
freedom from interference in its courts, on the assumption that they are capable of doing 
justice. 
3) The home government should have the opportunity offer justice to the injured party in its 
own regular way, thus avoiding international scrutiny. 
4) If an individual or minor official committed the injury, the exhaustion of local remedies is 
necessary to discover that the wrongful act or denial of justice was or was not a deliberate 
act of the state. 
5) If the act was a deliberate act of the state, this rule provides an opportunity to ascertain 
whether the state wishes to leave the wrong un-righted.9  
 
Amerasinghe criticises these arguments and asks what would happen if a state was unwilling 
to repair a wrong even after local remedies have been exhausted.10 In addition, Amerasinghe 
questions what remedies must be exhausted in order to satisfy the requirements of the rule, 
particularly with respect to extraordinary remedies.11 However, these questions remain 
unanswered. Indeed, Jessup argues that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies is, “well 
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established” but “inadequately” because, “the alien must exhaust his local remedies before a 
diplomatic claim is made.”12  
 
Even though the rule of local exhaustion divides the views of scholars, the rule still continues 
to be used in modern international law. Article 44 (b) of the ILC Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) explains that a state’s 
responsibility is not invoked where the exhaustion of local remedies rule is applicable, and 
where there is an effective local remedy that the claimant has not exhausted. Roberto Ago 
argues that, according to Article 44, the principle of the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ is an 
essential and absolute condition for the determination of the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act.13 The purpose of this Article is to cover any case in which the exhaustion of 
local remedies rule applies, whether this is under treaty or general international law, or in 
spheres that are not necessarily limited to diplomatic protection.14 A similar view on the 
exhaustion of local remedies can be found in Article 14 of the International Law Commission 
[ILC] Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006). According to Article 14 of this 
legislation, those required to exhaust all local remedies include the following: natural 
persons, legal persons, foreign companies or parties mainly financed by public capital, non-
nationals, and in exceptional circumstances, refugees and stateless persons (Article 8).15 
However, injured aliens can exhaust only those remedies which might result in a binding 
decision.16  
 
Local remedies are relevant to the settlement of certain international disputes involving 
states17 but this is applicable only in cases where a state is not directly aggrieved.18 This 
means that the law is not applicable between states, and the rule is not relevant if there is a 
direct breach of international law against to another state, for instance, when the injuries are 
against diplomatic or consular staff. In other words, heads of state, ministries, diplomatic 
agents, or consular agents who are already enjoying ‘special international protection’ in a 
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foreign territory do not need to exhaust local remedies.19 The main idea behind this exception 
is that these people are classed as state organs, and they are accepted as a foreign state in 
itself.20 For this reason, the rule is not applicable to them. Foreign companies who are mainly 
or partly financed by public capital are not outside the scope of this rule, and in these 
circumstances public funds cannot be used as grounds not to exhaust local remedies. 
However, in cases where there is direct injury to the state and to a citizen, the rule is not 
applicable.21 This happened in the case of the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, where the ICJ 
Court stated the following: 
 
“The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr. Yerodia's 
personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in professional situation of Mr. 
Yerodia, the character of the dispute submitted to the Court by means of the Application 
has not changed: the dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the arrest warrant issued on 11 
April 2000 against a person who was at the tine Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, 
and the question whether the rights of the Congo have or have not been violated by that 
warrant. As the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals, 
Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.”22 
  
In different ICJ cases, judges have, several times, confirmed the significance of the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule. For instance, in the Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United 
States of America) the International Court of Justice affirmed that, “the rule that local 
remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-
established rule of customary international law.”23 In addition, the Court stated the following: 
 
“Before resort may be had to an international court in such a situation, it has been 
considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity 
to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.”24 
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Moreover, in the Panevezys-Saldutikis Railway case, Justice Hudson highlighted the 
‘exhaustion of local remedies’, noting the following:  
 
“It is a very important rule of international law that local remedies must have been 
exhausted, without redress before a State may successfully espouse a claim of its national 
against another State.”25 
 
The rule was accepted as a one of the main conditions of exercising DP. In principle, if a 
home state does not comply with this rule then it cannot espouse a national’s claim. An 
injured person should exhaust all the remedies of a court in the first instance, and no appeal 
to a higher court is allowed until the conditions of the rule have been met. An international 
claim can only be received if the redress was not satisfactory to the alien.26 Only after that 
can the alien’s home state espouse a claim or bring it before an international tribunal. Until 
that time, the alien’s national state only has the potential right to intervene in a citizen’s 
claim.  
 
Therefore, this rule has different functions, which include the following: 
 
1. To ensure respect for the sovereignty of states. 
2. To provide a state with the opportunity to remedy the behaviour of state organs within its 
own legal system. 
3. To ensure that a deliberate act of the state has occurred. 
4. To protect states against the premature exercise of DP. 
5. To protect states against the abusive exercise of DP. 
6. To limit the cases that can be brought before international organs.27  
 
Kreibaum believes that the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule is designed to ensure respect 
for the sovereignty of the host state, and this is main reason why the rule continues to survive 
today.28  
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It is worth mentioning that the ‘exhaustion of local remedies rule’ is not applicable in all 
cases as a condition for exercising DP. For instance, if a local remedy is not provided by the 
host state, or the local remedies are ineffective, notoriously corrupt, or the decision would be 
unfair to foreigners, it is not reasonable to require foreigners to spend time and money using 
these local remedies.29 This is clearly stated in Article 15 of the ILC Draft Articles. Local 
remedies need not be exhausted where the following applies:  
 
1) There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress. 
2) There is an undue delay in the remedial process, which is attributable to the state alleged to 
be responsible. 
3) There is no relevant connection between the injured person and the host state. 
4) The injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies. 
5) The state alleged to be responsible has waived the requirement that local remedies be 
exhausted.30  
 
Bochard argues that if the local judiciary is corrupt, or the possibility of local remedy is 
remote, then the foreigner should be excluded from exhausting local remedies.31 
Accordingly, summing up in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case confirms that, “there 
can be no need to resort the municipal courts if those courts have no jurisdiction to afford 
relief…”32 Moreover, Wallace stresses that the rule must be adequate and effective and must 
be applied reasonably and not be a, “rule of infinite pursuit by platonically ideal parties with 
bottomless wallets to pay legal fees or professors wishing to create new legal theories.”33 
Indeed, the above-mentioned court decisions, as well as the various Draft Articles that deal 
with the exhaustion of local remedies, all confirm that the rule should be used in a good faith, 
effectively and satisfactory. When the rule is adequate to accomplish a purpose then the local 
remedies can be: 
 
“…normally quicker, cheaper and more effective than international ones…They can be 
more effective in the sense that that an appellate court can reverse the decision of a lower 
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court, whereas the decision of an international organ does not have that effect, although it 
will engage the international responsibility of the state concerned.” 34 
 
In the past, this rule was applicable only between a host state and foreigners. However, 
nowadays, the rule is widespread and is implemented in different situations, including cases 
involving human rights. For instance, the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) provides that, “The Court may only deal with a 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognised rules of international law.”35 This means that the Convention requires only 
domestic remedies, and does not require other remedies within the framework of international 
organisations. This principle is explained in Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, in which the 
Court held that:  
  
“The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore an indispensable part of the 
functioning of this system of protection. States are dispensed from answering before an 
international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right 
through their own legal system and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies 
provided by the national legal system.”36 
 
In the case of LaGrand (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States of America), which 
came before the ICJ, Germany sought to exercise diplomatic protection for its citizens who 
were convicted of the murder of Karl and Walter LaGrand.37 The U.S. argued against 
Germany’s exercise of diplomatic protection for its nationals on the grounds that the LaGrand 
brothers had not exhausted all domestic remedies before Germany began to espouse their 
claims.38 However, the Court rejected the U.S.’s arguments and stressed that the U.S. had 
failed to carry out its obligation under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), 
to inform the LaGrand brothers of their right to consult with their consular representatives in 
order to exhaust the local remedies available for them.39  
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In the case of Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S) fifty two Mexican 
nationals faced death sentences in the U.S. The Mexican citizens claimed that they had not 
been advised or informed that they had the right to take consular assistance from their home 
state, but the U.S. claimed that they had requested the exhaustion of all local remedies and 
that only after this could Mexico espouse the individual claims of its nationals to exercise 
diplomatic protection.40 The Court accepted the U.S. request stating that, “only when that 
process is completed and local remedies are exhausted would Mexico be entitled to espouse 
the individual claims of its nationals through the procedure of diplomatic protection.”41 
 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule continues to be an important tenet of international law. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the above noted court decisions, in addition to the various 




The previous section discussed the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies as part of 
customary international law. However, this rule does not carry the same level of importance 
in investor-state arbitration; scholars argue that the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule in 
relation to investor-state disputes simply does not enjoy the same importance today as 
enjoyed in earlier times. As such, it is permitted under the Convention, but only with the 
agreement of the parties, according to their autonomy. Indeed, the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule is in opposition with the idea of investment arbitration. Under CIL, national 
courts play a significant role in the mechanism of the rule, but under the ICSID Convention 
different principles apply. The purpose of the ICSID is to encourage parties away from 
dealing with national courts in order to de-politicise disputes. In the preamble of the 
Convention it is declared that investor-state disputes can be subject to national legal 
processes but in certain cases, international methods of dispute settlement are appropriate.42 
Nevertheless, the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule is permitted under Article 26 of the 
Convention, under the following conditions:  
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“Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, 
be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting 
State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition 
of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.”43  
 
Therefore, Article 26 of the ICSID Convention deems that if the exclusion of any other 
remedy44 rule is decided upon after the parties have agreed to arbitration, the investor may 
not seek any other remedies. In this case, arbitration would be the only remedy for the parties. 
At the same time, the second part of Article 26 allows for the exhaustion of local remedies 
only if there is consent between parties. The terms of consent should either be written in the 
treaty or contract itself, or in arbitral clauses, and both parties should be aware of the terms.   
Furthermore, once the parties unanimously ‘consent’ to arbitration, then neither party can 
unilaterally withdraw, change or restrict the process. However, the condition that local 
remedies must be exhausted may be withdrawn any time by either party, and then the parties 
can apply directly to ICSID arbitration.45 As a result, a tribunal must examine issues on a 
case-by-case basis, and should decide whether the domestic remedies rule is compulsory in 
the context of an agreement between the parties. However, Kryvoi explains that the purpose 
of Article 26 is not to modify the rules of international law regarding to exhaustion of local 
remedies.46 To date, three countries, namely, Israel, Costa Rica and Guatemala, have 
informed the Centre that they want to implement the exhaustion of local remedies according 
to Article 26 of the Convention.47 However, later on, Israel withdrew that notification.48  
 
Nowadays, the exhaustion of local remedies rule is ignored in most BITs49 and model BITs 
used by states such as Canada, Germany and the USA silent on this issue. Where a treaty is 
silent on this question, it may be assumed that any reference to arbitration is subject to the 
rule.50 This is found mostly in older BITs51 and the Norway (2007) Model of BIT Article 15 
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also deals with this subject. The Netherlands-Jamaica BIT (1991) Article 9 (2) states the 
following:  
 
“If such a dispute has not been settled amicably, within a period of three months from the 
date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, either party may 
pursue local remedies for the settlement of that dispute.52 
 
In addition, other multilateral agreements require the exhaustion of local remedies. For 
example, Article 28 of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on 
Finance and Investment states the following: 
 
“Disputes between an investor and a State Party concerning an obligation of the latter in 
relation to an admitted investment of the former, which have not been amicably settled, and 
after exhausting local remedies shall, after a period of six (6) months from [the] written 
notification of a claim, be submitted to international arbitration if either party to the dispute 
so wishes.”53 
 
The multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does not explicitly waive 
the exhaustion of local remedies rule. In Articles 1121 (1) (b) and 1121 (2) (b) it is stated that 
investors can bring a claim before an international tribunal pursuant to NAFTA, but only if 
investors first, “…waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal 
or court under the law of any party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings 
with respect to the measure of the disputing party shall is alleged to be a breach”’54 It is 
interesting that, like other types of agreement under ICSID or BITs, the NAFTA treaty is not 
clear or straightforward about waiving the exhaustion of local remedies rule. As a result, 
different scholars have interpreted this question, and have concluded that Chapter Eleven – 
Investment, does not close the door completely on domestic litigation.55 Rather, it serves to 
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encourage foreign investors to pursue remedies in domestic courts in the hope that at least 
some investment disputes will be settled at a local level.56  
 
Dodge explains the main idea behind encouraging the use of of local courts is that, in most 
instances, the domestic court systems of the United States and Canada will correct their 
mistakes, because a court judgment that violates Chapter Eleven is also likely to violate some 
provisions of domestic law.57 However, Bjorklund argues that if a large amount of 
arbitrations waive the local remedies rule, then this will likely become ever more 
questionable.58 It is also believed that if the rule is applied in the context of investor-state 
disputes, it could help to strengthen and integrate domestic and international systems for 
investor protection.59 At the same time, it should be noted that Chapter Eleven permits 
investors to bring claims before a NAFTA tribunal directly if they wish to do so.60 However, 
this is not a condition. In Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States the Tribunal 
explains as follows, “In common with almost all investment treaties, there is no requirement 
of local remedies.”61  
 
It is true that there are other BITs which do not require local remedies. The Austria-United 
Arab Emirates BIT (2001) Article 10 (5) reads as follows, “If the investor chooses to file for 
arbitration, the host contracting Party agrees not to request the exhaustion of local settlement 
procedures.”62 Most BITs and investment model treaties do not encourage local remedies in 
investment treaty disputes.   
 
It should be noted that the text of BITs might include amicable settlement periods, such as 
between three to six months. However, in practise, it has been shown that this period of time 
is not sufficient to reach to an amicable settlement, especially when the investment was 
millions of (USD) dollars. Furthermore, this waiting period can be dismissed on the grounds 
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that it is directory and procedural, rather than mandatory or jurisdictional in nature.63 Also, 
such waiting periods are often treated more like ‘cooling off’ periods than as time to organise 
a serious attempt to settle the dispute domestically.64 However, in reality, it is very rare that 
investment tribunals face this issue.  
 
The case law of the ICSID Convention confirms that, “claimants are not required to exhaust 
local remedies before this Tribunal may hear their claims.”65 Tribunals outside of the ICSID 
Convention have come to the same conclusion, that they do not require any local remedies in 
investor-state disputes.66 There might be different reasons for not to requesting local remedies 
as the rule in investor-state disputes. However, it is obvious that the rule developed in an age 
when claims were relatively few in number, and the applicable international law was 
relatively stable. Furthermore, for practical purposes the local remedies rule usually has little 
or no effect on most claims.67  
 
At present, if, in all investor-state disputes, local remedies were only available or made a 
condition for the tribunal, then most claimants would go home empty-handed.68 This would 
be risky for foreign investors from less developed countries.69 Schreuer states that the ICSID 
Convention would be seriously affected by the intervention of domestic courts.70 However, 
this does not mean that investor-state disputes do not need any involvement from domestic 
courts. Rather, an enforcement mechanism should be available to domestic courts.  
 
Nevertheless, there are exceptional times when tribunals might insist on the exhaustion of all 
local available remedies before arbitration begins. This demand may be made in the 
following circumstances: (i) in a bilateral investment treaty that offers submission to ICSID 
arbitration; (ii) in domestic legislation; or (iii) in a direct investment agreement that contains 
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an ICSID clause.71 It should also be noted that the condition set that local remedies must be 
exhausted before resorting to ICSID arbitration is valid only up to a fixed time (if any) but 
not later.72 In investor-state disputes where a case involves a license, or when other local 
issues, such as safety and security issues, are in question, then as a primary solution local 
remedies should be sought first by investors. In Maffezini v. Spain, the Claimant was able to 
rely on the most favored-nation (MFN) principle, but the Tribunal explained the following:   
 
“[I]f one contracting party has conditioned its consent to arbitration on the exhaustion of 
local remedies, which the ICSID Convention allows, this requirement could not be 
bypassed by invoking the most favored nation clause.73 
 
In the same Maffezini v. Spain case the Tribunal stressed that if the parties agreed on ‘fork in 
the road’ provisions, where an investor needs to choose between the local courts or 
international arbitration, the investor’s choice is final and irreversible.74 At the same time, a 
member of Tribunal explained that, “the exhaustion of local remedies rule is imposed on a 
party to resort only to such remedies as are effective.”75 The language of the Convention 
suggests that, on the one hand, in investor-state disputes it is not required to follow the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule. Nevertheless, on the other hand, there must be local 
remedies in denial of justice cases, as is the situation when national courts fail to provide fair 
and equitable treatment and justice to investors. Paulson names recognised denial of justice 
situations as: the refusal of access to a court to defend legal rights; the refusal to decide; 
unconscionable delay; manifest discrimination’ corruption’ or subservience to executive 
pressure.76 
 
In recent decades, the rise of ‘internationalised’ investments has revealed that the host state’s 
national laws are sometimes not enough to protect investors. The report of the Executive 
Directors to the ICSID Convention explains that, “…investment agreements entered into in 
recent years show that both States and investors frequently consider that it is in their mutual 
interests to agree to resort to international methods of settlement.”77 Indeed, legal and 
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arbitration costs for parties in recent investor-state disputes have averaged at over USD 8 
million, with costs exceeding USD 30 million in some cases.78 ICSID claims typically take 
more than four years to settle.79 Presumably, because of this, states like Australia have openly 
declared that it will no longer include an arbitration clause in investment treaties, and, 
therefore, it will negotiate on the basis that investment disputes with foreign investors are 
heard in domestic courts.80 In addition, there is significant support for the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule in the European Union (EU). In 2011, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the EU’s future of international of investment policy, in the belief that, 
“changes must be made to the present [investor-state] disputes settlement regime and… [to 
make an] obligation to exhaust local judicial remedies where they are reliable enough…”81 In 
the future investor-state dispute mechanisms must be structured to supplement domestic legal 
systems by requiring investors to exhaust local remedies first. It is assumed that this kind of 
settlement mechanism is appropriate in law abiding nations, where it gives investors a way to 





The recent trend for the globalisation of trade has led to state intervention in foreign 
investment disputes becoming minimal. This move is reflected in the available provisions of 
international instruments that deal with international trade. This chapter has focused on 
analysing the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule as a pre-requisite for invoking diplomatic 
protection, and state intervention, to protect its nationals. The chapter has looked at the 
narrow interpretation of the condition where the exhaustion of local remedies rule leads to 
state intervention in the shape of diplomatic protection. Resultantly, the ICSID and other 
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related international institutions have created international forums for the resolution of 
international disputes. This chapter concludes that this new wider interpretation has come 
about due to two main reasons: Firstly, ascertaining the exhaustion of local remedies is a 
complex process, in which both foreign investors and contracting states may shift the burden 
on each other. Secondly, the lengthy process of local remedies may jeopardise the interests of 
foreign investors, and this can affect the growth of international trade and globalisation. 
Keeping in mind these two factors, the ICSID has interpreted the condition of the exhaustion 








This chapter will examine the roles of diplomats and arbitrators in the context of the thesis. 
This is because DP forms part of the role of diplomats, and, therefore, it is important to 
understand who diplomats are, and why they are important for investors. Furthermore, as 
noted in previous chapters, DP is not always provided to nationals. In some cases, requests 
are rejected. In this situation, diplomats are key persons who can make decisions or report 
back to the home state, and they can support or reject a national’s claim. They do this after 
assessing relationships and the worthiness of protection. In some cases, even if they start to 
investigate a case, they might be asked return to their home state, or they might be transferred 
to another country. In such situations, investors have to make contact with new diplomats so 
that they can renew their claims and seek diplomatic protection. However, these procedures 
can be costly from a financial and moral perspective. If investors are not successful in their 







Previous chapters of this thesis have explained that, in earlier centuries, the settlement 
process used in investor-state disputes was not as institutionalised as it is today, and 
numerous factors played an important role in the resolution of disputes. These factors 
included: home state involvement (diplomatic protection), state power, international law, and 
the role of politicians, especially diplomats, who were tasked to make decisions about 
disputes. During the 1950s, the use of 'gunboat diplomacy' or 'diplomatic protection' began to 
fade, because it had ceased to function properly. DP and other ideas about corporate 
legitimacy, appropriate business conduct, and foreign policy began to contribute to a new 
business climate.1 This new climate also applied to investment disputes. In the 20th century, 
investment protection continued to play a significant role in diplomatic issues, even when 
																																																						





BITs were introduced. At first, BITs were often used to promote or tie in diplomatic links 
between states.2 At this time, diplomats were expected to be conflict managers and problem 
solvers as well as the main negotiators of international agreements and treaties between 
states, and the role of the diplomat was more complex than it is now.   
 
Diplomats are trusted officials of state, and the decisions they make often reflect the positions 
of their home state. This is why, for some scholars, diplomatic practice is interpreted as an 
early example of govern-mentality.3 In the contemporary world, diplomacy is a highly 
legalised role.4 This aspect of the diplomatic role emerged due to the proliferation of 
international law. International conventions now clearly define a diplomat’s role and 
responsibilities. In addition, it is expected that diplomats or consulates must protect their 
state's national interests. In 1961 diplomatic mission was legalised by the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations (1961).5 According to Article 3 (b) of this Convention, it is the 
diplomat's function to protect the interests of his state, and its nationals (investors) within 
limits permitted by international law. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, 
provides similar protection.6 In Article 5 (a) of this Convention, individuals as well as 
corporations are mentioned. 
 
In this part of the chapter, I compare the roles of diplomats and arbitrators in the context of 
the thesis. This is because DP forms part of the role of diplomats, and, therefore, it is 
important to understand who diplomats are, and why they are important for investors. 
Furthermore, as noted in previous chapters, DP is not always provided to nationals. In some 
cases, requests are rejected. In this situation, diplomats are key persons who can make 
decisions or report back to the home state, and they can support or reject a national’s claim. 
They do this after assessing relationships and the worthiness of protection. In some cases, 
even if they start to investigate a case, they might be asked to return to their home state, or 
they might be transferred to another country. In such situations, investors have to make 
contact with new diplomats so that they can renew their claims and seek diplomatic 
protection. However, these procedures can be costly from a financial and moral perspective. 
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If investors are not successful in their first application or communication with diplomats, they 
will be more hesitant to re-contact their embassies. 
 
In the 21st century, the diplomat’s role is not significantly different from that of the lawyer, 
judge or arbitrator, but diplomats must be able to think from an international relations 
perspective in the first instance.7 They need to return home with some kind of achievement of 
their goals.8 This means they are often biased in favour of the national interests of their home 
state. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect neutrality or impartiality from diplomats, as it is 
required from arbitrators or judges. Accordingly, from a dispute settlement perspective, it 
must be understood that the role of the diplomat, including their attitudes and values, is 
usually influenced by foreign policy factors.9 These factors often affect the conclusion of 
disputes. This means that they do not seek to apply the law impartially. Therefore, when 
disputes are settled by diplomats, the results might be different from those deemed by judges 
or arbitrators. However, the international community has experienced the use of ‘diplomacy’ 
as a dispute settlement mechanism in investment or trade disputes. For example, in respect of 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) (1947), it was concluded that the use of 
'diplomacy' (state-to-state) was a weaknesses of the GATT system.10 Hudec describes the 
situation as follows:  
 
…everything begins with the formal legal structure - the obligations interpretative 
precedents and the like. But the extent to which these sources come forward in any situation 
will vary greatly according to prevailing community. One must expect to find, therefore, 
that GATT law will be of a rather uneven quality, varying from issue to issue and 
significantly, from time to time.11   
 
Scholars argue that one of the main causes of this weakness is that disputes were settled by 
diplomats or GATT Secretariat Officials, rather than by lawyers. Secondly, diplomacy itself 
allows room for manoeuvre in every part of the process.12 The successor of GATT was the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, under this system, Pauwelyn notes that 57% of 
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WTO panellists are Geneva based diplomats, and only 15% are experts in private law.13 Here 
it is worth to mention a brief history of GATT and discusses why it was dissolved after 50 
years of functioning. It ceased with the foundation of WTO in 1995. 
 In 1947, GATT was signed by 23 countries and these countries became contracting 
parties to this agreement. Membership in GATT allowed for contracting parties to engage in 
a set of rules that promoted international trade, reduced import tariffs, and treated other 
nationals without any discrimination at the national level. Nevertheless, certain weaknesses 
accelerated the demise of GATT. For instance, agricultural and textile products, trade 
services, and the protection of intellectual property rights were not governed by GATT 
disciplines.14 Moreover, as mentioned earlier trade disputes were not settled, as they should 
be in modern times. At the time, it was accepted that GATT had the most developed and 
active systems of formal dispute settlement15 nonetheless, contracting parties did not settle 
their conflicts for years and ultimately lacked any enforcement mechanism.  
In Uruguay, on 20 September 1986, GATT trade ministers launched eight rounds of 
trade negotiations between contracting parties. They discussed all the weaknesses and the 
overall functioning of the GATT system. The contracting parties successfully completed their 
Uruguay meeting on 15 December 1993 and they updated GATT (1947) and 128 countries 
signed it in 1994. The conclusion of the Uruguay meeting and signing of the agreements in 
1994 transformed GATT into the WTO. On 1 January 1995, WTO officially started to 
operate. Currently it has 164 members and represents 98% of the world’s trade.16 As 
previously noted, WTO’s main aim was to rectify GATT’s weaknesses and disadvantages. 
Importantly, WTO became an institution with a proper secretariat.  
The functions of the WTO are described in Article III of the organization. According 
to that Article III, the WTO shall, first, facilitate the implementation, administration and 
operation, and further objectives of the Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. 
Second, it shall provide a forum for negotiations among its members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations. Third, it shall govern the dispute settlement understandings 
between member states. Fourthly, the WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review 
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Mechanism. Lastly, it shall cooperate as appropriate with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and their 
affiliated agencies.17  
As the successor of GATT, the WTO’s main aim was to rectify previous weaknesses.  
Hence, the WTO provides an amended and upgraded version of GATT. Unlike GATT, the 
WTO covers agriculture and textile products, bank and insurance services, hotel and tour 
operators, transport companies, intellectual property rights, and efficient and enforceable 
dispute settlement. The WTO trade monitoring system allows for improved transparency and 
understanding of the trade policies in member countries of the institution.18   
In GATT, as in other trade and investment sectors, dispute settlement mechanisms are 
removed from diplomacy to legally enforceable mechanisms, which are more efficient and 
reliable during a shorter time. Hence, dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO are 
becoming more popular. According to the latest statistics, compare to 2017 in 2018 the 
number of registered disputes were doubled and, 38 new disputes were initiated by member 
states, which again confirms that the WTO is becoming more popular – not only in trade but 
for settling disputes among member countries too.19 
After all, nowadays many contemporary diplomats have either practised as lawyers or 
have legal training, and lawyers usually advise all of them.20 Even so, sometimes, their 
dispute settlement methods are not strong enough to satisfy conflicted parties. In other words, 
the methods used by diplomats are sometimes very low in legalism, and this allows disputing 
parties to reject any proposed settlement lawfully.21 Also, diplomats are not always able to 
solve conflicts between parties, and they need to request additional help and support from 
lawyers. These problems have incentivised some to request a move from diplomacy as a 
dispute resolution mechanism towards legalism, by the appointment of ad hoc arbitrators, in 
order to address particular disputes.22  
 
As a dispute settlement mechanism, arbitration was designed to be practical, in that 
arbitrators would be more involved in settling disputes between parties, rather than 
diplomats. Arbitrator participation in investment disputes has resolved a lot of avoidable 
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problems, which have prevailed with diplomat involvement. Moreover, it should be noted 
that not only diplomats, but judges, as generalists, may be relatively unfamiliar with the facts 
or laws in front of them, and arbitrators are often very highly appreciated for their expertise 
in their field.23 Nowadays, arbitrators, not diplomats or judges, are at the centre of 
international investment dispute resolution, because they are more valued and trusted. Their 
role is vital in the global economy, to oversee disputes involving billions of dollars, and to 
make decisions that take into account transnational rules of law.24 The move from diplomacy 
to rule of law, was a significant transformation around the world, and is classed as the most 
important legal development of the post-cold war age.25  
 
In the past, investors were not substantially active in the dispute resolution process. This was 
because governments appointed diplomats and judges, and the parties did not have any power 
of influence. With arbitration, one of the advantages for disputing parties is that they are free 
to select 'judges of their own choice'.26 In other words, disputing parties are allowed to select 
their own arbitrators. In describing the role of the arbitrator, Park explains, ‘in real estate the 
three key elements are “location, location, location” so in arbitration the applicable trinity is 
arbitrator, arbitrator, and arbitrator.’27 This view is confirmed by a survey of International 
Arbitration from Queen Mary University of London, 2012. In this survey 76% of the 
respondents said they preferred to select their own arbitrators in two co-arbitration and three-
member tribunals.28 In general, the selection and appointment procedure for arbitrators is 
based on applicable international treaties and institutional rules. For instance, the 2012 U.S. 
Model of BIT provides that, ‘Unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall 
comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each of the disputing parties and the 
third, who shall be the presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing 
parties.’29   
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Article 37 of the ICSID Convention applies a similar appointment system for arbitrators as 
that described above, and if parties cannot agree on the selection of arbitrators, then the 
tribunal appoints them. UNCITRAL rules have similar provisions, where each party selects 
their own arbitrators.30 This selection process is one of the core elements of the arbitration 
process for many parties, and it is the main reason why they choose arbitration over other 
methods of dispute resolution in the first place.31 In other words, it helps place parties in an 
equal position. Diplomatic or political dispute settlement methods do not offer this kind of 
equality to the disputing parties.  
 
The ICSID Convention Article 14 (1) requires that arbitrators who are selected to a tribunal 
are as follows, ‘[they] shall be persons of high moral character and recognised competence in 
the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment.’32 Furthermore, they have to share the same nationality as the people 
they are representing.33 In UNCITRAL rules the arbitrator nationality requirement is not as 
strict as it is in the ICSID Convention. UNCITRAL approaches this issue as follows:  
 
The appointing authority shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure the 
appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator and shall take into account the 
advisability of appointing the arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the 
parties.34  
 
Article 6 (7) of UNCITRAL states that arbitrators must be independent and impartial. If 
either party has justifiable doubts regarding an appointed arbitrator’s ‘independence’ or 
‘impartiality’ then they are allowed to request a disqualification.35 The ICSID has a similar 
policy regarding the neutrality of arbitrators. Article 57 of the ICSID Convention clearly 
states that, ‘A party may propose to a ... Tribunal the disqualification of any of its members 
on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities required by paragraph (1) of 
Article 14.’36  
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It is important to understand that at the beginning of any arbitration process, appointing 
unbiased arbitrators is very important. Taking the necessary steps at the beginning of the 
arbitration process can help manage time and money costs for the disputing parties. If this is 
not done, after the conclusion of arbitration, a lack of independence and impartiality might 
become grounds for commencing an annulment process of the award.37   
 
Preventing difficulties occurring before and after the arbitration process is possible only if the 
arbitrators are unbiased, impartial and independent during the investor-state conflict period. 
To date, in forty-seven ICSID cases, arbitrators have been challenged by either party.38 
However, only in four cases were the arbitrators disqualified.39 In Caratube v Republic of 
Kazakhstan40 the following was noted:   
 
In these cases [the above mentioned disqualified arbitrators], Dr. Kim Yong Kim, the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council found that ‘Articles 57 and 14(1) of the 
ICSID Convention do not require proof of actual dependence or bias; rather it is sufficient 
to establish the appearance of dependence or bias’. Therefore, the Claimants must show 
that a third party would find that there is an evident or obvious appearance of lack of 
impartiality or independence based on a reasonable evaluation of the facts in the present 
case.41  
 
In other words, disqualifying an arbitrator is not an easy task. The disputing parties must 
prove that a lack of independence or impartiality is not only possible but also highly 
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No arbitrator and more generally, no human being of a certain age is, in absolute terms, 
independent and impartial. Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and opinions 
based on its moral cultural and professional education and experience. What is required, 
when it comes to rendering judgment in a legal dispute, is the ability to consider and 
evaluate the merits of each case, without relying on factors that have no relation to such 
merits.43  
 
Attention is drawn to the idea that arbitrators should not confuse and combine non-linked 
merits to the case. This scenario might help to define the main difference between diplomats 
and arbitrators. For diplomats, it would be very difficult to solve investor-state disputes 
without assessing the importance of the dispute and their state's interest. However, for 
arbitrators it is not a case. Their task is solving investor-state disputes in a fair and efficient 
ways. In recent years, no empirical proof has been unearthed to show that arbitrators make 
worse decisions than national court judges. However, there is proof that national court 
judges, even in developed states, like the United States of America, are biased.44 Under such 






Foreign investment is a vital part of the international political economy, and the protection of 
investors is one of the core elements of maintaining this system.45 Historically, home states 
have sought to protect their investors using local courts or diplomatic channels, but this has 
not always been an easy task, especially for weaker and less developed states. As explained 
in previous chapters, in the past, imperial states have applied ‘gunboat diplomacy’ against 
developing countries. The most prolific era for using this system was during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, and the actions taken by powerful states were seen as legal. Even wars between 
states were accepted as legal actions by imperial states.46 Powerful and developed countries 
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have also used diplomatic protection, taking sanctions and applying political pressure to 
achieve their goals. For investors, these methods have not always been the most painless or 
most preferable protection systems, and for home states, these methods of protection have 
sometimes been accompanied by negative diplomatic, political and economic consequences. 
These kinds of protection mechanisms are not satisfactory, even for the most developed 
countries like the United States. Vandevelde explains this situation as follows, ‘It complicates 
the situation and impedes the conduct of a foreign policy in the broad national interest. 
Moreover, an investment dispute will be always a political problem and can become a foreign 
policy nightmare.’47 
 
In an attempt to avoid these kinds of situations, in the 1930s the idea of BITs was floated. 
Idelson explains that the protection of countries and companies would be, ‘…much easier for 
the State concerned if the rights of such nationals were defined by elaborate treaties and not 
allowed to rest on general principles of International Law. Those principles were formulated 
in times when the economic life of nationals was much simpler than it is today.’48  
 
BITs allow parties to settle conflicts at an investor-state level, while investment arbitration 
means that arbitrators can guide parties towards working out their own remedies. BITs allow 
host states to attract more investments from abroad. In general, BITs protect, liberalise, 
promote and regulate investments.49 The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and 
Pakistan, and linked a capital exporter state with a capital importer, and was one of the first 
phases of implementing an international investment regime. Article 3 (I) of this first BIT 
states that, ‘Investments by nationals or companies of either Party shall enjoy protection and 
security in the territory of the other Party.’ This was done to promote and encourage both 
parties to work in both countries. However, this first BIT did not include an investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) clause.  
 
The first BIT to include an ICSID clause was between the Netherlands and Indonesia in 
1968. However, this did not mark the beginning of investor-state arbitration. Yackee claims 
that investor-state arbitration did not even begin with the Chad-Italy BITs, but in 1864 when 
investor-state arbitration was recorded between the Suez Canal Company (the investor) and 
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Egypt where Napoleon III (Louis-Napoleon) the Emperor of France, was the arbiter of the 
dispute.50   
 
Nowadays, investor-state arbitration remains a popular investment dispute settlement 
mechanism used by states and investors. However, state-to-state arbitration or direct 
diplomatic or economic intervention by the home state of the investor is also used. However, 
when using these settlement mechanisms, investors are less active in the process, and there is 
a chance that they might not be compensated. In investment arbitration there is no such risk. 
Furthermore, in modern times, it is very difficult to imagine any foreign ministers of 
developed or developing countries who would welcome other alternatives except for 
arbitration.51 The next part of this chapter will explore different points of view about the 
different mechanisms available. This discussion will pose the question of what BITs mean for 
developing and developed countries. Here it should be mentioned that 'developing countries’ 
also include 'third world', 'less-developed' or 'underdeveloped' countries, and, these countries 
are, increasingly, being referred to as countries in the ‘south’.52 Developed countries are, 
traditionally, classified as those in the 'west' or the 'north' and are often referred to as 'high 





There is no globally accepted multilateral instrument for the regulation of foreign 
investment.54 Nowadays, multilateral or bilateral treaties between states protect ‘foreign 
investment’. The definition of 'investment treaty' is explained by Salacuse as, ‘an 
international agreement embodied in one or more written documents by which two or more 
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states agree to certain legal rules to govern investments undertaken by nationals of one treaty 
party in the territory of another treaty party.’55  
 
BITs started to become popular after the first BIT between Pakistan and Germany was issued 
in 1959. In the decades that followed, states began to sign their first BITs. However, until the 
1990s only a limited number of BITs had been signed. BITs were seen not only as legally 
binding documents between states, but as instruments to promote economic diplomacy.56 In 
other words, when signing BITs, developing countries had strong expectations that BITs 
would help strengthen relationships between parties, and increase trade, foreign aid, security 
assistance, and technology transfer.57 A combination of nurturing these hopes and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in more BITs being signed between capital exporters 
and capital importers.58 At the time, developed countries took advantage of being capital 
exporters and, during the negotiation process they became the final decision makers. 
However, this dynamic began to change after some years. Now, more than 3,000 BITs have 
been signed and almost 2,500 of these BITs are in force.59 This means that most countries 
have signed at least one agreement.60  
 
It is common for developing states to be eager to sign BITs with developed states. This 
‘paradoxical’ behaviour has been noted by Kaushal, who explains that in 1974 a Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States61 allowed developing countries national sovereignty 
and full control over the investments of foreign investors in their territories. Moreover, this 
Charter gives permission for disputes to be settled in the national court of the host state, but 
international arbitration is not mentioned. However, by signing BITs, developing countries 
can lose their rights and give their sovereignty away.62 Nonetheless, to date BITs have been 
very popular between developed and developing states. Since 2000 they have become more 
popular, even if only with developing countries. For this reason, BITs between developing 
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countries are often described as: 'south-south' bilateral investment treaties.63 Over the past 
few decades, 'south-south' investment treaties have become more popular because more 
developing countries have become capital exporters, and so they are using BITs to protect 
their investments in different countries.  
 
Nevertheless, as Craven claims, ‘every treaty, in some respect is a manifestation of inequality 
- whether it is in terms of a substantive lack of equilibrium in the respective burdens and 
benefits, or in terms of the unequal bargaining power of the contracting parties.’64 This 
situation also applies to investment treaties. For example, China is a ‘developing’ country, 
albeit one with great economic and financial power. However, when the Chinese Government 
sign a BIT with another developing state it is classed as a 'south-south' agreement, but both 
states are not usually on the same economic level. However, Elvarez explains that this kind of 
treaty is no longer a one sided tool for the imposition of western power. States who sign such 
agreements not only protect developed countries investors, but their own investors in other 
developed countries.65 A similar argument is explored by Miles, who comments that the 
imperialist dynamics of some ‘south-south' agreements have come to resemble those of the 
‘north-south’ which, ‘remains the same but in new hands.’66 Finally, it is worth noting that 
the template of the 'south-south' BIT is almost the same as that of the 'north-south', without 
much difference.  
 
Usually, BITs cover the interests of three parties: the investor, the host country where the 
investment takes place, and the home country of the investor.67  Before BITs, the Hull Rule 
protected investors.68 Guzman claims that BITs offer more efficient protection than the Hull 
Rule ever did. Moreover, BITs provide an aggrieved investor access to binding arbitration, 
with an enforcement mechanism, which is efficient and effective in comparison to the Hull 
																																																						
63 Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘The Politics of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties’, in Tomer Broude and 
Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges, The Politics of International Economic Law (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 186. 
64 Matthew Craven, ‘What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire’ (2005) 74 
Nordic Journal of International Law 338-339. 
65 Jose E Alvarez, 'The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime' in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Jacob Katz 
Cogan et al. (eds) Looking to the Future Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Mucheal Reisman 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 626. 
66 Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of 
Capital (Cambridge University Press 2013) 91. 
67 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: National Contractual and International 
Framework for Foreign Capital (Oxford University Press 2013) 18-22; Jeswald W Salacuse (n 48) 46-49. 




Rule.69 Indeed, investors can benefit from BITs in two ways: BITs discourage treaty breaches 
and provide compensation for any treaty breaches that still exist.70 However, the protection 
offered to investors via BITs should be understood correctly, but BITs legally protect 
investors nonetheless. Indeed, Alvarez explains that BITs do not provide a fool-proof method 
of forcing compliance on a restrained state.71 
 
Generally, when the first BITs were signed, they were signed between capital exporting states 
(developed states) and capital importing states (developing states). Developing countries 
signed BITs with other states in order to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
their market. A BIT was an invitation for potential investors from a developed country to 
invest in LDCs. As Salacuse and Sullivan explain, ‘this was a grand bargain: a promise of 
protection of capital in exchange for the prospect of more investment.’72 
 
Soon, BITs became the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement 
and governance of FDI73 and were the predominant method of regulating FDI.74 Therefore, 
BITs became national policy in the western world, and western countries began to compete 
with each other to sign more investment agreements in developing countries. In countries 
such as the USA, BITs were a foreign policy tool used as, ‘a means to facilitate liberalisation 
of the economies of developing countries.’75 The USA began to recognise that developing 
countries might want to sign BITs in order to privatise and liberalise their economies. 
International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank also supported this view; 
signing BITs with developing countries became a condition to get support from these 
institutions.76 Allee and Peinhardt find that host states that depend upon foreign aid from 
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actors such as the World Bank are more willing to include ICSID in their BITs.77 However, 
in general, LDCs do not usually wish to change their behaviours or their national laws, or 
even substitute their own legal systems or institutional quality, except to attract more FDI 
from the developed world.78  
 
It soon became obvious for LDCs that adopting international policies and legal systems is 
important in order to attract FDI. However, by signing BITs, LDCs do not seek to unite their 
national laws with those of different countries, and BITs are no substitute for a weak 
investment environment.79 If all parties to a BIT have a weak investment regime, their 
investment treaty might be interpreted as having symbolic importance, and nothing more.80 
 
The main expectation of LDCs when they enter into BITs is to attract more investment. 
Accordingly, for them, they must understand that FDI is vulnerable to uncertainty, including 
uncertainty stemming from poor government efficiency, policy reversals, the weak 
enforcement of property rights, and the legal system in general.81 However, scholars do not 
always support this view. In 1986, Sornarajah, said that, ‘in reality attracting FDI depends 
more on the political and economic climate for its existence rather than on the creation of a 
legal structure for its protection.’82 This view is supported by other scholars, including 
Hallward-Driemeier, who after analysing twenty years of bilateral FDI flows, came to the 
conclusion that: 
 
It is not a condition to sign BITs to attract more FDI, and little evidence has been found that 
BITs have stimulated additional investment. Those countries with weak domestic 
institutions, including the protection of property, have not gotten significant additional 
benefits; BITs have not acted as a substitute for broader domestic reform.83   
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Nevertheless, one recent study finds that signing BITs positively affects some sectors, and 
increases FDI in signatory countries.84 Here, it is worth mentioning that if the economic 
situation of a host country is stressful and vulnerable, they sometimes appear keen to sign 
BITs with capital-exporters, even if the investment is not significantly large from the 
developed countries.  
 
Over time, many developing countries have come to realise that BITs do not attract more 
FDI, as they expected. For instance, Brazil has signed more than twenty BITs, but only one 
has been ratified.85 Furthermore, this did not stop the country attracting more FDI from 
abroad. If disputes arise with Brazilian investors or against Brazil, these disputes are resolved 
using inter-state mechanisms, domestic procedures, or negotiation.86 
 
Recent research by Poulsen and Aisbeet found that almost half of developing countries that 
have undertaken investor-state arbitration have come away with fines of hundreds of millions 
of dollars fines against the developing countries. After this experience of investment 
arbitration, developing countries have come to understand that adopting BITs can bear 
considerable risk, and now sign BITs with more caution.87 These results have also slowed 
down the signing of BITs.88 Developing states are beginning to question BITs and are re-
evaluating their participation in them.89 In other words, although BITs can have a positive 
impact on FDI flows into developing countries, this works only for those countries that have 
not had BIT claims brought to arbitration.90  
 
For some countries, being a respondent in investment arbitration has changed their behaviour. 
Ecuador is an example of this. One Ecuadorian official has explained that in the, ‘early days 
of the BITs [Ecuador] did not understand the responsibilities and obligations of BITs, but 
they started to understand only when they were sued.’91 When referencing Swiss investment 
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negotiations and claims, Poulson notes that in the 1990s most developing countries were not 
aware what they were signing.92 In another article, Poulsen attempts to explain why BITs 
have not been helpful for developing countries for attracting FDI into their markets. Poulson 
argues the following:  
 
1) From an investor’s point of view, the reduction of risk may often be much lower than 
assumed. 
 
2) Developing states often work with financial institutions such as the World Bank, OPIC, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank, 
and developing countries become dependent on these agencies rather than using legal 
protection available in treaties. (They include these institutions’ protection systems in their 
investment policies.)  
 
3) Obtaining investment insurance as an alternative to a BIT is a more straightforward way of 
avoiding political risk. Poulson explains that investors can obtain compensation much more 
quickly and more easily, even if the host states to refuse to pay for damages. 
 
4) In the absence of a BIT investors can protect their assets using carefully signed contracts, 
and using a BIT is not the only way of attracting FDI into a developing country’s market.93  
 
The next section of this research explores what BITs mean for developed countries. It will 
investigate why many countries, after being sued in investment arbitration, have decided to 





Previous sections of this chapter have explored the main reasons why developing countries 
sign BITs. This is mainly because they want to attract FDI. However, in developed states the 
situation is different. In other words, developed countries do not perceive BITs in the same 
way as developing countries do. The main goal of the developed country when entering into a 
BIT is not to attract foreign investment, but to protect the interests of their investors. In the 
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1960s when the first BITs were signed, officials of capital exporting states recognised three 
ways of protecting investors: using a substantive code; using an investment insurance 
institution; and using a convention on investor-state arbitration.94 At this time, scholars such 
as Broches encouraged developing and developed countries to negotiate investment treaties 
and to adopt BITs with investor-state arbitration clauses.   
 
The role of developed states in the foundation of BITs is significant. However, it is important 
to ask which countries are classed as ‘developed’, and what makes a country a ‘developed’ 
state? According to the UN Human Development Index 201895 or a Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) March 2018 report almost all European countries are classed as developed, 
but outside of Europe only a few countries are counted as being developed. Nevertheless, 
there are some exceptions to this rule, even among European States. These are the some 
European states that export less, are poorer, and are smaller than other European states, and 
these places include: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. The FTSE identifies developed states outside of Europe as: Australia, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, and the USA.96   
 
The negotiation process for BITs in developing and developed states is different. Ackerman 
and Tobin explain that the identity of treaty partners (either in developing or developed 
states) has an effect on investment, property rights, and the discussion process for BITs.97 
Therefore developing countries are in the process of signing agreements accepted a deal that 
are more favourable to the stronger more developed countries.98 A similar explanation has 
been offered by the BIT expert Salacuse (2017), who claims that, as a treaty partner, the, 
‘richer [developed country] is better than the poorer.’99 He explains why developed countries 
are different from developing or poor countries, noting that: firstly, developed countries have 
large numbers of potential investors; secondly, large capital exporting countries usually have 
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more negotiating power and can obtain higher levels of protection in comparison to the poor 
partners; thirdly, richer and more developed countries have sufficient funding for diplomatic 
and political institutions in order to persuade investment treaty partners, and to protect their 
investors abroad; finally, the enforcement process of awards and the signing of BITs (with 
the USA and Germany) sends a positive message to international capital markets which 
might benefit from investment. However, establishing an investment agreement between two 
or more developing countries does not send the same positive message to the market, 
especially for the investors from developed countries.100 
 
In developed countries BITs are accepted as the, ‘handiwork of powerful investors.’101 This is 
because investors often lobby their home states to sign an investment treaty with other 
developing states. For instance, the German companies and investors such as Daimler-Benz, 
Liebherr, and Mann initiated Germany-China BITs. Other well-known companies, such as 
Siemens lobbied their home government to sign an investment treaty with China. The 
lobbying process began in 1979, and the treaty was concluded in 1983.102 However, 
nowadays, developed countries investors are less interested in BITs. In 2000, when the 
European Commission asked about the role of BITs for European investors, almost half of 
the respondents (300 investors) replied that they never heard of the treaties and only 10% had 
used BITs in their investment activities.103 Yackee found a similar result. She asked 200 USA 
top companies whether BITs could influence an investor’s decision, and he found that BITs 
do not always matter to investors when they decide whether to and where to invest.104 These 
results confirm that the function of BITs for developed countries and for their investors is 
perceived differently from how developing countries perceive the function of BITs. 
 
The example above clarifies that, paradoxically, on the one hand, strong investors might 
influence home states and push them to sign investment treaties. At the same time, the same 
companies might not take into consideration BITs when they want to invest in developing 
countries. One reason for this might be because BITs are not usually popular between 
developed countries. Only a few agreements have been set up between developed countries. 
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Additionally, investors from developed countries do not ask their home states to sign BITs 
with other developed states. They believe that the domestic legal systems in the host 
countries are sufficient to deal with their needs and are not discriminatory.105 However, when 
developed states sign BITs with developing countries, the developed countries have two 
advantages: Firstly, developed countries can negotiate protection for their investors on a 
bilateral basis; and Secondly, developed countries can use BITs to inject western arguments, 
ideas, and content from customary international law into developing countries.106 For 
developed countries, trying to protect all investors via diplomatic channels is not practicable 
anymore. For instance, the USA comes first in the global diplomacy index. The country has 
more than 167 embassies and 90 consulates all over the world.107 When countries like the 
USA have embassies and consulates that operate almost in every country, trying to espouse 
investors’ claims and providing DP is not an easy task.   
 
The USA also ranks first for FDI inflows and outflows.108 In the USA, signing a BIT is a 
low-cost foreign policy tool, which is used to promote investment and to protect American 
investors abroad.109 The protection of American investment abroad is an important element of 
USA foreign policy. This protection policy has been an explicit goal of USA foreign policy 
since the earliest days of the independence of the country.110 The USA signed its first BIT on 
29th September 1982 with Egypt, and then on 27th October 1982 with Panama.111 In both 
countries American investors were protected. The Reagan administration provided investors 
with direct access to the ICSID, and this was interpreted as giving an 'added bonus' to 
investors.112 Also, with the emergence of BITs, the USA decided not to deal with all the 
claims of investors.113 If there were any questions regarding compensation for expropriation, 
again BITs were used as a codified document, where, it was established “the fair market 
value of the property as of the date of expropriation, including interest from the date of 
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expropriation to the date of payment”.114 In addition, USA BIT policy was used to settle 
investment disputes at investor-state level. Specifically, it is prohibited for American 
investors to ask for support from their home state once an ICSID arbitral decision has been 
made.115 
 
There is a political dimension for both 'south-north' parties who sign BITs. Chilton explains 
that BITs are not expensive and the Government does not need to outlay significant funds to 
implement BITs. Secondly, he claims that, with BITs, the Government makes 'redundant' 
promises, because foreign investors already have full access to the USA courts. Thirdly, he 
explains that local politicians sell BITs, which provide that American investors are protected 
abroad. Lastly, the negotiation of any new BITs requires little effort.116 Alvarez was part of 
the USA BIT negotiation team in the days when USA BIT policy was being devised. He 
comments as follows:  
 
For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary 'un-coerced' transaction. They [U.S. BIT 
partners] feel that they must enter into the arrangement, or that they would be foolish not to. 
For Latin American countries, the BIT represents a return to the earlier days of reliance on 
FDI before they learned to fear becoming dependent. But the truth is to date the U.S. model 
BIT has been regarded as, generally speaking, a 'take it or leave it' proposition, with the 
United States calling the shots and the BIT partner as supplicant… A BIT negotiation is not 
a discussion between sovereign equals. It is more like an intensive training seminar 
conducted by the United States, on U.S. terms, on what it would take to comply with the 
U.S. draft.117   
 
In other words, the USA signs BITs with states that are ready and willing to accept the USA 
BIT model.118   
 
When using BITs, investment treaty arbitration is an efficient settlement mechanism that is 
used by ‘developed states’ like the USA, but BITs have emerged under different 
circumstances in different countries. In the USA investors lobbied their government to sign 
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BITs with the developing world. However, in the case of the UK, BITs was a government 
policy, and investors did not play any crucial role in the process.119  In practice, it is rare to 
see a claim against a developed country, such as the USA or the UK. To date, only two-
investment treaty claims have been brought against the UK When developing countries began 
to be sued by investors, they hesitated to sign new BITs. Being a respondent in the arbitration 
process is not the same for developing countries, as it is for developed countries. For 
instance, when Germany was a respondent in Vattenfall v. Germany120 a German official said 
that, ‘Overall, the German government's experience with the international dispute settlement 
in this case was positive’ and he, ‘stressed the benefit of the international arbitration 
mechanism in creating an environment in which the disputing parties face strong incentives 
to find constructive solutions to their disputes.’121  
 
Over the last a few years, the BIT process has changed across EU- Member States. On 25th 
October 2010 the European Council adopted Conclusions on a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy122 and the Commission drafted Towards a Comprehensive 
European International Investment Policy.123 The aim of these documents is to deliver better 
results as a union than might be achieved by the member states individually.124 The 
Commission stipulates two main items: Firstly, relating to internal policy, that all investment 
agreements should take into consideration the protection of the environment, decent work, 
health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, and development policy; 
and Secondly, relating to external policy, that states should promote the rule of law, human 
rights, and sustainable development.125 In this regard, in the 20th Century, the aim of BITs 
was to protect investments and investors, but the situation is different in the 21st century; the 
EU has plans to protect their investments abroad while trying to develop other values such as 
human rights, environmental sustainability, and health and safety.    
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On the 1st December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. After this date, the 
commercial and FDI policies of the member states was transferred from individual states to 
EU level.126 The EU signed trade agreements with other developed states: EU-New Zealand, 
EU-Australia, EU-Singapore, EU-USA (The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
TTIP), and EU-Canada (CETA). For example, the provisional CETA entered into force on 
the 21st September 2017. These trade agreements are similar to the previous BITs applied by 
member states. For instance, in the CETA agreement investors are allowed to use the ICSID 
Convention to gain settlement. It is worth noting that the EU is not a contracting party to the 
ICSID Convention. However, according to Article 8.25 of the ICSID, if there is conflict 
between an investor from the EU and Canada, they can go to the ICSID to settle their 
investment dispute. In this regard, under the CETA agreement, the EU, or members of the 
EU, can be a respondent in investment disputes according to Article 8.23, and the agreement 
obliges a determination of the respondent. Agreements such as the CETA between developed 
states are similar to the ‘north-south’ agreements that were used for a long period of time. 
However, establishing BITs between developed countries raises questions about why 
developed countries are still signing BITs between themselves? Lowe suggests that, ‘for 
countries [developing or developed], buying investment guarantees that are provided by BITs 
is much easier than building a reputation as a safe place for investments. A reputation takes 
many years to build, but a BIT can be signed with the stroke of a pen.’127 BITs have a history 
of almost 60 years, and this system has worked until today for all types of states. It is not 
always easy for states to change their behaviour and their investment policy. These kinds of 




During the 19th and 20th centuries, developed countries were able to directly protect their 
investments and investors in developing countries. However, the foundation of arbitration 
institutions, such as the ICSID and UNCITRAL, has worked to change this system in order to 
try to establish 'win-win conditions' for both developing and developed countries. 
International law emerged during a time when many developing countries were still under the 
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direct control of developed states, and these developing states were not able to participate 
directly in international legal environments.128 The previous chapters of this research confirm 
that, even during the negotiation process for BITs, developing countries were not placed on 
the same negotiating level as developed countries. Research also finds that developed 
countries adopted the role of 'rule makers' and developing countries became the 'rule 
takers'.129 For these reasons, developed states gained more chance to protect their investors in 
comparison to developing states.  
 
It is widely agreed that, ‘today's investment regime emerged when the western 'developed' 
countries tried to protect their investors in their colonial empires and facilitate for future 
investments in these countries.’130 After some time, it became noticeable that developed 
states were winning far more investment arbitration cases in comparison to developing 
countries, and this was not merely a hypothetical finding, but one statistically proven by 
researchers. Schultz and Dupont found that between the periods of 1998-2010 developed 
countries were 1.7 times more successful in investment arbitration in comparison with 
developing countries.131 Moreover, Franck finds that the economic or financial circumstances 
of a state have a bearing on the results of investment arbitration; sometimes but not always, 
developed countries win more cases than upper-middle income countries and lower-middle 
income states.132 Therefore, this means that high-income states are stronger than developing 
countries, in this regime. Scholars also believe that if a dispute settlement mechanism favours 
stronger parties to such an extent, then international law is pursued less fully.133 Here, it is 
important to note that the Government of the USA has never lost an investment arbitration 
case as a respondent, but USA investors have lost more than they have won.134  
 
The USA uses the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and 
Investment Disputes (L/CID), which is the largest office in the Department of State's Office 
of the Legal Adviser. This officially, ‘represents the United States and co-ordinates activities 
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within and outside the Department with respect to all aspects of international claims and 
investment disputes.’135 Furthermore, the Department works closely with the Government of 
the USA to protect its interests and those of American investors abroad.136 This could be 
interpreted as a 'home states protection' for investors who want to invest and work abroad. 
This kind of home state support and protection has been widely interpreted and explained by 
the scholars. For instance, Schultz and Dupont argue that investment arbitration has its 'haves' 
and 'have-nots'.137 The 'haves' are the strong parties, and this signals an unequal application of 
the legal regime. Secondly, when 'haves' are characterised, their economic power is taken into 
consideration, and they can afford better legal counsel in comparison to 'poorer' states. 
Thirdly, the 'haves' are high-income countries, and are usually the home states of the 
investors in investment arbitration. Therefore, economic power disparities seem to be a factor 
of success.138 It can be seen that power politics are still alive.139 However, 'power politics' in 
the era of the ICSID Convention means that the 'risky business' of investors has become 
'risky politics' for the LDCs.140 Moreover, some scholars interpret the BIT process as a ‘hand-
tying’ process for developing states.141 Also, they argue, it is expected to address political 
problems too.142  For instance, Alvarez explains the situation in terms of USA BIT policy as 
follows:  
 
The U.S. 'cookie-cutter' approach to BIT negotiation results is a one-way conversation of 
imposed terms. A BIT negotiation is not a discussion between sovereign equals. It is more 
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like an intensive training seminar conducted by the United States, on U.S. terms, on what it 
would take to comply with the U.S. draft.143  
 
The above facts pose some questions, namely, why and how are developed countries more 
successful in investment arbitration? Does the ICSID Convention only stand up for 
developed countries? Does being rich influence the outcome of investment arbitration? Does 
a fragmented form of DP still survive for capital export states? These questions do not have 
one correct answer. Nevertheless, it would not be wrong to claim that investment arbitration 
has helped to depoliticise disputes between host states and investors. In recent decades the 
process was approved by states that preferred to settle their disputes via third party 
participation, but not at a state-state level. Before institutions such as the ICSID came into 
existence, investment disputes were settled on a state-state level, and this served to politicise 
almost all investment claims. However, it should be noted that, in Tokyo in 1964 during an 
ICSID Convention meeting, many developing countries from Latin America voted against 
the ICSID Convention.144 The main reason for their hesitation or saying 'no' to ICSID was 
because, in the past, western developed countries had mistreated developing countries. 
However, when the ICSID Convention was founded, delegations from developed countries 
(the Europeans and Americans) believed that they would never be respondents in investor-
state arbitration, because this mechanism would be primarily used in developing countries.145 
Indeed, scholars confirm that developing countries have typically featured as respondents in 
investors-state arbitration.146  
 
The situation has changed now. Both developed and developing countries are seen to be 
respondents in the process of investment arbitration. And, when all types of countries 
(developing or developed) can become respondents in investor-state disputes, this changes a 
state's behaviour. However, many Latin American states, specifically Bolivia and Ecuador for 
instance, have decided to denounce the ICSID Convention, after having being several time 
respondents in investor-state arbitration. However, Australia has also rejected investor-state 
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arbitration for BITs.147 Between January 2003 and February 2017 Australian investors 
invested more than 20.9 billion US dollars in the USA.148  
 
Interestingly, in the Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), there is no investor-
state settlement mechanism between parties. The Australian Government explains this 
situation as follows; ‘This is in recognition of the Parties' open economic environments and 
shared legal traditions, and the confidence of investors in the fairness and integrity of their 
respective legal systems.’149 When the investors for both parties are not allowed to directly 
claim, they have only one choice, which is to apply for DP, or for any other home state 
support. However, the situation in Australia and in the USA is different. The legal systems of 
both countries are established and reliable, and for investors investing in these countries, 
there is usually no political risk. Moreover, both countries are not classed as weak in the rule 
of law or as corrupt. These kinds of legal and political circumstances allow BIT parties to 
remove investor-state dispute settlement clauses from BITs. In other words, in these countries 
there is no reason to fight for domestic dispute resolution over delegation to the ICSID or 
vice-versa, because in neither case, no one can influence the dispute outcome.150   
 
After reviewing what scholars and states say about investment policies, it is worth looking at 
ICSID statics to assess whether the ICSID stands up only for developed countries. As 
previously noted, the ICSID was founded in 1965. The first dispute submitted to the ICSID 
was in 1972, which was five years after its inception, and this might be thought of as a slow 
start. The first ICSID arbitration case was registered against a developing country was 
Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco.151 Until the 1980s only nine cases were registered 
with the ICSID Secretariat, and, again, all of them were against developing countries.152 
However, from 1981, ICSID cases began to increase rapidly. After this, in almost every year, 
cases were submitted, and, not surprisingly, they were against developing countries. After 
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1987 and until 30 June 2018, 586 cases were recorded.153 Up until 2017, 113 developing 
countries were respondents in at least one investor-state dispute.154 The UNCTAD 2018 
report shows that in investor-state cases, the majority of the respondents were developing 
countries, and developed country investors brought most of the investment cases against 
developing countries. The main investor home countries were the USA, the Netherlands, the 
UK, Germany, Canada, and France.155 Furthermore, states such as the USA and the UK never 
lost their investor-state disputes. According to one researcher, high-income respondents are 
about 22 percentage points more likely to receive a final award by a tribunal, relative to lower 
and middle-income respondents. Also, middle-income governments lose about twice as many 
cases as high-income states.156 Another researcher found that foreign investors win only 17% 
of their cases against developed countries, but have won 62% of ITA cases against 
developing countries. This is almost four times more than developed countries.157 Moreover, 
investors who win against poor countries settle 80% of their disputes; they either win or settle 
their cases.158  
 
The above statistics show that there are economic or trade policy ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ and 
the international investment regime make it harder or easier to win, depending on the poverty 
or wealth of the country.159 For instance, it is true that investors are simply more willing to 
pursue claims against weak and poorer countries than they are to pursue claims against 
wealthy states. They believe that, with their limited resources, it is difficult for poorer 
countries to protect their interests under ICSID jurisdiction. In other words, investors know 
that being economically poor will create problems when trying to fund a defence. A recent 
survey confirms that investment arbitration costs on average about 4.5 million USD for 
respondent states.160 In some cases, the amount might be up to 30 million USD.161 If 
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investors are international companies, and they have enough capital to protect their own 
interests in the host states from early on in the arbitration process, these investors are at an 
advantage in comparison to weaker countries. When the poor and rich states are viewed 
through the lens of an investor they are not equal. This allows investors to make a decision 
about whether to initiate claims against developing and developed countries.  
 
The home states of investors (in developing or developed countries) never become involved 
in the arbitration process in investor-state disputes against host countries. In other words, 
officially, home states do not try to protect investors after the commencement of the 
arbitration process (and if they do, this information is not publicly available). Investment 
cases against countries are settled by third party tribunals, and even enforced by third party 
funding. It is very difficult to find any data to suggest that developed home states become 
directly involved in investment disputes on any grounds to protect their nationals. 
Nevertheless, Sornarajah claims, ‘power continues to dictate the course of developments in 
international foreign investment arbitration.’162 Just not in the outcomes of investor-state 
disputes. Accordingly, just as is the case in other trade and economic deals involving BITs, 
during the negotiation process, powerful states are more advantaged. However, after the 
commencement of arbitration, powerful states are not in a privileged position. In other words, 
they are placed on an equal level with weak states.  
 
The arbitration process is a rule based dispute settlement mechanism designed to resolve 
disputes between parties, and it gives more advantage to weaker states in order to force 
powerful states to hold to the terms of agreements. However, powerful states prefer to use the 
ICSID or other third party institutions to settle investor-state disputes, because, at the end of 
the process, this allows them to enforce an award internationally under international law. 
Paulsson argues that arbitral tribunals are instruments of the rule of law and their purpose is 
not to favour the rich, but to enable states to make trustworthy promises. Decisions should be 
respected in order to achieve the long-term benefits of the rule of law, and these rules are 
preconditioned to create healthy international relations between states.163  
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It is worth noting that developed countries do not usually commence an arbitration processes, 
and, in this way, they differ from developing countries because developed countries 
systematically achieve ‘what they want’ from the BITs they sign.164 This does not require any 
DP or home state involvement in the dispute process. In other words, the powerful states have 
changed their method of protection. In the past they used direct reaction to an investment 
dispute but now they use legal means according to international rules, and before the 
initiation of an arbitration process. The USA is a good example. In 1993 the USA pressured 
Costa Rica to ratify the ICSID Convention. Moreover, the USA has BITs with almost all non-
OECD countries, and American investors are the most active in taking developing countries 
into arbitration.165 This confirms that a powerful state can take action before the arbitration 
process begins.  
 
Lastly, another reason why developed countries are successful in investment disputes, before 
and after the arbitration process, is because of the quality of management of the country, 
especially political regime stability, democratic values, quality of the judiciary system, 
protection of property rights, and levels of political corruption. At this point, as a country, 
Switzerland is a good example of quality management. The country is not as politically and 
economically powerful as other countries, such as the USA or the UK, for example, but 
Switzerland allows investors to invest in their country with minimum risk. As Vogler stated, 
people often believe that Swiss banking secrecy law is key for a country’s financial and 
investment success.166 However, he claimed that until 1935 Switzerland had no national 
banking law or official banking secrecy within the country. After 1935, when the Swiss law 
on Banks and Savings Banks entered into force this marked the birth of modern banking 
secrecy.  
Before the Swiss Banks Law (1935) and especially during the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Geneva and Basel banks conducted business among the wealthy clients of foreign 
countries.167 At that time, there was nothing like Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act. 
According to this Article, all employees or representatives of the financial institutions must 
keep clients’ information secret, even after they stop working for the bank or institution. A 
bank employee breaching the client’s secrecy is prosecutable under Article 47; in the early 
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years it was 50’000 CHF or up to six months in prison, and currently it is 250’000 CHF or 
three years in prison.168  Hence, Article 47 has become harsher in terms of fines and 
imprisonment. This change indicates that client confidentiality is crucial for Swiss 
authorities. However, it does not mean that financial institutions’ clients or investors can earn 
and keep their illegal capital in Swiss banks. The Swiss bank secrecy law should not be 
interpreted as an instrument that supports tax fraud. The bank or financial institution is 
obliged to revoke the confidentiality if a customer is prosecuted for a serious crime or if there 
is tax fraud or criminal activities by the account owners.169 Nevertheless, if there is no tax 
fraud but only tax evasion, in that case the Swiss government does not provide administrative 
or legal assistance to foreign countries; this scenario allows bank account owners to conceal 
their capital in Swiss banks.170 The main reason is that according to Swiss terminology, ‘tax 
evasion’ simply means non-declaration of funds and is a minor infringement of the law, 
sanctioned by monetary fines or prosecuted by tax administrative authorities. By contrast, 
‘tax fraud’ signifies active deception, such as lying or using false documents to mislead the 
authorities; this is a criminal offence and is penalised with imprisonment and is pursued by 
prosecutors.171  According to the Financial Secrecy index Switzerland has the most secretive 
jurisdiction, with a score of 76.172  
In addition, Swiss Bankers Association claims Swiss banks manage 27.5% of the global 
assets that are managed cross-border, and half of the assets under management derive from 
other countries.173 According to the 2019 Index of Economic Freedom, the Swiss economic 
score is 81.9, which makes the country the fourth freest in the world and first in the region.174 
All these data confirm that Switzerland is one of the most secure countries for investment. 
However, the secrecy law of Switzerland is not enough to attract such a vast amount of 
investment or capital to the country. Vogler stated that secrecy is only one element among 
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many other reasons for the country’s success regarding FDI. Other main reasons why 
Switzerland’s banks attract investors to the country are as follows:  
 
1- Political and legal stability and economic prosperity in the country. 
2- Economic prosperity from the constant potential of a strong and convertible currency. 
3- The country has an open and globally networked economy. 
4- The country not only offers foreign investors protection against falling value but its 
prosperity increases the value. 
5- Swiss banks attract foreign capital not only because of the law of secrecy but also 
because the country’s banks have simplified their transactions and minimized political 
and economic issues for foreign investors. 
6- The Swiss banks’ secrecy policy does not encourage criminal or unethical behaviour 
by clients.175  
 
In conclusion, Switzerland’s BITs with other countries and its secrecy law are unlikely to 
be the main reasons it attracts capital into the country. Historically, the country has a legal 
background and is one of the countries in which the protection of property rights is strongly 
enforced. An independent, fair judicial system operates throughout the country. All these 
facts indicate that the country should be assessed as a whole. This provides clear 
understanding of why the country attracts investors and that the secrecy law alone is not 
enough to attract foreign direct investment. In other words, even if a well-managed country 
has not signed BITs with other states, it can still attract investors into their market.  
 
 At the same time, even if countries such as Ecuador or Venezuela sign BITs with other 
countries, including well managed countries, it is not easy for them to attract foreign 
investors, because they do not maintain the same management values as countries such as 
Switzerland, Norway, and some other Western countries. In ‘Why is Africa Poor’ (2010) by 
Acemoglu and Robinson, it is argued that the reason, “African nations are poor today is that 
their citizens have very bad interlocking economic and political incentives. Property rights 
are insecure and very inefficiently organised, markets do not function well, and states are 
weak and political systems do not provide public goods.”176 However, most Western societies 
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have well developed political and national judicial systems. In these countries property rights 
and investors rights are more secure in comparison to the weaker countries. This provides 
more opportunity for developed countries to win in investor-state arbitration cases. This 
might provide an answer to the question ‘Does the ICSID stand for developed countries’ as 
‘No’.    
 
History reveals that developed countries have used ‘gunboat diplomacy’ to protect their 
investors’ interests abroad. However, nowadays, this is not common. The main reason for this 
is because there are enough institutions, such as ICSID, which work to help settle disputes 
between investors and host states, according to international legal norms and regulations. In 
other words, investors do not need home protection anymore. At the same time, for more 
experienced, developed countries, it is more efficient to rely on diplomatic rather than 
legalistic dispute settlement with smaller partners.177 This is because legalistic dispute 
settlement takes a long time, but diplomatic methods for settling disputes usually progress 
more quickly. 
 
It is worth mentioning that very large multinationals (usually set up in developed countries) 
are still able to rely on DP in their home countries, and can obtain similar protections and 
legal guarantees to those provided for in BITs. For that reason, as Poulsen claims, BITs and 
their protections are important not for wealthy investors, but for medium-scale investors.178 
The same rule applies for developed countries. Finally, it is understandable why developed 
and powerful states and/or multinational companies do not need support or help from 
institutions such as the ICSID. This is because they have enough experience, money and 
power to protect their interests with their partners, and in host countries. Nowadays, it is an 
accepted rule that investor-state arbitration is respectable for all types of states and investors. 
Probably for this reason, it is noted that, ‘Arbitration is good when it corrects misbehaviour 
by foreign host states.’179 Looking into the history of the ICSID, it can be seen that it 
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Several years ago, the scholars Alvarez and Topalian suggested that, ‘the international 
investment regime is the enemy of the state.’180 Indeed, some academics and states began to 
see the ICSID as an ‘enemy of the state’ and decided to denounce the ICSID Convention. 
This happened when it was perceived that the institutions surrounding the Convention and the 
Convention itself did not serve the interests of certain governments, and these governments 
decided to change their policies so that they could exit or withdraw from the agreement. In 
particular, at the beginning of the 2000s, some Latin American states started to believe that 
belonging to the ICSID went against their interests, and, on these grounds, in May 2007 the 
World Bank received a notice of withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. This was the first 
time this had happened in the history of the World Bank. The writer of the letter was the 
Republic of Bolivia. The official Bolivian statement suggested that the Convention has the 
following problems:  
 
1) It is an unbalanced arbitration tribunal where only multi-nationals can challenge states. 
2) It is a tribunal that deliberates behind closed doors, and makes its own rules and decisions 
which cannot be challenged. 
3) It is a very expensive tribunal for developing countries. 
4) Large investors seek damages of millions of dollars because they claim not only for 
investments but for loss of future profits. 
5) The World Bank acts as both judge and jury though Corporate Investment Funds, and is 
involved as a shareholder in many private companies controlled by multi-national companies. 
6) The ICSID Convention is a violation of Bolivia's constitutional law.181 
 
Similar views were offered by President Evo Morales, who said that the, ‘ICSID is an 
international organisation where investors bring their grievances and no country, except 
perhaps the United States, will win.’182 The Bolivian denouncement was followed by other 
states: on 6 July 2009 by the Republic of Ecuador, and on 24 January 2012 by Venezuela, 
who also submitted notices of withdrawal to the World Bank. The Ecuadorian President also 
offered a similar view, and claimed that withdrawal was important for, ‘the liberation of our 
countries because ICSID signifies colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, with 
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respect to Washington, and with respect to the World Bank.’183 Argentina also signalled its 
intention to follow its neighbours’ steps and withdraw from the ICSID Convenion, but, to 
date, it has not officially sent a letter to the World Bank.184   
 
These statements paved the way for scholars to agree that investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms can sometimes harm the global economy and international relations.185 Indeed, 
academics began to argue that, ‘With increased political, economic and legal scrutiny on 
international investment dispute resolution it has become a global hot button issue.’186 
Nevertheless, in practise, investor-state conflicts have not switched to inter-state disputes. 
The governments of Bolivia or Ecuador are allowed to give official statements and change 
their home state policies on investment arbitration, because every sovereign state is allowed 
to do this under international law.  
 
The comments made by both Bolivia and Ecuador might be reasonable from their point of 
view, but, more generally, it is difficult to justify or confirm that the ICSID Convention 
works only in the interests of the USA and/or developed countries. The main winners of 
ICSID cases are indeed wealthy countries, but this is not simply because the ICSID is biased 
against the interests of developing countries. It is worth noting that ICSID and/or other 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms try to be impartial and neutral, and they aim to 
work for both parties at the same level during the arbitration process. The main problem is 
that, before a dispute arises, some states are not in an equal position.  
 
States are free to sign BITs or to join the ICSID, or to renegotiate or withdraw from the 
ICSID Convention. Indeed, Schreuer comments on this matter. He explains that the treaty 
obligations of the host state are owed to the home state of the investor. Furthermore, the 
withdrawal of an offer to arbitrate by denounciation of an international treaty may violate an 
obligation to the investor's home state.187 In addition, Schreuer notes that the investor is 
powerless and cannot fight against a state's decision because investors are not counterparties 
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in BITs.188 In addition, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
Article 39, home states and host states are free to make a decision on an investor's rights and 
obligations, and they can even terminate an investor's right to arbitration by amendment or 
modification of the BIT.189 
 
Withdrawing from the ICSID Convention is regulated by Articles 71 and 72 of the 
Convention. According to the terms of Article 71 of the Convention, withdrawal takes effect 
after six months, ‘Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to 
the depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt 
of such notice.’190 This means that during this six months, the Convention is still valid and 
enforceable. However, Article 72 of ICSID states as follows: 
 
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect the rights or 
obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of its constituent subdivisions or 
agencies or of any national of that State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre given by one of them before such notice was received by the depositary.191 
 
According to Article 71, at the first stage, it seems that states can fully denounce the 
Convention and that it will not apply anymore. However, Article 72 of the Convention 
introduces an exception and contradiction to the general rule of Article 71.192 In other words, 
according to Article 71, any member state of the Convention can unilaterally withdraw from 
the ICSID Convention, and, after a six month period, a state (Bolivia for instance) ceases to 
be party to the ICSID. This means the state will not be bound by new rules and obligations. 
However, paradoxically Article 72 protects investors even after an official denouncement has 
been completed. The Tribunal's view on this matter is important. As already mentioned, 
withdrawal by Bolivia was a first occurrence in ICSID history, and, hence, investors did not 
know what would happen after the six month period.   
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In Euro Telecom International N.V (E.T.I.). v. Bolivia193 the question of whether to register a 
case or not to register a case was raised. However, Article 36 (3) of the ICSID Convention 
obligates the Secreteriat to register cases if they are not outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
In this case the Secretatiat ETI's claim was jurisdictional, and this allowed the firm to register 
against Bolivia on 31 October 2007. This was only a few days before the official 
denouncement of the Convention by the Government of Bolivia. As the Respondent, the State 
of Bolivia objected to the claim, but the UK and the USA froze the assets of the third party 
Entel (which belongs to the Bolivian Government), then, after some time, the national courts 
of these countries asked for the release of the assets on the grounds that Entel was not a party 
to this dispute. However, the ICISD pushed the Respondent state to participate in the 
arbitration process and to settle it.194 This case is not publicly available, but details of the 
compensation paid to investors were published.195 Furthermore, this case raised questions 
such as: What would have happened if the ETI had submitted its claim against Bolivia after 
the six month period? These kinds of  question were asked during the drafting period of the 
ICSID Convention. Specifically, this question was asked by Mejia-Palacio:  
 
What will happen if a State which was a party to the Convention signed an agreement with 
a company and later withdrew from the Centre while no disputes were pending. If, say ten 
years later a dispute arose- would that disputes still be under the jurisdiction of the Centre? 
 
In answer to this question, Broches replied as follows: 
  
If the agreement with the company included an arbitration clause and that agreement lasted 
for say 20 years, that State would still be bound to submit its disputes with that company 
under that agreement to the Centre.196 
 
Moreover, Broches details different scenarios: 
 
If the arbitration clause has no definite duration and if it is terminated by the one of the 
parties the jurisdiction to the Centre come to the end. At the same time, if the State 
withdraws from ICSID before it is accepted by any investor, no investor could later bring a 
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claim before the Centre. However, if the State's offer has been accepted by one of the 
investors then conflicts arises between the State and the investor, even after the date of 
denunciation, will still be within the jurisdiction of the Centre'.197 
 
Broches’ comments can be interpreted as, if consent is given by the state before the date of 
the denouncement, then only in this case will the ICSID Convention be applicable, even after 
withdrawal from the Convention (Article 72). The withdrawal process as outlined in Article 
72 is very significant, because, without this Article, all the rights and obligations of the 
withdrawing state, including those that arise about consent, would cease from the date 
withdrawal takes effect.198 Here, it is noteworthy that Articles 25 and 72 deal with the 
question of 'consent' of the parties. Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention deals with the 
question of ‘consent to ICSID jurisdiction’.199 In this respect, Schreuer provides a broad 
explanation that withdrawal, ‘does not affect consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID (Article 
25) given prior to the denunciation or an agreement between the host state and the investor 
which contains consent to jurisdiction benefits from Article 72 and will not be affected by the 
Articles 70 and 71.’200 In addition, because of the consent between the parties, withdrawal 
itself does not avoid new claims from investors. Alternatively, if all withdrawing states seek 
to prevent foreign investors bringing a claim against them, then they have to remove their 
'consent' from national laws, contracts, and from BITs.201    
 
In the cases outlined above, the states have officially withdrawn from the ICSID Convention. 
However, this does not mean that these states cannot subsequently be taken into investor-
state arbitration. If the main aim of these countries is to close all doors to foreign investors, 
and stop them from accessing investment arbitration, then their aim will not be successful. 
The main reason for this is because other options are open to investors. For instance, 
according to Article 8 of the UK-Bolivia BIT, disputes between investors and host states can 
be settled under different instituions such as using the ICSID, or an Additional Facility of the 
ICSID, or the ICC, or using ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules. For example, 
Article 13 of the UK-Bolivia BIT has a 'survival clause', whereby the BIT will be in force for 
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twenty years after the termination of the BIT.202 Similar BIT clauses exist between Canada 
and the Republic of Venezuela.203 Here, Article XII allows the parties to settle their 
investment disputes under ICSID Rules or Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID if either 
party is not party to the ICSID Convention. Furthermore, if these avenues are not available, 
then the parties are allowed to submit their disputes to an ad hoc tribunal, established under 
UNCITRAL Rules. Also, the dispute settlement hierarchy of each BIT must be followed.  
 
As previously discussed, the BIT, the ICSID, and the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID 
are the main dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can use. Otherwise, as in Novo 
Scotia Power Incorporated v. Venezuala204 a tribunal might request to apply the above 
mentioned rules, but then if they are not applicable, to apply UNCTIRAL rules. In this case, 
the Tribunal highlighted the importance of hierarchical dispute settlemet mechanisms, 
explaining as follows:  
  
ICSID or the Additional Facility Rules are adopted as the primary dispute resolution 
mechanism, and the Treaty only authorises access to UNCITRAL if ICSID or the 
Additional Facility Rules are not available. In the Canada-Venezuela BIT, the investor has 
no right to initiate proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules if arbitration under 
ICSID or the Additional Facility Rules is available. In such circumstances, the investor 
must initiate whichever ICSID procedure is applicable.’205   
 
Finally, after taking everything into account, it could be argued that withdrawing states 
cannot make a complete exit from international investment arbitration. The exit is only a 
'partial exit' and that this kind of exit was not wanted by Bolivia and Ecuador. Therefore, 
exiting is more symbolic than material.206 The main reason for this is that after withdrawal, 
foreign investors can still file a claim against these countries. For instance, after officially 
withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, Bolivia faced different arbitration claims. These 
claims were submitted under UNCITRAL Rules. Specifically, the cases were as follows: 
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The main reason why Argentina has not submitted its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention 
might be because they have perceived that withdrawal would be ineffective, and they could 
still face investor-state arbitration. Therefore, withdrawal is not effective in terms of 
preventing claims.   
 
Lastly, it should be noted that states that have withdrawn are still ratified by the New York 
Convention, which allows for winning parties to enforce awards under the national laws of 
states. Until now, withdrawing states have willingly exited from the ICSID Convention, but 
have not denounced the New York Convention. This kind of behaviour allows us to 
understand that some countries are not against investor-state arbitration under different 
institutions, but are against the ICSID Convention.  
5.8.	The	Union	of	South	American	Nations	(UNASUR)	
	
After withdrawing from from the ICSID Convention, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
founded the UNASUR Centre for Investment Disputes. In their region, there are also other 
alternative institutions to the ICSID, such as The Members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
People of Our America (ALBA) which was created as an alternative to the ICSID 
Convention. In the context of this research, the main difference between ALBA and 
UNASUR, is that UNASUR is founded and promoted mainly by the Ecuadorian 
Government. In the case of Ecuador, its main aim in creating UNASUR was to change the 
ICSID's dispute settlement mechanism and set up an alternative arbitration centre.208  
 
In 2009, at the 39th Session of the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States, 
Ecuador's Foreign Minister, Fander Falconi, suggested that UNASUR should create an 
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arbitration centre for investor-state or state-to-state disputes, for twelve member countries209 
who would be free from foreign tutelage.210 UNASUR is a successor of the South American 
Community of Nations (CSN) which was created in 2004, but the organisation’s name was 
changed to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) at the South American Energy 
Summit of April 2007.211 This dispute settlement centre is promoted by the Head of the 
Ecuadorian Government, but is supported and encouraged by other member countries of the 
union because the region decided that it needed its own arbitration centre for investment 
disputes. There might be several reasons for making this decision, but there are at least two 
known reasons why this region set up its own investor-state dispute settlement centre. First of 
all, nowadays, Latin American countries are not only capital importers but they are capital 
exporters.212 Therefore, they needed protection for their own investors in the region. 
Secondly, when this new Centre was set up, the ICSID Convention was not the most desired 
dispute settlement mechanism for the region. In relation to the ICSID Convention, among 
UNASUR member states, Argentina has been the Respondent in 54 cases, Venezuela in 45 
cases, and Mexico in 21 cases, under both ICSID Additional Facility Rules and/or 
UNCITRAL Rules. In contrast, only three UNASUR member countries have been 
respondents in more than 120 cases. Under such conditions, at the end of 2010 in Guyana, 
UNASUR member states decided that Ecuador should work on a 'Dispute Settlement System' 
and prepare a draft treaty which would be discussed three months after the first meeting.213  
 
The Ecuadorian Government became Chair of UNASUR, a system of dispute resolution 
based on three documents as follows:  
 
1) A set of proposed rules and operations for an arbitration centre. 
2) The UNASUR Arbitrators and Mediators Code of Conduct. 
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3) A proposal for the creation of a legal dispute centre in the area of investment disputes for 
member countries.    
 
In 2014, foreign ministers, finance ministers, consultants from the central banks, and general 
attorneys of the member countries consensually agreed on 80% of the proposal.214 This meant 
that there was no still consensus on the whole draft of the proposed Treaty. Later on, it was 
clarified that the member countries could not reach agreement specifically on certain matters 
as follows:  
 
1) On some definitions of ‘nationality’.  
2) On state-to-state dispute settlement between member states. 
3) Protecting or not protecting investors from the indirect actions of the host state. 
4) The degree of transparency of the proceedings. 
5) The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards as issued by the Centre. 
6) The composition of the list of arbitrators and mediators. 
7) The availability of the appeal mechanism to the parties. 
8) Whether an ad hoc of a permanent tribunal would be adopted as a form of dispute 
settlement to the Centre.215   
 
As noted previously, the creators of UNASUR found the ICSID Convention problematic, and 
so they aimed to draft a proposal that was easy to undersand. Unfortunately, for English 
speakers it is only possible to read and comment on this proposal using secondary sources.216 
The proposed UNASUR Treaty works as follows:   
 
1) Article 2 of the UNASUR Treaty does not affect other conflict resolution mechanisms 
and obligations contained within international agreements signed and ratified by the 
member countries.  
 
2) Article 2 of the proposed Treaty's agreement can be interpreted as: if there are existing 
agreements (BITs, for instance) between parties, and if these agreements have not been 
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terminated, then the Centre cannot settle disputes between parties. As previously 
mentioned, terminating BITs is not an easy task, and can usually take between ten to 
twenty years.  
 
3) The Centre has no jurisdiction for any disputes concerning health, the environment, 
education, taxation, and energy issues, unless they are specified in treaties between the 
member states.  
 
4) There are no circumstances under which tribunals will be allowed to resolve any disputes 
that involve the national laws of the UNASUR member states.217   
 
5) Article 3 of the proposed Treaty requires investors to apply for an exhaustion of local 
remedies, which is prohibited under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. As explained in 
the previous chapters the 'exhaustion of local remedies' rule has disadvantages for foreign 
investors, because, usually, investors do not want to use the national courts of a 
respondent (the host) state. Nevertheless, the positive side of this issue is that, by insisting 
on this rule, UNASUR member countries might improve the efficiency of their national 
courts.  
 
6) UNASUR's prepared draft requires that before starting an arbitration process, parties must 
try to settle their disputes using mediation or negotiation during a six month period, 
unless otherwise agreed. If the parties are able to settle disputes during this six month 
period through mediation or negotiation, they will be asked to sign an agreement of 
settlement by the mediators, which will automatically complete the dispute (see Article 
5). However, for some reason, dispute settlement mechanisms such as mediation, 
negotiation or consultation through diplomatic channels are promoted over arbitration, 
which is seen as a last option.218  
 
7) Article 6 of the proposed Treaty allows for a home state's involvement in investor-state 
arbitration at a UNASUR Centre. Specifically, before initiating the arbitration process, 
the investor must inform their home state that there might be a case to be brought against 
a host state, and the national state of the investor might then take on a mediation role and 
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try to settle the dispute between the parties. 219 Here, there is the involvement of the home 
state of the investor in the dispute. This coin has two sides: one is that the home state will 
want to protect its own investors; and the second is that the national state of the investor 
would wish to settle the dispute between the parties as soon as possible, through 
diplomatic channels.  
 
8) Article 19 of the Draft Treaty establishes the exclusivity of the UNASUR Arbitration 
Centre. This Article can be interpreted in two ways: firstly that, in submitting their 
disputes to the Arbitration Centre, all parties confirm that they will settle their disputes 
only through arbitration; or secondly, that all parties confirm that they will abandon the 
use of any other alternative dispute settlement mechanism in relation to their investment 
conflict. Accordingly, the same Article prohibits other parties (for instance, shareholders) 
from bringing a claim on the same matters to a different arbitration centre.220 In short, 
Article 19 tries to prevent 'treaty shopping' among the parties, a tactic commonly used 
under the ICSID Convention.  
 
9) The recognition and enforcement of awards is mentioned in Article 22 of the draft 
proposal. However, in this respect the members could not come to one conclusion and, 
therefore, enforcement issues are still to be negotiated between parties. For instance, 
Colombia and Venezuela proposed that arbitral tribunals should grant pecuniary 
compensation against the losing party.221 Therefore, in this respect, the ICSID 
Convention is more successful in its recognition and enforcement mechanisms, which 
have been proficiently established. However, the proposed Treaty is similar to the ICSID 
Convention in how it treats the annulment of awards (see Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention). According to the Draft Treaty, awards can be rendered in certain conditions 
which are very similar those specified in the ICSID Convention. These grounds are: a) If 
the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted; b) if it exceeds its powers; c) if it is 
corrupt; d) if it lacks of rules of procedure; and e) if the award did not state the reasons 
upon which it was based.222   
 
10) Lastly, it should be noted that ICSID awards are confidential and are not open to public 
scrutiny. However, Ecuador's proposed Draft Treaty (Articles 23-26) requires the 
																																																						
219 Fiezzoni (n 198) 141. 
220 ibid.  
221 Gomez and Titi (n 198) 3-7. 




arbitration process to be transparent. Specifically, all relevant evidence documents, 
records, hearings, and final awards should be available for public scrutiny. The only 
exception to this matter is for state special security and defence matters, which are to be 
mutually agreed by states.223  
 
According to Ecuador's Draft Treaty, UNASUR's arbitration centre will settle disputes 
between states and between investors and states. This Draft Treaty favours the involvement 
of the home state more than other arbitration treaties do. This principle is, hypothetically, 
possible to put into practise, but in reality it will be difficult. For example, the member 
countries have not reached a consensus agreement yet about the terms of the Treaty, and this 
reveals the problem of differences of opinion and how to solve them. Morever, there is a risk 
that if the home and host states involve themselves in investor-state disputes, it might end up 
in 'gunboat diplomacy' where only the strong parties will be able to protect their investors 
against the weaker more developing countries. In addition, Argentina and Brazil have a 
complicated relationship, punctuated by ups and downs and conflict, and both countries have 
their own reasons for joining UNASUR. On the one hand, Argentina wants to join because it 
sees an opportunity to reach certain goals, including cementing intellecutal leadership in the 
region within UNASUR.224 On the other hand, it would not be wrong to claim that Brazil has 
not ratified the ICSID Convention but has ratified UNASUR. This is because Brazil is a 
leading country in the region and, in joining UNASUR, it seeks to retain this leadership, and 
solve almost all of its investment disputes using the Arbitration Centre of UNASUR.  
 
Ecuador's proposed Draft Treaty and the ICSID Convention have similarities and differences. 
For this reason, UNASUR Arbitration has been described by some scholars as a  'hybrid' 
system of dispute settlement.225 However, the region’s emerging 'hybrid system' might be 
useful for finding a solution to the problems of the ICSID Convention. Under this new 
'hybrid' system, investors who do business in Latin America will be better served, because the 
system offers new alternative routes to solve their investment disputes.226 In the past, 
investors were limited in this scope, but now, within UNASUR, investors will have more 
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options, and their lawyers will be able to make more relevant choices and decisions. At the 
same time, the 'hybrid mechanism' will satisfy more investment participants in the region and 
will allow for regional cooperation and collaboration in some conflicts, especially in bias and 
cost problems.227  
 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that very positive progress has been made in the Latin 
American region, in their efforts to establish a regional arbitration centre. Nevertheless, this 
kind of regional institution for investment dispute settlements cannot be active from the first 
day of being established. For instance, in the 1980s, the Unified Agreement for the 
Investment of Arab Capital was signed among Arab States, and this came into force in 1985. 
This agreement established the Arab Investment Court, and the aims of the Agreement are 
similar to those of UNASUR, in that it allows the settlement of investment disputes between 
national investors of member countries.228 However, the Arab Court only began to operate in 
2003, almost eighteen years after the agreement was signed. In 2003, a Saudi Company 
named Tanmiah Consultancy, Management & Marketing decided to sue the Tunisian 
Government.229 The Court's decision was rendered on 12 October 2004.230 The Arab 
Investment Court is not the only dispute settlement mechanism open to investors and member 
countries for settling disputes in the Arab world. In other words, the creation of the Arab 
Investment Court does not prevent the use of the ICSID Convention. For example, in 
Bawabet Al Kuwait Holding Company v. Arab Republic of Egypt Case231, a Kuwaiti investor 
sued Egypt and settled the dispute using an ICSID tribunal.  
 
The examples given above confirm that creating a new dispute mechanism establishment 
does not happen ‘overnight’, and that the process needs time. However, ultimately, there will 
be lots of advantages for UNASUR member states in having their own dispute settlement 
centre. One of the main advantages is that the Centre will be owned by Latin American 
countries, which is better for the business interests of the region. At the same time, it would 
be premature to argue that the system will be sucessful and that it will meet the expectations 
of the parties that use it. As one scholar has claimed that, ‘it is hard to know whether they 
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The fundamental focus of this chapter was to identify the concept of DP and to analyse the 
characteristics and distinguishing features of the ICSID. This chapter also focused on 
examining the political aspects of investment arbitration for both developing countries and 
developed countries. Moreover, a textual and contextual analysis of Articles 71 and 72 of 
ICSID was undertaken. It can be concluded that alternative institutions to the ICSID are 
available for use in certain jurisdictions, such as the UNASUR. 
																																																						








In the new global world of trade, an increase in the number of international investments has 
also increased the possibility of international disputes occurring between investors and host 
states. There are several dispute resolution methods that are available to resolve disputes, 
such as diplomatic protection, bringing a case against a host state in the national courts, and 
international investment arbitration. International investment arbitration is one of the most 
effective methods for the resolution of international investments disputes. In recent years, 
investment arbitration has become more popular, and is usually used by international 
investment communities after signing international treaties, such as BITs and MITs. Because 
of these international treaties, investors can now obtain arbitral awards in compensation for 
damages arising from the actions or acts of omission of host states. In order to obtain 
desirable coverage, investors need effective enforcement mechanisms. There are several 
judicial and extra-judicial solutions that can be used to resolve disputes between investors 
and states. However, questions have been raised as to whether the mechanisms currently 
available are effective for solving the problem of the enforcement of international investment 
arbitral awards. In this chapter, issues relating to the timely and effective enforcement of 
investment arbitration awards will be explored, together with the different judicial and extra-
judicial methods available to a winning party.  
6.2.	The	Power	of	the	ICSID	When	Granting	a	Stay	of	Enforcement	
	
The aim of arbitration is to enforce awards voluntarily. However, it is in the interests of all 
parties to achieve a binding award, and to contractually enforce an award.1 The most valuable 
characteristics of arbitration are its role in enforcing awards and the goal of satisfying 
disputing parties.2 Enforcement mechanisms are the most important elements of an effective 
system of dispute resolution.3 In other words, the effectiveness of international arbitration 
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ultimately depends on whether an arbitral award can be enforced.4 At the same time, one of 
the first questions usually posed to counsel by clients is whether and how an award can be 
enforced.5 ‘Recognition’ and ‘enforcement’ tools are a necessity when the losing party will 
not honour an award, and the enforcement of an award is often needed by claimants in order 
to obtain the fruits of victory.6 If the losing party refuses to pay an arbitral award, then the 
successful party finds they have earned a hollow victory.7 These unexpected surprises can be 
reduced if enforcement mechanisms are available. Nowadays, winning parties can refer to 
different international conventions, such as the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York Convention of 1958), or the ICSID 
Conventions. Before these conventions were introduced, individuals had substantive duties or 
rights under international law, but they could not enforce their rights directly on the 
international stage.8 However, in the last decades, the international community has promoted 
multilateral co-operation in order to ensure uniform and simplified enforcement and 
recognition procedures for arbitration awards.9  
 
Those who draft international conventions believe that in order to meet the concerns of all 
parties, it is necessary to create a special enforcement regime for awards of investment 
arbitration.10 However, achieving this goal poses challenges, because all parties are not 
always in an equal position (in state-to-state arbitration). Secondly, any convention must 
address the legal obligations of different legal systems. In other words, although states might 
be party to a convention, investors are not always party to the same convention. This is 
broadly explained by Professor Lauterpacht as follows: 
 
For the first time a system was instituted under which non-state entities - corporations or 
individuals - could sue states directly; in which state immunity was much restricted; under 
which international law could be applied directly to the relationship between the investor 
and the host state; in which the operation of the local remedies rule was excluded; and in 
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which the tribunal's award would be directly enforceable within the territories of the state 
parties.11 
In the early 1960s, when the ICSID Convention was being drafted, one other important 
treaty, the New York Convention (1958), had just entered into force. At the time, the New 
York Convention was coined the most effective example of international legislation in the 
entire history of commercial law.12 However, the founders of the ICSID did not want to apply 
the New York Convention as an enforcement tool in investor-state arbitration. Nevertheless, 
the New York Convention was the only successful enforcement mechanism in place for 
awards given in commercial and investment disputes. In the very first Working Paper of the 
Draft ICSID Convention13, it is suggested that awards rendered under the Convention will be 
granted the ‘most favorable treatment’, whether or not a country’s ‘internal law’ is pursuant 
to the, ‘Geneva Convention of 1927 on the execution of foreign arbitral awards, or the New 
York Convention’.14 Moreover, this is confirmed in the annulment proceedings of Compañía 
de Aguas Del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic as follows:
  
[O]ne of the fundamental issues which the drafters of the ICSID Convention were keen to 
achieve was a total divorce from the recognition and enforcement system which prevailed 
under domestic laws or under the 1958 New York Convention governing commercial 
arbitration in the Member States.15 
Generally speaking, in the early days of the Convention, the question of ‘enforcement’ was 
qualified as ‘somewhat academic’16 and it was never a concern for the founders.17 Indeed, it 
was estimated that member states of the Convention would abide by and comply with awards 
voluntarily and this would not pose practical problems.18 The main reason behind this 
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expectation was that, at the time, the ICSID was one of five organisations of the World Bank 
Group, and this was supposed to provide confidence that disputing parties would resolve 
matters, and that awards would be executed voluntarily. However, policy makers among the 
World Bank’s staff perceived that it was necessary to apply the principles of ‘disputes over 
defaults on external debt’, ‘expropriation’, and ‘breach of contract’ if there might be harm to 
a country’s international credit standing. This also applied if the country was not making 
reasonable efforts to settle external debt disputes that had a significant effect on the country’s 
creditworthiness, or on its ability to implement bank financed projects or service bank 
loans.19 Nevertheless, there was no broadly accepted policy or statements to apply to the non-
payment of awards, and there was no one single enforcement tool. The only consideration 
was that conduct by the parties might lead to an adverse reaction from other states and might 
affect the standing of the state concerned in the international business community.20 This is 
confirmed in Mr. Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of Congo as follows, ‘…a state’s 
refusal to enforce an ICSID award may have a negative effect on this state’s position in the 
international community with respect to the continuation of international financing or the 
inflow of other investments.’21 
 
If the ICSID Secretariat or, occasionally, the World Bank is informed of a delay in the paying 
of an award, then the Secretariat or the Bank must remind the debtor party of the importance 
of fulfilling obligations under the Convention.22 For these reasons, when the ICSID 
Convention was founded, the drafters’ main purpose was to ensure that no party could impair 
the validity of the award once the post-award remedies had been exhausted.23 With this aim 
in mind, the authors of the Convention established, ‘a complete, exclusive and closed 
jurisdiction system from national law’ for arbitration proceedings, awards and the review of 
awards.24 Also, the recognition and enforcement of awards is now a, ‘required interaction of 
international and domestic law’ and this has led to the creation of a, ‘mixed juridical 
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structure.’25 Sometimes enforcement processes are seen as being of interest to the host states 
more than to private parties, and as a means by which successful states can enforce awards 
against private parties.26 However, the obligation to comply by awards applies equally to both 
parties, and there is no difference between a host state and a foreign investor in this respect.27    
 
In general, the ICSID does not have any formal role with regard to the enforcement of ICSID 
awards.28 Nevertheless, the language of the Convention imposes two separate obligations: 
Firstly, it requests disputing parties to comply with an award. Article 53 (1) of the 
Convention states the following:  
The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and 
comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been 
stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.’29 
Article 53 restates the principles of the customary international laws of pacta sunt servanda 
and res judicata.30 Res judicata is one of the most essential and settled rules of law used in 
international tribunals.31 According to this principle, parties may not seek any other remedies 
before any tribunal, until the awards are binding in all contracting states. In other words, 
ICSID awards are not subject to review, and when the award is rendered, the losing party 
must comply with it immediately.32 These characteristics make it impossible to imagine that 
any other awards could be more authoritative.33 At the same time, this self-contained regime 
does not completely isolate the ICSID Convention from general international law and 
domestic rules. These rules are relevant, and the provisions of the Convention are to be 
interpreted according to the customary rules on treaty interpretation as reflected in Articles 
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31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).34 Also, the finality of the 
decision must be balanced against the need to ensure that justice has been administered 
fairly.35 The only exceptions are stated in Article 53 (2), which allows disputed parties to 
analyse awards if there is disagreement on the interpretation (Article 50), or revision (Article 
51), and annulment by an ad hoc committee appointed by the panel of ICSID arbitrators (see 
Article 52).  
Secondly, according to Article 54 member states of the Convention must recognise and 
enforce/execute awards. However, in terms of ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’, it is crucial to 
emphasise that there is no clear picture as to how these two terms should be treated, namely, 
either synonymously or separately.36 Schreuer argues that in the case of Article 54 of the 
Convention, the words are essentially identical in meaning.37 Article 54 requests the 
enforcement of pecuniary obligations, which apply to member states of the Convention, 
including host states, but not investors. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this 
provision that an ICSID tribunal cannot order non-pecuniary relief when it deals with every 
question submitted to them.38 The article acknowledges state responsibility to implement 
adequate legislation in order to ‘recognise’ and ‘enforce’ awards, but Article 54 does not 
prescribe any particular method to be followed in domestic implementation, even though it 
requires each member state meet the requirements of the Article.39 Article 54 (1) states the 
following: 
Each contracting state shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories 
as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A contracting state with a federal 
constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide 
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a 
constituent state.40 
 
The language of the Convention implies that only final judgments are enforceable for 
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member states. Professor Schreuer notes that the finality of awards excludes any examination 
of their compliance with international public policy or international law in general.41 At the 
same time, the Convention does not oblige a contracting state to execute an ICSID award if 
an equivalent judgment in its own courts cannot be executed (Article 54 (3)).42  
 
It is understandable that a key ingredient in the validity of any judgement, of course, is the 
jurisdiction of the original court, and the lack of such jurisdiction in the foreign court is one 
of the principal grounds upon which the enforcement of foreign judgements is denied.43 But, 
it is remarkable that Article 54 enforcement arises when there is a breach of Article 53.44  
Particularly, Article 54 comes into play only when the losing party violates Article 53 and 
refuses to comply with an award.45  In fact, Article 54 does not allow a losing state to avoid 
its obligation under Article 53, and it is obliged to satisfy an ICSID award in full.46 However, 
the ad hoc committee in Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P v Argentine Republic, 
refused this principle, claiming that, ‘The obligations under Articles 53 and 54 are separate 
and independent.’47 Moreover, the same committee defined its position and differentiates 
Article 53 and Article 54. The Argentine Government stated the following:  
 
Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention complement each other and have to be read in 
conjunction. According to Argentina, Article 53 of the ICSID Convention establishes the 
final and binding nature of ICSID Awards while Article 54 establishes the way in which 
ICSID Awards have to be complied with.48   
 
This theory was rejected in a letter from the United States Department of State to Ms. Claudia 
Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee. In Siemens v. Argentina, Argentina 
makes an incorrect interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention.49 As 
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discussed above, the interrelation between Articles 53 and 54 has sparked debate among 
scholars and has raised questions at tribunals. Alexandrov tries to give an explanation in 
order to clarify the two articles, stating that the two obligations should not be conflated, and 
under Article 54, the enforcement mechanism cannot be interpreted so as to weaken or 
diminish obligations under Article 53.50 Broches promotes a similar view as follows; ‘Just as 
Article 53 affirmed the absolute binding force of the award on the international law level, 
Article 54 affirms its external finality, i.e., vis-à-vis domestic courts. The award is res 
judicata in each and every contracting state.’51 In addition, Broches claims that, ‘in the 
absence of this article, ICSID awards would be probably regarded as ‘foreign awards’ for the 
purposes of recognition or enforcement in all states, including the states party to the dispute, 
and the state whose national was the other party to the dispute.’52 
 
It is essential to note that the recognition and enforcement of awards can be initiated at the 
same time in different countries, but with the condition to avoid double or multiple 
recoveries. The ICSID Secretariat published Case Load statistics from 1972 to until 31 
December 2016, and these show that more than 534 investment disputes were registered with 
the ICSID.53 However, there were only nine cases where it was publicly known54 that 
enforcement mechanisms were demanded and availed for private parties.55 In other words, 
these statistics confirm that the ICSID’s practise to award creditors has been successful in 
obtaining the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards. It would not be wrong to 
assume that this significant degree of voluntary compliance is, probably, due the fact that 
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effective international enforcement measures are generally available to the winning party.56 
Furthermore, in practise, the payments of the awards are, mostly, kept confidential, and even 
if the successful party is not paid promptly, they hesitate to make the fact known.57 Indeed, to 
date, no ICSID award has been refused for recognition and enforcement in national courts.58  
In conclusion, Alexandroff and Laird argue that without the touchstones of legal rules, such 
as the principles of pacta sunt servanda or good faith, it would be impossible to designate the 
rules as a ‘law’, rather than simply ‘politics’ or ‘diplomacy’.59  In this context, it would not 
be wrong to argue that the ‘enforcement’ mechanism is one of the touchstones of the 
Convention, and without this instrument it would be very difficult to achieve success in 
investment arbitration.  
6.3	Enforcement	Against	the	Assets	of	State-Owned	Enterprises	(SOEs)	
	
It is estimated that 22% of the world’s largest 100 firms are now effectively under state 
control.60 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are continuing to increase their investments and 
are becoming leading players in the international investment sector.61 Sovereign investors 
tend to make long-term investments that are associated with a taking high risks.62 Usually, it 
is government policy to support sovereign investors, but in limited circumstances, they might 
grow more than expected, especially in energy sectors. For instance, the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (an SOE) has developed to such an extent that they have the power of a ‘state 
within a state’.63  For this reason it would be wrong to put SOEs and private companies in the 
same category, because they are different. When there is a good relationship between the 
home and host states, then private investors and SOEs can take advantage of this, but it is 
SOEs that benefit more.64 This shows that by investing abroad, SOEs do not take the same 
degree of political risk as private investors. However, in rare circumstances, they may have 
fears that, ‘they might be subject to discriminatory or arbitrary governmental, regulatory or 
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administrative treatment motivated more by political considerations than by genuine cause to 
be concerned with the nature, scope or purpose of their operations.’65  
Private investors often do not have strong political support and do not expect their interests to 
be protected by their home state over a short period of time.66 However, some SOEs might 
make use of relevant ministries to take diplomatic action to ask for special support or help 
from the host state. In practise, if it is necessary, they might sign a special treaty for one 
specific project. For instance, on 7th of September 1994, The Russian Federation and Ukraine 
signed the Treaty for Co-operation in the Development of Fuel and Energy Complexes. This 
shows that sovereign investors have power to conclude special treaties for specific projects.67 
However, it does not mean that sovereign investors are always welcomed or appreciated in 
the host state. Sometimes, they are not allowed to invest in ‘strategic’ or ‘sensitive’ industries 
because of concerns about the national security of the host state, transparency, moving 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in or out of the markets, and the possibility of distorting asset 
prices and protectionism concerns about fuelling FDI.68  From another point of view, it could 
be argued that SOEs are not welcome in vital areas of investment because they are perceived 
as a threat when they are fully owned by foreign governments, or when they do not have any 
commercial objectives in the host state.69 Nevertheless, this does not mean that prohibiting 
countries are against investment in their home state; rather they are trying to stabilise their 
markets and protect their national interests.  
Poulsen argues that rather than opposing sovereign investors, states should balance their 
defensive and offensive state interests.70 But, in this respect, governments often have 
different policies regarding SOEs. For instance, in the USA ownership restrictions are placed 
on particular sectors, such as energy, shipping, air transportation, telecommunications, and 
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financial services.71 Moreover, the 2012 US Model BIT clearly notes that, ‘Nothing in this 
Treaty shall be construed to preclude a party from applying measures that it considers 
necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.’72  
Similar policies operate in other countries, such as Canada, Germany and Russian Federation.  
As it was noted earlier, SOEs expect to be treated and protected like individual private 
investors. Some BITs allow and expressly provide that SOEs are investors, and they can 
bring claims against host states. For instance, in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of the 
United States of America - Republic of Korea Article 11.28, the definition of investor is 
given as, ‘Investor of a party means a party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of a party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the 
territory of the other party…’73 Another example can be cited from the China-Mexico BITs 
where an ‘enterprise’ is defined as, ‘any entity constituted or organised under the applicable 
law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately owned or governmentally owned, 
including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other 
association.’74 However, those who draft BITs still need to consider whether the BITs may 
require adjustments to substantive treaty protections.75   
It is interesting to note that Article 25 (1) of the Convention on the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
permits the settling of disputes between a contracting state of the Convention and a national 
of another member state. The Convention does not allow the settling of conflicts between 
SOEs operating as a government agency, and another state. In other words, the ICSID cannot 
be used as a mechanism to resolve disputes between private parties or between states. It is 
clearly noted that the ICSID excludes any claims by states against other states, even in a 
subrogation context.76 In the case of SOEs, if the respondent has attribution to the state, only 
in these cases will the ICSID have jurisdiction. However, in investment arbitration it is rare 
that SOEs that act as a claimant submit to ICSID arbitration, as in the case of CSOB v Slovak 
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Republic.77 In this case, the Respondent argued that CSOB’s major shares were owned by the 
Czech Republic and that it was performing state functions. For this reason, they were not 
private investors, and their dispute was handled as a state-state dispute, and not as an 
investor-state dispute.78 After analysing the functions of the CSOB, the Tribunal focused on 
the activities of the Claimant and concluded that the actions taken by the Claimant promoted 
government policies and/or the purpose of the State, but were commercial rather than 
governmental in nature.79 From a tribunal’s perspective, focus must be on the nature of the 
activities and not on the purpose.80   
In different cases, ICSID tribunals81 will apply prima facie tests and confirm jurisdiction, 
unless the responding state is able to show the ‘manifest absence of a link’ to the SOE.82 
Architect of the ICSID Convention, Broches, claims the following: 
For the purpose of the Convention a mixed economy company or government-owned 
corporation should not be disqualified as a ‘national of another contracting state’ unless it is 
acting as an agent for the government or is discharging an essentially governmental 
function.83 
Broches’ words can be simplified as: if the SOE is an agent for the government or is 
discharging an essentially governmental function then ICSID Convention will not apply, and 
will not be able to protect an investment. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Broches’ test is 
not enough to determine if there is a link between an SOE and a respondent state.  
In practise, tribunals may apply different kinds of influential tests. An example can be given 
in the case of Maffezini v Spain, where the Tribunal applied two analyses: (a) whether the 
conduct of the entity is ‘governmental’ and is empowered by the internal law of the state, or 
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(b) whether an entity is an organ of the state, or whether its acts may be attributed to the 
state.84   
It is worth noting that in the case of Adel A. Hamadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, a 
dispute arose due over the investment of the USA citizen Mr Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi in 
the development of a limestone quarry in Mahda, Oman. 85 The Claimant’s lease agreement 
was signed via his two companies Emrock Aggregate and Mining LLC (Emrock) and SFOH 
Limited (SFOH), with the Omani state-owned enterprise Oman Mining Company LLC 
(OMCO).86 OMCO was established in 1981 and the Omani Ministry of Oil and Minerals 
mainly owns it.87 The dispute between the parties started because of Article 10.15 of the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA), and when OMCO terminated the lease agreement of the Claimant. 
In this dispute, Mr Al Tamimi presented two main arguments: Firstly, regardless of OMCO’s 
status, the actions of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Affairs precipitated and 
purported lease termination; and, secondly, OMCO is in fact an organ of the Omani State.88 
Therefore, the Claimant attempted to attribute all the charges to the Sultanate of Oman, under 
the principles of customary international law.89 The Tribunal took the view that OMCO was a 
state-enterprise,90 but it would not permit the attribution of the actions of OMCO to the 
Sultanate of Oman.91 In addition, the Tribunal confirmed that OMCO had been established as 
a ‘limited liability company’ under company law act of the country, with the purpose of 
exercising ordinary commercial activities.92 Moreover, for the Tribunal, OMCO’s conduct in 
terminating the lease agreement was nothing more than what it was expressed to be a 
commercial response to the Claimant’s alleged various and repeated breaches of contract.93 
Here, it is seen that the Tribunal applied Broches’ test and decided that OMCO’s decision 
was not linked to the Government, even if a Ministry of the State owned 99% of the 
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company.  Here, the main rule applies that if the entity is not a state then it is an investor, and 
if it is an investor then it is not a state.94  
As previously noted, SOEs are taking advantage of their home state’s support and protection 
in host countries, whereas this is not the case for private investors. Moreover, if another state 
is ‘behind’ the investment, then the host state will not interfere with the investment, and in 
cases of enforcement, then SOEs have more chance of gaining enforcement at state-state 
level in comparison with private investors.95 However, this can be regarded as two sides of 
the same coin, and in limited situations SOE assets may be attached to satisfy an award 
against the home state of the enterprise. The execution against an SOE is not easy task, 
however, especially if the home state has used the SOE as a shield.96  
 
Although the above does not apply to ICSID cases, there is a precedent where a winning 
private party were able to enforce an award against an SOE, including the home state of the 
enterprise. In TMR Energy Ltd v State Property Fund of Ukraine,97 the TMR (Cyprus) 
company obtained an award against the State Property Fund of Ukraine (SPF), which is an 
SOE of the Ukraine. In this case, the Court applied different tests to identify whether the SPF 
was an organ of the Ukrainian State. Briefly, the Court found that the Parliament of Ukraine 
created the SPF and it was body of the State, and the budget of the SPF was paid by the 
budget of the Ukraine.98 This allowed the winning party to enforce the award against the 
home state of the enterprise.  
 
In general, an ideal award leaves each side believing it has won.99 However, it is not an easy 
task for a tribunal to satisfy both disputing parties. In investor-state arbitration, the disputing 
parties know that if the losing party does not comply with the award voluntarily, then their 
asset might be seized using legal enforcement proceedings, wherever property exists. 
Otherwise, the award ‘floats’ until enforcement seeks to anchor it within a given legal 
system.100 It is strongly encouraged that parties (for both political and economic reasons) 
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comply with arbitral awards voluntarily.101 Commonly, non-compliance of awards is 
minimised internationally, but cannot be avoided. As mentioned earlier, when an award is 
granted, it becomes an executing title.102 This final award can be enforced against the 
property of the investor without any struggle. However, the situation is different if the debtor 
is a state or a state agency.  
Disputes can arise over the enforcement process of an award, where the state or a state 
agency might not comply, and in order to prevent payment state immunity is pleaded. ‘State 
immunity’ is recognised as one barrier to automatic enforcement. According to Fox, ‘State 
immunity is the most intransigent, the extent to which an order of a national court for 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award can be executed against State property.’103 
Indeed, it could be argued that the current legal framework for the enforcement of awards and 
judgements against sovereign states is far from adequate.104 The main idea behind this rule 
revolves around the sovereign equality of the states. At the same time ‘state immunity’ is a 
jurisdictional doctrine that prohibits the national court of one state from exercising 
jurisdiction over other states.105 In other words, this rule facilitates the performance of public 
functions by the state and its representatives by preventing them from being sued or 
prosecuted in foreign courts.106 However, it should not be a barrier for states in respect of the 
compliance of awards. States are free to comply with awards. Rudolf and Schreuer explain 
that state immunity is a procedural bar for the execution of awards, but it should not affect 
the obligation of the state to comply with awards where the losing party cannot rely on state 
immunity and, therefore, cannot comply with awards.107 Article 55 of the Convention states 
that, ‘Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
contracting state relating to immunity of that state or of any foreign state from execution.’ 
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Article 55 confirms that Articles 53 and 54 do not guarantee that the winning party will 
automatically enforce the award. Alternatively, immunity from execution is the single most 
common reason for non-enforcement permitted by the Convention.108 However, it should be 
understood that consent to arbitrate under the Treaty does not automatically constitute a 
waiver of the execution of immunity109 but it waives pure jurisdictional immunity for the 
transaction.110 In other words, it does not waive immunity for the execution of awards. This 
means that the Convention relies on municipal laws relating to sovereign immunity from 
execution, which determine whether a state’s assets can be attached111 and no exceptions 
should be made regarding domestic law by virtue of the Convention, other than as provided 
by municipal law.112 Additionally, at least one other scholar believes that the only barrier to 
execution under most municipal laws is sovereign immunity.113 Accordingly, investors 
should play it safe in advance by including a contract clause that explicitly waivers immunity 
from execution in contracts or arbitration agreements with the investing states. The Model 
Clause 15 of the ICSID could be one solution for investors. The clause reads as follows:   
The host state hereby waives any right of sovereign immunity as to it and its property in 
respect of the enforcement and execution of any award rendered by an arbitral tribunal 
constituted pursuant to this agreement. 
 
Such a clause or ‘waiver of immunity’ should be demanded in the enforcement stage of the 
award. This might encourage the state to promptly seek an amicable settlement through 
negotiation.114 Also, in the recognition process, state immunity cannot be used.115 For 
instance, in the case of SOABI v Senegal, a case administered in the French courts, a clear 
distinction was made between the recognition of an award and its execution. For the Cour de 
Cassation there was no sovereign immunity with respect to the recognition of an award and 
immunity from execution under Article 55; it arises only when actual measures of execution 
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are taken.116 In this context, it is not wrong to argue that, for investors, the nature of the host 
state’s domestic laws of immunity might be essential for winning in disputes, because the 
success of achieving an award depends upon the immunity laws of the state where the 
execution is sought. Each state determines its own municipal law on immunity and different 
states have different immunity rules.  
Some states, such as Hong Kong or the People’s Republic of China follow the doctrine of 
‘absolute immunity’. This doctrine was traditionally applied in China, and deems that the 
national courts of the country do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate commercial matters that 
name another state as a respondent, unless the state waives its immunity.117 In the judgement 
of FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo118, the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong confirmed the following:  
The consistent and principled position of China is that a state and its property shall, in 
foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including absolute immunity from jurisdiction and 
from execution, and has never applied the so-called principle or theory of ‘restrictive 
immunity.119 
 
However, absolute immunity is not applied universally. States such as the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom adopt a ‘restrictive’ approach to immunity. The national 
law of the state distinguishes properties classed for ‘commercial’ or ‘public’ purposes. 
Examples of public purpose projects are military property projects and central bank assets or 
diplomatic or consulate buildings which are immune from execution. Moreover, in some 
countries there are small differences when they apply ‘restrictive approach immunity’. For 
instance according to the United States of America’s Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA) contracts for the repair of an embassy building, a national airline’s ticket sales 
to USA passengers, and a defence ministry’s purchase of military supplies, are admitted as 
commercial activities even if these projects are to further a public function.120 Moreover, the 
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USA federal courts might come to the opposite conclusion in a similar case. For instance, in 
LETCO v Republic of Liberia, the Federal Court of the USA ruled against the use of a bank 
account held by the Liberian Embassy; the account was used for both commercial and public 
purposes. For this reason, the Court assumed that funds in the bank account might be used for 
commercial activities, such as transactions to purchase goods or services from private 
companies, and these activities are not immune from attachment.121 However, in the similar 
case of Birch Shipping Corp. v Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania122 the Federal 
Courts did not allow the execution of an award.  
Another interesting example can be cited from the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 
(SIA, 1978). This provides that state properties used for commercial activities can be 
awarded execution, as well as those intended for commercial purposes.123 One well-known 
case was AIG v Kazakhstan, where the Claimant attempted to enforce ICSID awards against 
funds invested by Kazakhstan’s Central Bank for the purposes of funding ‘National Funds’ 
known as ‘London Assets’.124 In this case, the Claimant tried to execute awards against the 
Kazakhstan Republic, but according to the High English Court, the ‘London Assets’ were not 
at any time either in use or intended for  ‘commercial purposes’, according to the meaning of 
S.13 (4) of the SIA.125 For this reason, the ‘London Assets’ were immune from execution, but 




In the past, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, protections for investors were used by 
powerful states only. These states used forms of threat, the use of force, or military 
intervention, now known as a ‘gunboat diplomacy’.127 However, by the beginning of the 20th 
century, the use of force began to be interpreted differently, and it was not tolerated any 
longer in the arena of international agreements. For instance, in 1907 a group of states agreed 
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to the Second Hague Peace Conference, which respected the limitations of the employment 
of force for the recovery of contract debts, and not to allow the use of force to collect debts if 
claims were submitted to inter-state arbitration.128 Moreover, legal scholars began to support 
for these ideas. In 1931 the famous arbitrator Dr. Idelson proclaimed the following:  
Protection of nationals (including companies) would be much easier for the state concerned 
if the rights of such nationals were defined by elaborate treaties and not allowed to rest on 
general principles of international law. Those principles were formulated in times when the 
economic life of nations was much simpler than in its today.129   
These views expedited and facilitated the foundation of the ICSID Convention. However, 
before the establishment of the ICSID Convention, DP was the more popular dispute 
settlement mechanism used among powerful states. This was because it was a less 
objectionable, and advocated the right to use military intervention in the protection of 
nationals.130 Later, in 1965 after a long debate, the Washington [ICSID] Convention was 
established, which embodied following principles: 
1) Recognition of the principle that a non-state party, as an investor, might have direct 
access, in his own name and without requiring the espousal of his cause by his national 
government, to a state party before an international forum. 
 
2) Recognition that local courts are not necessarily the final forum for the settlement of 
disputes between a state and a foreign investor. This does not imply that local remedies 
cannot play a major role.  
 
3) Offering a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, for investment disputes between 
the state and the foreign investor, and insulating such disputes from the realm of politics 
and diplomacy. 
 
4) Awards rendered pursuant to the Convention to be recognised by, and enforceable in all, 
contracting states, as if they were final judgments of national courts, regardless whether 
the state in which enforcement is sought is or is not a party to the dispute in question. 
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5) The Convention does not lay down standards for the treatment by states of the property of 
aliens, nor does it prescribe standards for the conduct of foreign investors in relation to 
host states. Accordingly, the Convention is not concerned with the merits of investment 
disputes, but with the procedures for settling them.131  
These principles for investors provide direct access to international arbitration. By allowing 
the investor to litigate a claim directly, the investor's sovereign state can distance itself from 
the dispute.132 This progression represents the ‘emancipation’ of the individual from their 
home state, and provides the most progressive form of ‘emancipation’, enabling individuals 
to be on an equal footing with states in international proceedings and enjoy jus standi.133 
Orrega calls this the ‘minimisation of state intervention’ and notes it as a turning point.134 
These changes were conceptualised as the acquisition of the partial legal personality of 
investors under international law.135   
 
Under the terms of the ICSID Convention, investors have entered into a new field where their 
rights and investments are protected by international institution. Accordingly, under the terms 
of this new investor-state arbitration, it is assumed that investment disputes will be 
‘depoliticised’ and that investment disputes or confrontations between host and home states 
will be minimised.136 ‘De-politicisation’ is an important goal of the ICSID Convention but it 
is not an absolute one.137 Bjorklund believes that investor-state dispute settlement will never 
be entirely depoliticised. For her, the international investment regime has attempted to limit 
political considerations by ‘legalising’ disputes between investors and host states, and by 
introducing a neutral forum for the resolution of legal claims, and the second main goal is 
removing DP.138 DP is a state tool, as Lauterpacht claims, ‘a state is a political institution and 
all questions, which affect it as a whole, in particular in its relations with other states, are, 
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therefore, political and as a rule every international dispute is of a political character.’139 This 
viewpoint notes that disputes between states might have a political character, and that this is 
not unusual. At the same time, it should be understood that declaring a ‘legal’ process does 
not abolish politics.140As already mentioned, the ICSID Convention attempts to keep political 
disputes out of the equation, and the main requirement of the Convention (Article 25) is that 
disputes must focus on the investment.  
 
With these developments, it has been accepted that the ICSID has introduced important 
innovations.141 It should be noted that before the ICSID agreement, investor’s rights were 
protected by their national governments (diplomatic protection) or they were insecure. The 
ICSID Convention has converted diplomatic or political disputes into legal or judicial 
disputes.142 According to one scholar, one of the main goals motivating the ICSID 
Convention is the removal of investment disputes from the standard procedure of DP, by 
enabling direct access to international remedies.143 Moreover, it is true that with the advent of 
investment arbitration in international affairs, much of the utility of DP has lost its appeal.144  
At the same time, DP and arbitration are two different institutions, and it would be wrong to 
combine them. Schreuer argues that, ‘the combination of two institutions would lead us to 
undesirable results.’145 For this reason, these two terms should be examined separately.  
 
The terms of DP are defined neither in the ICSID Convention nor in the ILC Draft Articles 
on DP. The definition of DP is given by one scholar as, ‘DP consists of resorting to DP or 
other means of peaceful settlement by a state adopting, in its own right, the cause of its 
nationals in respect of an injury to that national arising from an internationally wrongful act 
of another state.’146 The ICSID does not allow DP or any home state involvement, and the 
ICSID does not accept DP if there is consent between parties (investor and state) for 
arbitration, and if the arbitration process has already started. This is one of the principal 
																																																						
139 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Clarendon Press 1933) 153. 
140 Robert O Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Legalised Dispute Resolution: Interstate 
and Transnational’ (2000) 54 (3) International Organization 470. 
141 Broches (n 51) 303. 
142 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 403. 
143 Nigel Blackaby, ‘Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Albert Jan International Commercial 
Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions ICCA Congress Series 2002 (Kluwer Law International 2003) 
357. 
144 Ilias Bantekas, An Introduction to International Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2015) 277. 
145 Schreuer (n 1) 416. 
146 Sir Frank Berman QC ‘The Relevance of the Law on Diplomatic Protection in Investment Arbitration’ in 
Federico Ortino, Lahra Liberti, Audley Sheppard (eds) Investment Treaty Law: Nationality and Investment 
Treaty Claims Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law (British Institute of International and 




features of the Convention.147 The Report of the Executive Directors reads as follows: 
 
When a host state consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor to the centre, 
thereby giving the investor direct access to an international jurisdiction, the investor should 
not be in a position to ask his state to espouse his case and that state should not be 
permitted to do so.148 
 
Nevertheless, consent to ICSID arbitration by the investor cannot be construed as a valid 
waiver of diplomatic protection and this is why Article 27 is addressed to contracting states 
and not to investors.149 At the same time, DP is an exercise of a state’s own rights, but the 
majority of the international community denies that a private individual can waive a right that 
belongs to his state.150 It is the state’s right to espouse investors’ claims or to not adopt them. 
Accordingly, an investor and host state might come to an agreement that the investor will not 
seek DP. However, the home state of the investor cannot be stopped from exercising DP.151 
Under ICSID, DP is only allowed under some conditions. More broadly, in Article 27 it is 
clearly stated that DP revives only if the losing state does not comply with a final award.  
Specifically, Article 27 of the Convention states as follows:  
1) No contracting state shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another contracting state shall have 
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless 
such other contracting state shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered in such dispute. 
 
2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include informal 
diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating the settlement of the dispute.152 
 
It seems that the mission of Article 27 is to comply with non-complying awards. However, 
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this is an alternative supplement to the judicial enforcement of awards.153 Alexandrov notes 
that Article 27 repeats verbatim the text of Article 53, and, according to him, the text of 
Article 27 (1) runs in parallel to the language of Article 54.154 The Enron Committee argued a 
similar view, as follows:  
 
It is clear when these two provisions are examined together, that the failure of a state to 
abide by and comply with an award, as required by Article 53(1), is a breach of the ICSID 
Convention, entitling the national state of the award creditor to give diplomatic protection 
or bring an international claim. If a contracting state was entitled to require an award 
creditor to use enforcement mechanisms established under Article 54(1) as a precondition 
to compliance with the award, the Committee considers that the final words of Article 27(1) 
would have reflected the language of Article 54(1), rather than that of Article 53(1).155 
 
This provides that if the host state, as the losing party, breaches Articles 53 and 54 of the 
Convention and does not comply with the awards, then the home state of the investor can 
espouse the investor’s claim and can commence a DP against the losing party. Under the 
ICSID, the main purpose of DP is to achieve the implementation of the award and obtain 
reparation for any additional damage caused by failure.156 The main reason why DP is 
allowed in the ICSID Convention can be explained by the idea that coercive enforcement is 
not available on the international stage, and the winning party, therefore, has no other choice 
than to seek DP, or to bring ‘an international claim’.157 Nevertheless, it is critically important 
to mention that DP is useful only if the award has already been rendered and if it needs 
support exclusively for its implementation, but it does not support any other remedies.158 In 
other words, if the arbitral tribunal has rejected an investor’s claim, it cannot be pursued 
subsequently through DP.159   
 
Schreuer claims that allowance for DP in the ICSID Convention not only secures compliance 
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with an award but is designed to counter-balance any state immunity that is preserved by 
Article of 55 of the Convention.160 In these circumstances, it is appropriate to argue that DP 
might be used to promote international relations between member states of the ICSID 
Convention. One example can be cited from Italy. In 2007, the Italian Government warned 
that a new South African law (regarding the development of natural resources) might breach 
a bilateral investment treaty between Italy and South Africa.161 This rule was used by the 
home state against the host country for the purposes of avoiding future disputes. Moreover, 
the Italian government’s actions show that DP can be exercised to enhance international 
relations between states.  
 
Article 27 (2) of the Convention allows informal exchanges between the host and the home 
states of the parties, and according to this article it does not constitute DP. In practice, there 
are cases where information exchange, consultation and diplomatic protection are confused. 
For instance, in the Pac Rim Cayman v El Salvador case, the Tribunal referred to CAFTA162, 
used Article 18.3 information requests, and Article 20.4 inter-state consultations, and DP.163 
As mentioned earlier, due to the existence of BITs and the ICSID Conventions, the institution 
of DP has taken a new turn, where new conditions or new rules are now applied. Crawford 
explains, ‘One might argue that bilateral investment treaties in some sense institutionalise and 
reinforce (rather than replace) the system of diplomatic protection.’164  
 
The interesting point here is when the first BIT (Pakistan-Germany, 1959) was signed it was 
heavily tinted by the legacy of DP, and this, effectively, turned into a dispute between a host 
and home state of the investor.165 In this case, there was no investor-state dispute clause, only 
a state-state dispute settlement clause (Article 11). However, in the new edition (2009) of the 
Pakistan-Germany BIT, the parties included an investor-state arbitration clause (Article 10). 
It can be seen that when the first BITs were signed, there was no ICSID Convention, and the 
only settlement available was a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism or DP. 
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Nevertheless, according to one researcher, the principles of Article 27 of the ICSID can be 
seen in BITs. From the 1950s to 1990s states signed 400 BITs, and, out of them, 32 had 
similar texts to Article 27 of the ICSID Convention.166  
 
Kokott claims that the rareness of DP in ICSID and BITs works as an advantage for both 
parties to avoid and exclude the uncertainties of DP.167 Kokott talks about exercising DP 
under BITs and MAI; they have similarities in that DP is exercisable only when awards are 
not enforced, but the differences are that BITs leave open how the home state reacts to non-
compliance, while MAI creates a framework and allows responsive steps only within the 
limits of that framework.168 Lastly, if the award is not paid there is another option for the 
investor, namely to request that its national state (or a third party interested state) initiates an 
ICJ action according to Article 64 of ICSID.  
 
It would be wrong to argue that the customary international law of DP has disappeared. Even 
under the terms of the ICSID Convention it continues to survive. Regarding this, Lillich notes 
the following:   
 
Hence, pending the establishment of international machinery guaranteeing third-party 
determination of disputes between alien claimants and states, it is in the interest of all 
international lawyers not only to support the doctrine (diplomatic protection), but to oppose 
vigorously any effort to cripple or destroy it.169 
 
This idea can be supported by the suggestion that there is not a problem with DP itself. 
However, the powerful states that abuse DP put the Convention at risk. Also, it is 
understandable that if, according to ICSID arbitration rules 37(2), a home state, as a non-
disputing party, applies DP and, ultimately, simplifies the dispute between the investor and 
the state, then no one should be against the principle of DP. Kaufmann-Kohler believes that 
the home state’s intervention could be a useful contribution for a tribunal in the decision-
making process, especially to facilitate better treaty interpretation, but there should not be 
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room for the investor’s home state to exercise DP that might risk damaging the carefully 
balanced framework of the investor-state arbitration mechanism.170 This argument is 
reasonable because Kaufmann-Kohler believes that allowing DP might damage the ICSID 
Convention. According to Paulsson, DP ‘has proved itself unworkable as a way of protecting 
business interests in the context of contemporary international economic life.’171 Other 
scholars support this idea.172  
 
The ICJ Tribunal stated that BITs and the ICSID Convention protect all investor’s rights, and 
in this context, the role of DP has somewhat faded as, in practise, recourse to it is only made 
in rare cases where treaty regimes do not exist or have proved in-operative.173 In these cases, 
there were no BIT between two states, and, for this reason, the dispute settlement solution 
used was DP or the African Charter on Human Rights and Property Rights. In general, the 
view is that universal human rights declarations protect investors, and there is no need to use 
any other protection instrument. Acceptably, the institution of DP used as a procedural device 
has been influenced by these changes.174 However, it is still questionable whether individuals 
are still subject to international law.175  
 
John Dugard claims that international human rights law does not consist of human rights 
conventions, but, instead, a whole body of conventions and customs, including DP, that 
together comprise international human rights law.176 Dugard also claims that the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) may offer real remedies to millions of Europeans, but, 
in his opinion, it is difficult to argue that other conventions such as the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969) or the African Charter on Human Rights (1998) have achieved the 
same degree of success.177 The reasons for this was by explained in previous chapters.178 
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Moreover, he believes that only a limited number of individuals have obtained, or will obtain, 
satisfactory remedies under these conventions, and that these remedies are weak.179  
 
For Dugard, diplomatic protection is only available to protect individuals against foreign 
governments, and this is a customary rule of international law, which applies universally, 
and, as such, it potentially offers a more effective remedy.180 Also, it must be noted that 
human rights declarations do not prohibit DP to be used as a dispute settlement mechanism. 
This means that for individuals, DP might provide a similar protection system to human 
rights conventions against other states. Dugard rightly notes that the enlargement of the rights 
of individuals (human rights conventions) is not a substitution for diplomatic espousal.181 
And, it must be noted that, nowadays, an individual’s rights are better protected by modern 
international law. Nevertheless, states still ‘own’ international law. Because of this, 
Amerasinghe believes that DP will survive as an institution based on the theory that the state 
owns rights in international law, and not the individual. 182 This opinion might be correct 
because, in general, an international institution’s task is to balance power, international law, 
diplomatic mechanisms and managerial systems of great powers and war.183  If DP is to 
survive as an institution, it must be exercisable and practicable.  
 
It should be noted that the ICSID itself is one institution among other institutions that works 
to realise the common goals of states.184 These same principles could be applicable under DP. 
However, the history of DP reveals that it has been abused by powerful states, and for this 
reason, it would not be misleading to argue that DP’s deficiency is the ‘fairness’ or ‘equality’ 
of its institution. Franck notes that ‘fairness’ should satisfy the participants’ expectations with 
the justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and when rules are made and applied, the 
participants perceive a right process, and its fairness will encourage members (states) to 
comply with law.185 Therefore, apparently, one of the main problems with DP is its ‘fairness’.  
 
The ‘fairness’ or ‘unfairness’ of DP is not limited to DP only; the ‘fairness’ of modern 
establishments, including the ICSID, has also been debated by different scholars. In light of 
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this, some argue186 that under investment treaties for arbitration, loosing investors and some 
states like Ecuador, Argentina are disadvantaged by ‘unfairness’, while others benefit from it. 
The ‘fairness’ of DP is only possible using the institutional mechanism as applied by states 
equally, without any mistreatment. It is necessary to mention that this research does not 
support the idea that DP should be the only dispute settlement mechanism used in investor-
state arbitration, but it encourages states, where there is a demand for DP, to apply it on equal 
terms. This allows for states to espouse investor’s claims without any hesitation.  
 
It is important to highlight that using DP is not always in the interests of investors. This is 
why there are different alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for investors in order to 
settle disputes, such as arbitration, mediation or negotiation. Moreover, with the onset of 
globalisation, investors’ plans have changed, and some prefer to do businesses without any 
home state intervention; this changes the traditional legal tasks undertaken by home states. 
August Reinisch claims that, ‘investors also contribute to the larger process of shaping 
international investment law.’187 However, Reinisch does not provide cases or facts where 
this has happened.   
 
In conclusion, it is worth asking whether ICSID has successfully avoided the process of DP. 
Interestingly, this question cannot be answered in one sentence. However, the ICSID 
Convention is not wrong when it asserts that the 21st century international legal environment 
is different from that of previous centuries, and it would be wrong to evaluate DP from a 19th 
and 20th century perspective. Developed states did not take as many risks in the past to harm 
their international image by exercising DP. Nowadays, it is expected that the outcome of DP 
will be different, but it is still the home state that decides how to exercise DP, whether 
through diplomatic pressure, economic or political sanctions or, as in bygone times, by the 
use of force or an adjudicatory dispute settlement.188 This is because one or more investor 
states do not willingly exercise DP.189 Reasons for this include the following:  
 
1) In the 19th and 20th centuries the nationals of developed states were usually investors in 
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developing countries. The situation now is different because citizens of developing 
countries are investing abroad. Previously DP was one-sided, but now it can be exercised 
by both developing and developed states. 
 
2) In the past, developed states were not looking for an investment but nowadays they are. 
They are aware that international investment is a competitive sector and they want to 
attract more investors to their market. They can do this by promoting good international 
relations with other countries. 
 
3) The economic relationships between states were different in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Now, states are different NGOs or institutions trying to keep their investments and trade 
in from a suitable position. (The EU market is one example.)  
 
4) It is believed that DP is a remedy of last resort, and experience demonstrates that it 
provides results that rarely satisfy the investor.190 
 
The above are arguments against exercising DP in investor-state arbitration. Nevertheless, in 
international law, historically, a state has had the power to settle claims on behalf of its 
nationals.191 However, it might be too costly for home states to espouse each investor’s 
claims and try to settle themselves. Ben Juratovich argues that, ‘Investment treaty actions and 
diplomatic protection will both continue to have a role, even if unequal in magnitude and it is 
therefore necessary to continue to grapple with their interface.’192 Juratovich is right because 
investment arbitration and DP are not the same. In legal terms, they do not cover the same 





As stated previously, enforcement mechanisms work successfully under the ICSID 
Convention. However, this does not mean that all awards are executed positively. In practise, 
there are some cases where ordinary enforcement mechanisms have proved to be 
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unsuccessful. In these cases, home states, debt collection funds, international organisations, 
and arbitral institutions have ‘non-judicially’ or ‘alternatively’ intervened to supplement the 
judicial framework for the enforcement of awards.194 Here, it is understandable why winning 
parties would try to obtain compensation via other legal channels. However, theoretically, the 
use of investor-state arbitration (ICSID) itself should be enough to enable parties to settle and 
enforce disputes without the intervention of third parties. Indeed, Wälde talked about 
‘equality of arms’ as the founding principle of investment arbitration procedures, and even if 
there is no ‘equality of arms’ it is a tribunal’s duty to pro-actively restore it.195 
6.5.1.	Third	Party	Funding	
When states do not respect their international obligations and refuse to satisfy awards, there 
are other opportunities investors can take to enforce an award. One of these opportunities is 
selling an award to a third party. On 29 June 2012, an online platform was launched where 
parties can sell their awards to third parties.196 Award buyers are now well known as third 
party funders, and their main business is to execute awards and compensation for investors. 
These third party funders are usually law firms, banks, insurance companies, and other 
financial institutions, but not the formal parties involved in the investor-state dispute. For 
example, it was journalist Luke Eric Peterson who reported that CMS sold its arbitral award 
against Argentina, and that the subsidiary Bank of America was trying to collect assets based 
on the award.197 In general, third party funders see their funding as an investment, and they 
are profit oriented. The primary goal of the funders or buyers of awards is to earn 15% to 
50% of the total amount of the award (this amount can change depending on the costs and 
risks of the investment).198 
  
Here, it is noteworthy to highlight that in the process of investment arbitration, the funders’ 
motives are not always based on making a profit. Sometimes, these bodies are fighting 
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against industries about health and safety issues, and they endeavour to support states against 
certain dominant companies. An example of this scenario is the Philip Morris v Uruguay 
case. 199 In this case, an Anti-Tobacco Trade Litigation Fund was created by a group of 
Bloomberg Philanthropists and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as a third party, and it 
was funded to help support a developing country (Uruguay) against tobacco companies such 
as Phillip Morris.200   
 
Third parties are not obliged to disclose their involvement in disputes, and this can help them 
prevent conflicts of interest arising in the proceedings.201 At the same time, funders and 
investors/states operate using a bilateral contract, and are not under the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. In general, for the funders, investment arbitration is more attractive than litigation, 
for the following reasons:  
 
1) Investment arbitration is high value, and the proceedings are often speedier. 
2) There is potential for greatly reduced evidentiary costs. 
3) There is greater predictability of outcome in comparison to litigation. 
4) There is a high enforceability of awards.202  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that, in general, enforcement mechanisms in investment arbitration 
work successfully when third parties support the execution of awards. Of course, with the 
intervention of third parties, winning parties usually lose a percentage of their award amount. 
However, as Lord Justice Jackson states, ‘…it is better for him to recover a substantial part of 
his damages than to recover nothing at all.’203  
 
6.5.2.	Political	Risk	Insurance	(PRI)	
In some circumstances, third parties and PRIs can be confused. In investment arbitration they 
are completely different entities. The key feature of difference is that PRI is a before the 
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event (BTE) action, and third party funding is an after the event (ATE) action. 204 ATE 
insurance is a type of third party funding, which covers almost all expenses including the 
arbitrators’ fees. In cases where the dispute is lost, it also pays the respondents’ legal costs. 
BTE is another type of insurance that is auctioned before any dispute arises. This PRI is 
similar to business insurance in that it is purchased by the investors themselves. However, 
taking out a separate insurance policy might create the question of why do investors need 
additional protection whilst they are under the protection of customary international law, 
such as BITs and IIAs? The answer to this question is that PRI compensates for certain 
actions taken by the host state, whilst BITs guarantee the investment climate in the host 
country.205 Also, it should be noted that when investors obtain PRI, they are trying to add in 
elements not stated in BITs.    
 
Different governmental, non-governmental and financial institutions can offer PRI insurance. 
MIGA is an institution of the World Bank Group, which provides PRI and credits to investors 
in order to facilitate foreign direct investment in developing countries. Insurance companies 
provide different types of insurance protections, but in general these fall mainly within PRI 
categories relating to:  
 
1) Political violence (war, terrorism, and civil disturbance). 
2) Governmental expropriation or the illegal confiscation of investment. 
3) Currency risk (currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction). 
4) Breach of contract (governmental frustration of contracts). 
5) Arbitration Award Default Coverage (AAD) (when the award is not collected).206  
 
It should be noted that AAD cover must be purchased in advance. In other words, investors 
are not allowed to acquire AAD insurance when a claim against a host state has already been 
launched.207 In investor-state disputes this coverage provides compensation if an award is not 
executed by the state. There are some basic requirements that an investor must meet in order 
to make a claim for an arbitral award payment, as follows:  
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1) The dispute between the investor and host state must be submitted to the correct 
international arbitration board in relation to the insured contract.  
2) The arbitral award must be a final and binding monetary award. 
3) At the first stage, the investor must take action to execute the award. 
4) The host state must pay the amount of the arbitral award within 60 to 90 working days 
after the enforcement stage has begun.208 
 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that in 2013, MIGA made significant changes to its 
requirements. According to these new changes, projects must meet all of MIGA’s 
requirements, and if a sovereign financial obligation is not honoured by a state or by a state 
enterprise, a PRI does not require any final arbitral award or court decision to cover or 
compensate investors.209 These new changes further support the collection of awards and 




On the international stage, there have been cases where powerful states like the USA (as the 
home state of the investor) have used other methods to enforce awards, such as sanctions, 
prohibiting financial aid or credits, or diplomatically pressuring other states to comply with 
awards. These methods or policies are used almost exclusively by economically and 
politically powerful states. Not all states can use these methods to achieve their goals. 
Usually, weaker and poorer states are not able to exert this kind of pressure. Therefore, using 
these methods shows that different states use different policies and demonstrate different 
behaviours relating to investment arbitration.  
 
It is important to understand the expectations of states when they sign investment treaties. 
Sometimes, the home state perspective will decide future policies relating to investment 
disputes. Poulsen and Aisbett explain that in ‘most Western states’ treaties are designed and 
negotiated primarily to protect their investors abroad, whereas for most states in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, treaties are entered into primarily to help attract foreign 
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investment.210 Moreover, the same scholars argue that BITs are used to strengthen diplomatic 
ties between states.211 Similar views are espoused by Chilton who states that, ‘the reason why 
foreign states sign a BIT with the U.S. is only to produce mutual political benefits.’212 These 
arguments demonstrate that states have different expectations and aims on investment 
treaties, when they use BITs. 
 
Brazil, which is not member of the ICSID, and does not ratify BITs, holds the status as the 
country into which the most foreign direct investment flows.213 This shows that investment 
treaties do not always play a crucial role when investors are investing in foreign countries, 
and it is not wrong to argue that their investments are based on their interests. Nevertheless, 
when an investor-state dispute appears, BITs and the ratification of ICSID can play a 
conclusive role for all parties. 
 
As mentioned earlier, home states might intervene in investor-state disputes, and this action 
can work to politicise the dispute. It should be noted that a political intervention by a home 
state can prove to be a defining situation or problem in a particular way.214 For instance, in 
Autopista Concesionada v. Venezuela,215 a dispute arose between Venezuela and Aucoven, a 
Venezuelan company, controlled by main Mexican shareholders. In this case, Koskenniemi 
noted that, after the commencement of ICSID arbitration, the Mexican Government tried to 
settle the dispute, and, several times, tried to contact their Venezuelan colleagues. However, 
the Mexican Government was not successful, and their attempt to settle the dispute was 
misunderstood by Venezuelan Government who claimed violation of Article 27 of the ICSID 
Convention.216 However, the arbitral Tribunal rejected the comments of Venezuela and 
clarified diplomatic protection and an amicable settlement. The Tribunal stated the following:   
 
Article 27 of the ICSID Convention makes a clear distinction between diplomatic 
protection and efforts to settle a dispute. The ICSID Convention provides a forum for 
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resolving disputes. However, its purpose is not to commit parties to arbitration, when there 
is a possibility to reach an amicable solution. Hence, attempts to settle a dispute do not 
constitute prohibited diplomatic protection in the sense of Article 27.  The record shows 
that the purpose of Mexico’s efforts has been to facilitate the settlement of the dispute 
between Aucoven and Venezuela and there is no indication that Mexico has espoused 
Aucoven’s claim.217   
 
Moreover, Argentinean officials have met with foreign government officials and some ICSID 
claimants in an attempt to amicably resolve their investor-state disputes.218  
 
A similar situation occurred in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica.219 In this case, the home state (the 
USA) diplomatically pressured the host state Costa Rica to consent to ICSID Arbitration.220 
The reason why consent was required in this case was because there was no agreement or 
BITs between the USA and Costa Rica. For that reason, according to Article 42 (1) of the 
ICSID Convention, Costa Rica’s consent was crucial. Here, the USA diplomatically evoked 
the Helms Amendment. This amendment is named after the USA Senator Jesse Helms and it 
prohibits USA foreign aid to a country that has expropriated the property of USA investors.  
As a result, the USA Government, via an Inter-American Development Bank delayed a 
$175,000,000 loan to Costa Rica until the host state consented to ICSID arbitration.221 This 
diplomatic intervention worked successfully, and Costa Rica then consented to arbitration. In 
this case, diplomatic intervention played a crucial role in persuading Costa Rica to settle a 
dispute for investor-state arbitration. However, at the same time, the DP did not note this 
award, which shows that home states can intervene to assist their investors without DP.  
 
The USA can use different methods, such as GSP (the Generalized System of Preferences), 
and these methods are referred to as, ‘trade remedies used to enforce arbitral awards.’222  In 
practise, the GSP method has been applied in two separate cases: CMS Gas Transmission 
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Company v. Argentina223 and Azurix Corp. v. Argentina224 where awards were enforced 
against Argentina. The main reason why the GSP method was applied in these cases was that 
Argentina was the Respondent and lost its case, and subsequently it declined to pay an award 
voluntarily. The amounts to be paid in both cases were $133 million and $165 million USD 
dollars respectively. The Argentine Government’s action against American investors was not 
welcomed by the USA and President Barack Obama announced that they had, ‘not acted in 
good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favour of USA owned companies and it is 
appropriate to suspend Argentina’s designation as a beneficiary country under the GSP 
program.’225 This decision was made by presidential authority, and, at the same time, the 
national law of the USA (the Trade Act of 1974, Section 502 (f) (2)) was amended (19 U.S.C. 
2462 (f) (2) to allow for this decision. Argentina was a beneficiary country under GSP, and if 
a receiver country fails to act in good faith to enforce arbitral awards in favour of USA 
owned companies, then USA aid is terminated.226   
 
This was the first time in the thirty-five year history of GSP that the USA suspended 
Argentina’s duty free allowance under this programme.227 At the time, in 2011, Argentina 
was the ninth largest GSP beneficiary, with $477 million in exports of duty-free products to 
the USA228 In addition, the American Government began to vote against all credits for 
Argentina, beginning with a $230 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, 
until it paid to Azurix and Blue Ridge Investments.229   
 
Alternatively, in cases of the non-enforcement of awards, states might take economic 
sanctions against other states. This is not a popular method to use, but action of this nature 
has been taken. The tribunal in Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. 
Republic of Guinea case confirmed that, ‘Non-compliance by a State constitutes a violation 
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by that State of its international obligations and will attract its own sanctions.’230 In 2012 the 
Argentine Government expropriated 51% of the YPF Oil Company from Repsol, a Spanish 
company. In response, the European Union launched a call to all member states to impose 
sanctions against Argentina.231 The EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, emphasises 
the importance of protection for investors with these words:  
 
It will grant legal security to existing bilateral investment treaties concluded between our 
Member States and non-EU countries, as the EU is moving to replace them over time by 
EU-wide investment deals. This will protect EU investments abroad and allow investors 
legal channels to defend themselves when needed. The current dispute between Repsol and 
Argentina is a case in point…[...]. It’s my ambition that, with time, every European investor 
has an equal protection of his interests abroad which, for the moment, is only sometimes 
assured to investors from a limited number of member states.232 
 
Accordingly, the Spanish Government restricted imports of bio-fuels from Argentina at a 
time they were importing three-quarters of all bio-fuels from Argentina.233 Interestingly, after 
the EU and Spain took this action, the Argentine Government began a WTO dispute 
settlement against the EU and Spain.234 As of 1 January 2018, the Argentine Government 
began to execute the award and has started to compensate foreign investors, and, thus, 
Argentina is being reinstated to the GSP program.235 Anna Joubnin Bret, an expert in 
international investment arbitration claims that, ‘sanctions do not work in investment 
arbitration and this system must be based on fairness and investors must be compensated.’236   
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Lastly, it should be noted that countries such as Argentina, who do not comply with awards, 
are in a minority, and/or information about countries that fail to comply is generally not in the 
public domain. Therefore, to enforce an award and compensate the investor, diplomatic, 
economic and trade actions can be taken. However, if more countries follow the lead of 
Argentina, then the ICSID system could collapse, and this would weaken the international 
system that has been built up since 1965.237 Maurer argues that it is very difficult for 
democratic states to ignore calls to protect their citizens’ investments abroad.238 Maurer also 
argues that the domestic political cost of refusing to intervene is often higher than the cost of 
intervening.239 Additionally, the cost of these interventions on behalf of private investors 
costs less when we compare the same costs to those of the Cold War period.240 Nevertheless, 
this kind of intervention is not the best solution for investor-state arbitration. In practise, if 
the majority of states did not obey international rules, it might be assumed that international 
society might change the ICSID Convention or renew it with any added necessary articles. In 
1965 the ICSID Convention was founded to demonstrate that the international community 
could create new conventions or change old ones, and replace them with efficient ones.   
 
The action taken by the USA and the European Union against Argentina, for example, is only 
possible for economically and politically powerful countries. Using these mechanisms is not 
feasible for politically and economically weak states, and only a few states are able to use the 
above discussed mechanisms to enforce awards. Therefore, it is very important to limit the 
use of such mechanisms in investor-state disputes. However, trying to ban or limit the use of 
these mechanisms would be difficult, and it raises new questions, but if this option is not 
considered, then the ICSID’s future might be in danger. Finally, it is worth mentioning that if 
disputes between the investor-state, or the state-state arise, then the use of diplomatic 
channels would be the most likely method for solution, and might be welcomed in this kind 
of dispute. 241 
6.6.	State	to	State	Arbitration	
	
The ICSID Convention and the BIT system embody two distinct spheres of rights and 
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obligations: the ones applicable between contracting parties (state-to-state arbitration) and 
others between one contracting state and the host state of the investment (investor-state 
arbitration).242 The first modern BITs were signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, 
during a time when the only dispute settlement mechanism available was state-to-state 
arbitration. In the first inter-state arbitrations, the clauses were influenced by previous 
friendships, and commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties.243 These BITs continued until 
1968, and it was only after this time that BITs were designed to settle not only state-to-state 
arbitration, via submission of the dispute to the ICJ, but also investor-state arbitration. With 
the introduction of modern BITs, foreign investors obtained the right to bring claims directly 
against a host state in investor-state arbitration. Nevertheless, this does not mean that party 
states cannot settle their disputes using state-to-state arbitration; almost all BITs allow for 
state-to-state arbitration, where contracting parties can settle their conflicts on ‘treaty 
interpretation or treaty application’. For some scholars, interstate arbitration mechanisms are 
important for two reasons: firstly they help parties re-engage with the investment treaty 
system, and they serve to re-politicise investor-state arbitration.244  
 
In general, state-to-state arbitration is different from investor-state arbitration or DP, but 
neither closes access to state-to-state arbitration. It is believed that state-to-state arbitration 
has a much broader scope than DP, and this is more useful to both host and home states.245 It 
also means that investor-state arbitration is not prioritised over, or insulated from, state-to-
state arbitration.246 These foundations of DP: investor-state arbitration and state-to-state 
arbitration can be applied separately or alternatively using different processing times for the 
disputes. For instance, in the Italy-Cuba case247 the Tribunal’s view was that the Investor had 
a choice whether to bring its DP claim according to Article 10 of the Italy-Cuba BIT, using 
inter-state arbitration or investor-state arbitration provisions, but not both.248 DP is applicable 
if the losing party does not comply with the award, and the same rules apply for state-to-state 
arbitration. In other words, state-to-state arbitration is appropriate for the enforcement of 
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awards, but not for investor-state arbitration and/or if the state party terminates the BIT 
earlier to the detriment of prospective investors.249  One example of this is the BIT between 
Japan and Colombia 2011 Article 40 (2), which reads as follows:   
 
If the disputing party fails to abide by or comply with an award, upon a request of the 
Contracting Party other than the disputing Party, an arbitration board in conformity with 
Article 24 [state-state arbitration] may be established. The requesting Party may seek in 
such proceedings: 
 
a. A determination that the failure to abide by or comply with the final award is 
inconsistent with the obligation of this Agreement; and 
b. A recommendation to the disputing Party to abide by or comply with the 
award.250 
 
Moreover, Reisman explains that state-to-state arbitration is relevant when there is a non-
enforcement of an award, and where the treaty is invalid, terminated or suspended.251 It 
confirms that none of the procedures (investor-state, DP or state-state arbitration) are, on their 
own, sufficient enough to protect foreign investments, and each of them might be accepted as 
alternative options for foreign investors in order to protect their investment in a foreign 
country. 252 Probably for that reason, ICSID or BITs allow for the settlement of inter-state 
disputes according to these treaties. In general, a state-to-state dispute settlement clause could 
read as follows:  
 
…Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty, that is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels shall be 
submitted on the request of either Party to arbitration, for a binding decision or award by 
a tribunal in accordance with applicable rules of international law.253   
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The ICSID allows for the settling of disputes between member parties of the Convention. 
Specifically, if there is any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the ICSID 
Convention, in accordance with Article 64 of the Treaty, then the parties are permitted to 
bring a claim before the ICJ. However, this is not for the protection of the investment, but for 
‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ of the Treaty. As Douglas explains, the purpose of Article 
64 is to ‘protect the integrity of ICSID system rather than to achieve compensation on the 
behalf of its investors.’254  
 
To date, 3,321 IIAs have been concluded255 but only four state-state arbitrations are publicly 
known about.256 These cases are: Mexico v. United States (NAFTA, 2000), Italy v. Cuba 
(2003), Peru v. Chile (2003), and Ecuador v. United States (2011). The disputes between 
Mexico v. United States were on the matter of cross-border trucking services.257 The first case 
of state-state arbitration was the Italy v. Cuba case, where investor-state arbitration was used 
as an alternative option for dispute settlement.258 In this case, Italy espoused sixteen 
investors’ claims (DPs) and initiated inter-state arbitration against Cuba. The Italian 
Government relied on Article 10 of the BIT (1993) between Italy and Cuba to argue that the 
Cuban Government was not complying with its treaty responsibilities and obligations.259  
However, Cuba objected and asserted that according to Article 10 of the BIT, Italy had no 
right to espouse national claims, and Italy was only able to bring a dispute on its own 
regarding the interpretation and application of the Treaty.260 In the final decision, the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal dismissed all of Italy’s claims on the basis of either jurisdiction or merits, and 
rejected the counter-claims of the Cuban Government, and the costs of arbitration were borne 
by the parties.261  
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Here, it is worth mentioning that in cases such as Italy v. Cuba (2003) if DP is applied as a 
dispute settlement mechanism, then DP is not only subject to customary international law but 
also to the new codified basis of the treaties.262 In a nutshell, Amerasinghe explains that in 
Italy v. Cuba (2003), DP is available to the treaty parties as an alternative to settlement 
procedures.263 Amerasinghe’s view is supported by Roberts, who believes that treaty party 
states should be permitted to bring DP in state-to-state arbitration clauses on the basis that 
this will help develop party investment treaty rights; today’s investor-state arbitration 
practices have proved there is a need for DP in most cases.264 However, to put it bluntly, 
scholars have not given any specific examples of where the investor-state is indispensable for 
DP. In other words, to the researcher’s knowledge, no practical examples have been given 
where investor-arbitration disputes have not been solved because of the absence of DP.  
 
Amerasinghe explains that if investor-state arbitration has already been commenced, then 
treaties (usually) do not allow the involvement of the home state in the arbitration process, 
because it would not simplify the dispute settlement but rather duplicate it, and the result 
would not be logically acceptable.265 A similar situation occurred in Peru v. Chile. In this 
case, the Chilean investor Luchetti launched ICSID arbitration against Peru in 2003. 266 The 
Chile-Peru BIT was signed in 2000 and entered in to force in 2001. However, the Peruvian 
Government declared that, according to Article 2 of the Treaty, this dispute lacked 
jurisdiction (ratione materiae). In other words, according to Article 2, the dispute was outside 
the scope of the Treaty.267 However, the Government of Peru tried to resolve the 
disagreement diplomatically, but it was not successful. When the Peruvian Government 
learned it had not been successful, it commenced state-to-state arbitration against Chile, and 
requested for the suspension of the Luchetti v Peru case.268 The investor-state arbitration 
Luchetti v. Peru Tribunal declined the request for suspension, claiming that the conditions for 
a suspension of the proceedings had not been met.269 At the same time the Luchetti v. Peru 
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case was decided in favor of Peru270 and, thereafter, the winning party abandoned its state-to-
state arbitral proceedings.271 
  
One other well known state-to-state arbitration case is Ecuador v. U.S. As in the previous 
case Luchetti v. Peru, this case also began as an investor-state arbitration case. Between 1991 
and 1993 Texaco Petroleum (TexPet) filed seven breaches of contract cases against Ecuador 
in the national courts of the Ecuadorian Government.272 One of the arguments of the 
claimants Chevron Corporation and Texpet was that Ecuador violated treaty obligations 
specifically under Article II (7) of the U.S.- Ecuador BIT, where under that paragraph, ‘Each 
party must provide effective means of asserting rights and claims with respect to investment, 
investment agreements and any investment authorizations.’273 On 30 March 2010 the 
Tribunal agreed that the Ecuadorian Government had violated Article II (7) of the BIT.274  
 
After this, the Ecuadorian Government tried to settle the dispute using diplomatic channels. 
However its efforts were not successful, and this was why inter-state arbitration was 
commenced. According to Article VII of the BIT between the USA and Ecuador, the 
Ecuadorian Government initiated state-to-state arbitration. The interesting point in this 
arbitration case is that the USA Government claimed that Ecuador’s claim fell outside of the 
scope of Article VII, and so there was no dispute between the parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaty.275 More importantly, the USA claimed that, as a 
respondent, they were not obliged to respond to or to confirm Ecuador’s unilateral 
interpretation of the Treaty.276 In practice, the silence of the USA or a failure to confirm 
Ecuador’s interpretation meant there was no basis for a dispute concerning interpretation.277 
Finally, the Tribunal dismissed the case on the grounds of the absence of the existence of a 
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dispute that fell within the ambit of Article VII of the Treaty.278  
 
Occurrences of the above described kind of inter-state arbitration are rare. For this reason, it 
is important to gauge expert views on this subject. In relation to the Ecuador v. U.S. case, 
Reisman claims that if the Tribunal had accepted Ecuador’s claims, then this would have 
worked to, ‘frustrate the investor’s right under the substantive provision of the Treaty and 
replace the investor’s right to a finally binding arbitration.’279 Moreover, Reisman argues that 
state-state arbitration should not replace investor-state arbitration, and the former should only 
be applied in certain circumstances, such as the failure of the host state to comply with 
awards, and then investors must push their governments to initiate arbitration between state 
parties.280 In other words, state-state arbitration should be the ‘last resort’ for the protection 
of investors if there is a problem with investor-state arbitration.281  
 
Here, it is worth mentioning that there is no template for how investor-state and state-to-state 
arbitration should interact; it is still an open issue.282 Lastly, it should be noted that inter-state 
arbitration should not be used as an appellate mechanism for investor-state arbitration, or 
used instead of a trial for dispute settlement. In general, the state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism is a useful tool for settling investors’ problems, even in specific territories such as 
the Crimea. In his article ‘Sovereignty over Crimea: A Case for State-to-State Investment 
Arbitration’, Tzeng explains that the terms of the Russian-Ukraine BIT state that the Ukraine 
Government can initiate state-to-state arbitration, and that Ukraine has a seat at the table.283 
These examples show that state-to-state arbitration is an essential instrument, even in 





The New York Convention (1958) is one of the most recognised and ratified conventions in 
the world. Its full name is The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
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Awards. Until today, the Convention was signed by 157 states, and is accepted as a key 
instrument in international arbitration. It has allowed arbitration to become the primary 
method for solving disputes in international trade and commerce.284 The Convention is 
remarkably short, and it does not seek to specify where foreign awards should and should not 
be enforced, or where awards should be annulled. The main principle of the Convention is 
that unless an award is faulty, then awards must be enforced and executed by the contracting 
states of the Convention without any complications.285 In addition, as indicated in its name, 
the Convention requires ‘recognition’ of awards in another country other than the seat of 
arbitration.286   
If awards are not ICSID awards, then the only option that remains for the parties, when they 
are seeking to enforce and execute their award, is the New York Convention. In other words, 
non-ICSID awards cannot be enforced without the existence of the New York Convention, 
which makes this international treaty valued in international society. Here, it is important to 
note that awards rendered by the ICSID Additional Facility Rules are not ICSID awards, and 
are out of jurisdiction of the ICSID Convention. For this reason these awards can only be 
enforced under the New York Convention (not under the ICSID Convention). Schreuer states 
that, ‘the question of the applicability of the New York Convention to ICSID awards is not 
likely to arise. But this issue may become relevant in exceptional circumstances, like the 
enforcement of an ICSID award in a state that is a party to the New York Convention but not 
to the ICSID Convention.’287   
In general it is accepted that, in comparison to the New York Convention, ICSID awards are 
enforced automatically and easily. The ICSID Convention does not allow municipal courts to 
review awards, but the New York Convention does.288 Moreover, Article V of the New York 
Convention allows for the national courts of states to resist the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign awards if one or more of the following five conditions are met:  
1) The incapacity and invalidity of the arbitration agreement. 
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2) A lack of due process. 
3) When arbitrators have acted beyond their jurisdiction. 
4) There is an improper constitution of the tribunal. 
5) The award is not binding or has not been set aside or suspended by the courts of the 
seat.289  
 
These grounds must be proven by the parties. According to Article V (2) of the New York 
Convention, courts may take into account sua sponte on two grounds, as follows:  
1) A violation of procedural or substantive policy/non-arbitrability. 
2) The public policy of the enforcing state.  
 
Here, it should be noted that in the earlier case of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Société 
Générale de L’Industrie du Papier, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
emphasised that the Convention’s public policy defence, ‘…should be construed narrowly. 
The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where 
enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.’290 
This shows that Convention’s main aim is to recognise and enforce awards internationally, 
but also to preserve the national values and morals of the member states. Lastly, it is worth 
noting that, under the ICSID Convention, if the award has been annulled, this means that the 
case is over, and the only remaining option for parties is to re-submit the dispute to another 
arbitral tribunal. However, the system of the New York Convention is different, in that it 
allows for the recognition and enforcement of suspended or annulled awards in different 
member states. For instance, the Svea Court of Appeals allowed the recognition and 
enforcement of a treaty award in Sweden, even though it was still under annulment review in 
Denmark. The Court found that a violation of the principles of lis pendens does not qualify as 
‘public policy’ circumstances, and it does not form valid grounds to refuse enforcement.291   
Therefore, as shown, both the ICSID and New York Conventions are different in some 
respects, and this makes their operation successful and practical in the field of international 
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arbitration. It would not be wrong to argue that the main reason why these Conventions are 
accepted and applied by members relates to the self-interest of all member states, not just the 
disputing parties, as in DP. Secondly, it is now accepted that if compliance is not working 
properly, then ‘punishment’ is not a perfect mechanism for encouraging compliance with 
international law.292 It is wiser to find other solutions (by devising ICSID or New York type 




This chapter has examined the judicial and non-judicial resolution systems available to 
resolve international investment disputes arising between investors and states. International 
investment arbitration is one of the most effective methods for the resolution of international 
investments disputes, but some legal challenges still arise in relation to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. This chapter has focused on analysing practical solutions that can provide 
effective enforcement, and which can increase an investor’s access to justice. In most cases, 
investors face some legal problems, especially in relation to state immunity from execution in 
some cases, where the losing party does not intend to comply with an arbitral award. The 
solutions discussed in this chapter can be used differently in order to offer more effective 
enforcement mechanisms for the winning party.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1. Conclusion	 
	
Historically, the protection of investors has been one of the main goals of DP. However, over 
the years, this changing process has been described using different terms by different people. 
Many have referred to the kind of protection practised in centuries past as ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ while in modern times it has been called ‘home state intervention’. Nowadays, 
investors are protected by ‘special bilateral or multilateral investment agreements’ and 
various treaties outline the processes investors can use to settle investment disputes, including 
ICSID Arbitration, Additional Facility Arbitration, or using an ad-hoc tribunal (UNCITRAL). 
However, after the commencement of investment arbitration, the ICSID Convention does not 
welcome any further home state involvement in a dispute.  
 
The main aim of this thesis was to explore and explain the role of DP in investment disputes. 
Before investors begin an arbitration process, home state countries might be able to 
diplomatically protect investors by negotiating with host states. Usually, the home state sends 
a notice letter and a warning that outlines how pursuing a case might harm specific investors 
(as in the Italy-Cuba case). If arbitration has already commenced between an investor and a 
state, home state involvement is only permitted under ICSID Article 27, which is during the 
enforcement process of administering ICSID awards. This thesis recognises that the 
enforcement mechanism of the Convention works efficiently, and that this has helped to 
minimise state-state conflicts when dealing with investor disputes. 
 
Nowadays, parties often have different alternative legal enforcement mechanisms available to 
them, such as third party funding schemes. These have become more popular in recent years, 
because they serve to reduce the involvement of the home state, especially during the 
enforcement stage of the award. Under this mechanism, parties can sell their award in 
exchange for compensation. This process has several advantages, but one of the main benefits 
is that it prevents state-state interaction on the behalf of investors. Furthermore, awards can 
be executed more easily. For now, it seems that the process of DP has largely collapsed; it is 
no longer an attractive dispute settlement mechanism for states and investors.  
 
After explaining the main conditions under which DP has been exercised in the past, the 




because DP has been mainly used as an instrument, and not used by states equally. 
Historically, DP has often been used as a tool to protect investors from powerful states, and 
this bodes badly for the future of the ICSID Convention. Indeed, the history of DP should 
serve as a lesson to member countries of the ICSID. As discussed in this thesis, DP became 
very popular in Latin American countries, and was mostly used by, but also, subsequently, 
denounced by these countries. The history of the ICSID Convention shows also that Latin 
American countries were among the first to reject the Convention. However, to date, only a 
few countries have actually officially withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, but this crisis 
might be a prequel to a trend that points to the beginning of the end for the ICSID 
Convention.  
 
This thesis has highlighted that, in investment arbitration, weak or developing countries often 
lose out when they come up against developed states. In other words, the ICSID Convention 
costs more for economically weak states. However, this is not the fault of the ICSID 
Convention per se, which is not biased, but is because developed states are economically and 
legally stronger in comparison to weaker states from the outset, and this status helps them to 
win cases against weaker states. Furthermore, if this winning streak increases each year, this 
could damage the relationship between treaty parties, hasten more withdrawals, and, 
ultimately, speed-up the demise of the ICSID Convention. This thesis argues in favour of 
promoting dialogue between states, and the importance of developed countries listening to 
weaker states, to try to find solutions to their problems, rather than have them move to 
automatic withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. This is important for future co-operation 
between countries, especially in investment, trade and economic sectors. 
 
Lastly, this thesis does not support the idea that DP should automatically be used to solve 
investor-state disputes, nor does it argue that DP should be completely avoided. This thesis 
contends that DP should be used when it offers the best framework for a solution for 









Diplomacy or DP should not be used as the primary dispute settlement mechanism available 
in investor-state disputes. However, there should be opportunity for parties to use it as an 
additional instrument to aid interpretation or to evaluate investors’ personal requests. When 
parties exercise diplomacy or DP in a fair and appropriate way, it does not damage ISA, and 
can work to support investment arbitration. It would be wrong to claim that the ICSID 
Convention or any other investor-state dispute settlement mechanism has ‘one size fits all’ 
capabilities to find a solution for all types of investment disputes.  
 
In the case of Occidental Exploration v The Republic of Ecuador1 the arbitral Tribunal 
ordered Ecuador to pay almost 2 billion USD for discriminatory treatment of the investor. 
This amount is equal to Ecuador’s annual health or education budget. In such cases 
‘diplomacy’ could play a key role in settling disputes between parties. For instance, in this 
case it is clear that ‘diplomacy’ would have been more efficient and beneficial for the parties. 
This is because the home state of the investor could have contacted the host state and 
especially requested the state not to discriminate against the investors. This would have 
helped both parties. Firstly, the investors would have been able to work in their field and 
improve their business with the host state. Secondly, Ecuador would not have been 
responsible for paying its annual education or health budget to a foreign company as 
compensation, and they could reinvest this money in their developing country, in health 
and/or education.  
 
7.2.2.	Recognising	the	Nationality	of	Investors	
The ICSID Convention has been in operation for more than fifty years. In the beginning it 
was advantageous for it not to provide specific definitions for some terminologies. At the 
outset, the Convention was a new, and states were limited in the choice of investors they 
could do business with. However, the situation has changed, and now ICSID has many years 
experience in resolving investor-state disputes, and in investment arbitration, and it has 
become clear that an investor’s nationality is extremely important. For this reason, the ICSID 
Convention needs reform in terms of how it defines ‘nationality’. This will help to prevent 
the phenomenon of ‘treaty shopping’ and abuse of the ICSID Convention. The way the law 
stands now is that ‘treaty shopping’ investors can sue host countries even if they are not 
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genuine investors in those countries. As Schreuer notes, from a human rights perspective 
individuals are enjoying their rights regardless of their nationality, and this situation might 
take a long time to resolve.2  
 
7.2.3.	Preventing	Withdrawal	from	the	ICSID	Convention	
After some decades, a small number of Latin American came to the conclusion that the 
ICSID Convention did not work for them and, so, they decided to withdraw from the 
Agreement. The thesis has explored some of the main reasons why these states came to 
denounce the ICSID Convention. Indeed, this situation might happen again, and other states 
might decide to join those who have withdrawn. However, if a substantial number of 
countries decide to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, this would destroy a system that 
has taken fifty years to develop and establish. For this reason, states that express concerns 
should be listened to by other member countries of the ICSID Convention. Also, the 
complaining countries should receive support to solve their problems, in order to keep them 
within the institution. The Latin American states who withdrew created their own regional 
Investment Arbitration Centre, and there is a danger that more small centres like this one 
might emerge. Therefore, collaboration between ICSID member states is required. 
 
7.2.4	Arbitrators	v.	Diplomats	
This thesis has explained how the role of investment arbitrator has supplanted that of the 
diplomat in investor-state disputes. This has freed-up diplomats to work on political issues to 
protect their own citizens’ interests and rights in foreign countries. At the same time, this 
trend has minimised the involvement of diplomats in investor-state disputes. However, some 
diplomats still work on investment matters, in specialised areas, such as inviting investors to 
visit their countries and organising events. The foundation of ICSID meant that member state 
arbitrators could settle investment disputes. However, research finds that only fifteen 
arbitrators have succeeded in solving more than 55% of well-known investment dispute 
cases, and all of these arbitrators are from developed countries.3 The substitution of diplomats 
with arbitrators seems to have been advantageous for investment arbitration, but if more than 
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ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 521-527. 
3  Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers Are 





half of disputes are resolved only by small number of arbitrators, this might work to 
undermine the ICSID Convention. This is because these kinds of facts can be used as grounds 
for party opposition against the settlement process of investment arbitration. One solution to 
this problem is that arbitrators should not be drawn only from developed countries; 
candidates from developing countries should be offered equal opportunity to work as 
arbitrators in investment disputes. If the ICSID Centre cannot recruit enough quality 
arbitrators or lawyers, then it should set up its own school for arbitrators, in order to train 
lawyers and experts to work on future investor-state disputes. The Centre could also train 
arbitrators from different countries, so that disputing parties can make choices between 
arbitrators from all over the world. In addition, there should be limit on arbitrators recruited 
to work on investment arbitration, and the ICSID Secretariat could put a cap in place.    
 
7.2.5.	Balancing	the	Interests	of	Developing	and	Developed	States		
This research has acknowledged that developed countries have abused the DP process, and 
this has worked to reduce the popularity of DP in the field of investment disputes. This is 
important in relation to the survival of the ICSID Convention too. If the ICSID system is 
abused or used unfairly against developing countries, it will lose its prestige in the 
international arena. For this reason, ICSID should work towards creating a harmonised 
arbitration centre where developing and developed countries can protect their own interests 
according to international law. It has been shown that developing countries lose more 
disputes in investment arbitration, because they lack adequate legal skills and financial 
resources. Therefore, the Centre could give legal aid to developing countries. This will help 
the Centre better understand and practise investment arbitration, which will, in turn, minimise 
investment disputes in the future. In this case, from legal point of view, both developing and 
developed states will be in more of an equal position from the outset, and both parties’ 
interests will be protected. In short, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms should not 
work just for the benefits of developed countries, and law firms, consultants, and arbitrators 




There are critics of the ICSID Convention. Criticisms put forward mainly concern the lack of 




disputes, and the limited accessible appellate mechanism of the ICSID Convention. Some 
commentators have called for the creation of a standing International Investment Court.4  
However, this is a long term goal, which will need to be supported by other new international 
organisations. For this reason, a better solution would be to reform the ICSID Convention 
under control of the World Bank. If necessary, member countries should also participate in 
and help to finance the reforming process. Nevertheless, in conclusion it should be noted that 
the purpose of the BITs or FTAs between are to stimulate foreign direct investment and 
'depoliticize' investment disputes between contracting parties. After this research it would not 
be wrong to claim that investment treaties between states sucessfully achieved their purpose 
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